



\ v s v 



The Shenandoah Valley and Virginia 
1861 to 1865 



THE SHENANDOAH 
VALLEY and VIRGINIA 

— i 8 6 i to 1865 — — 



A 



WAR 



STUDY 



BY 



SANFORD C. KELLOGG, U. S. A. 



NEW YORK & WASHINGTON 

The Neale Publishing Company 



THELIBRARVOF 1 
CONGRESS, 


Two Copies Receive** 


OCT 23 1903 


C*pyiight Entry 
Clt 7-T— /<ffl3 


CLASS «- XXc. N» 


'I n 3. 7_ 






COPYRIGHT, 1903, BY THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

I The Seizure of Harper's Ferry and the Pat- 
terson Campaign 9 

II McClellan's West Virginia Campaign, in- 
cluding the Battle of Rich Mountain, 
July 11, 1861 27 

III Lewisburg, Cheat Mountain and Romney, 

West Virginia— Evacuation of Winches- 
ter and Manassas 36 

IV Jackson's Campaign in 1862 50 

V The Capitulation of Harper's Ferry 71 

VI Jones's and Imboden's Raid into West 

Virginia 86 

VII The Gettysburg Campaign and Second 

Battle of Winchester 107 

VIII The Averell Raids of 1863 127 

IX The Dublin Depot, New Market and Lynch- 
burg Campaigns 147 

X The Early Raid to Washington and the 

Return to the Valley 173 

XI Sheridan's Campaigns— Battles of the 
Opequon, Fisher's Hill and Tom's 
Brook 196 

XII Sheridan's Campaigns (Continued)— Battle 
of Cedar Creek and Subsequent Cavalry 
Movements 217 

Epilogue 241 



PREFACE 



No section of the United States furnishes a 
fuller picture of the extraordinary operations 
of two American armies, pitted against each 
other for four long years, than does the beau- 
tiful "Valley of Virginia," from Harper's 
Ferry south to Staunton. Its most important 
city, Winchester, in the lower valley, was oc- 
cupied or abandoned sixty-eight times by the 
troops of both armies, as has been said by men 
of the period of 1861 to 1865, still living there. 
Indeed, that city changed commanders so fre- 
quently and so suddenly that it became cus- 
tomary for the inhabitants to ascertain each 
morning, before leaving their dwellings, which 
flag was flying — the Stars and Stripes or the 
Stars and Bars. 

Aside from its superb location, framed in by 
the Blue Ridge on the east and the Alleghen- 
ies on the west, the bottom lands watered by 
the two branches of the Shenandoah on either 
side of the main valley, it produced wonderful 
crops of grain and droves of horses, cattle and 
swine, proving a bountiful granary to either 
army that occupied it. 

With such attributes and its peculiarly ad- 
vantageous strategical location, it became a 
military thoroughfare of the greatest impor- 



tance to control, being subjected in consequence 
to all the ravages that war, even in its mildest 
mood, is capable of inflicting. 

Much as it suffered then, that same valley 
is to-day once more the garden spot of Vir- 
ginia ; its wounds of forty years ago were rap- 
idly healed as soon as peace was allowed to 
stand vigil over the thousands of dead, in gray 
and blue, that dotted the banks of its rivers, and 
the honest population that now live there train 
their sons to honor the flag against which the 
fathers fought, maintaining all the sturdy for- 
titude that has made the American soldier a 
world-wide wonder. 

The operations of the war in the Valley 
were naturally connected with the movements 
east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Alle- 
ghenies, as access to the Shenandoah was read- 
ily had by numerous mountain passes from 
either direction, causing collateral or co-opera- 
tive expeditions beyond the limits of the Val- 
ley proper. The writer has made a very ex- 
haustive study of the War of the Rebellion 
records and maps ; he relies on them mainly for 
the accuracy of this compilation, together with 
such other books as Sheridan's '"Memoirs," 
Allan's "History of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia," Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," 
Spark's "Washington," etc. 

Sanford C. Kellogg, 

U. S. Army. 
Washington, D. C, 1903. 



CHAPTER I 

THE SEIZURE OF HARPER^ FERRY AND THE 
PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 

Virginia (which then included what is now 
West Virginia) seceded from the Union on the 
17th of April, 1 86 1. The State authorities 
proceeded to seize all United States property 
within Virginia, particularly the Arsenal at 
Harper's Ferry, which with its contents — 
15,000 arms and machinery for their manu- 
facture — was partially destroyed by Lieutenant 
Roger Jones, U. S. Army, on the night of April 
1 8th, Lieutenant Jones then withdrawing his 
small party to Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

The Virginia State troops occupied the Ar- 
senal during the night of the 18th, extinguish- 
ing the fires. By the 21st of April Maj.-Gen. 
Kenton Harper, of the Virginia State forces, 
reported his strength at Harper's Ferry to be 
"about two thousand." General Harper ar- 
ranged with the Maryland State authorities for 
the occupation of Maryland Heights and start- 
ed to Winchester all the machinery and arms 
"he could recover from the ruins of the Arsenal. 
He mentioned "the absence of all written in- 



IO SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY 

structions" and that he had "had to assume 
heavy responsibility." 

This little town of Harper's Ferry, pictur- 
esquely located at the point where the Shenan- 
doah River enters the Potomac and where 
Thomas Jefferson loved to come and gaze upon 
the superb mountain scenery, had already, only 
a year and a half before, been the theater of 
the celebrated John Brown raid, when the Ar- 
senal had also been seized by an irresponsible 
zealot as part of a wild project "to free the 
slaves." For this Brown and his small party 
paid the penalty of their lives, but the intense 
commotion caused by their attempt had not 
been allayed when this second seizure of the 
United States Armory by the Virginia State 
authorities fanned into blaze again the dormant 
excitement of a thoroughly aroused country. 

To suppress the John Brown raid in October, 
1859, Virginia and Maryland had recourse to 
their military forces, of whom many thousand 
were sent to the scene. Of the Virginia troops, 
one company of artillery, composed of cadets 
from the Virginia Military Institute, went 
from Lexington under command of the after- 
wards celebrated Thomas J. Jackson, who was 
then Professor of Applied Mathematics, Artil- 
lery Tactics, etc., at Lexington, he having re- 
signed from the United States Army only a 
short while before. 

The United States authorities, to repossess 
the Arsenal which Brown had seized and which 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN II 

had never been guarded, sent a party of sixty 
marines and other troops from Washington, 
all under command of Lieut.-Col. Robert E. 
Lee, 2d U. S. Cavalry, who had with him, as 
his adjutant, Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, of the ist 
Dragoons. A most interesting account of their 
operations is to be found in the annual report 
of Secretary of War J. B. Floyd, dated Decem- 
ber i, 1859, and in Horace Greeley's "The 
American Conflict," Vol. I. 

With the renewed fame of Harper's Ferry as 
a locality in 1861, soon followed the marvelous 
notoriety of the principal actors in the suppres- 
sion of the insane attempt of 1859, for Lieut.- 
Col. R. E. Lee, as well as Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, 
resigned from the United States Army when 
Virginia seceded. Lee was immediately (April 
23d) appointed a major-general by Governor 
Letcher and assigned to command all the mili- 
tary and naval forces of the State; Stuart in 
June appears as a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry 
at Bunker Hill, near Winchester, while T. J. 
Jackson commanded a brigade nearby. All 
three were destined to become famous Confed- 
erate leaders. 

Col. Thomas J. Jackson ("Stonewall"), on 
being appointed by Governor Letcher, had been 
ordered by General Lee, on the 27th of April, 
to proceed to Harper's Ferry to organize into 
regiments the volunteer forces collected in that 
vicinity, and to expedite the transfer of the ma- 
chinery from the Arsenal to the Richmond Ar- 



12 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY 

mory. He was to take command of all the 
forces at and near Harper's Ferry, relieving 
Major-General Harper. 

On the 7th of May Jackson reported to Lee 
he had occupied and fortified Bolivar and Lou- 
doun Heights and would do the same with 
Maryland Heights; that his command was 
badly supplied every way and that his strength 
should be increased fe 10,000 disciplined men. 
He reported the Union troops as being at the 
Relay House, near Baltimore, on the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad. A large force was also 
said to be forming at Chambersburg, Pa. 

On the nth of May Jackson reported his 
strength at about 4,500, but not all armed. He 
had outposts at Point of Rocks, Berlin, Shep- 
herdstown and Martinsburg. He mentioned 
an armed Union force of Marylanders oppo- 
site Shepherdstown, threatening that place 
with artillery. 

An order of S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspec- 
tor-General, dated Montgomery, Ala., May 15, 
1 86 1, notified Joseph E. Johnston of his ap^ 
pointment as brigadier-general, C. S. A., and 
directed him to proceed to Harper's Ferry, he 
having been assigned by President Davis to 
the command of the troops there. 

At this period there was great confusion and 
conflict of authority arising from orders issued 
at Montgomery and those emanating from 
Richmond, in relation to military affairs in 
Virginia. This was partially cured by an order 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 1 3 

from Secretary of War Walker at Montgom- 
ery, dated May 10, in which General Lee, to 
prevent confusion, was directed to assume con- 
trol of the Confederate forces in Virginia until 
further orders. 

Later on, by the removal of the administra- 
tive machinery of the Confederate Government 
from Montgomery to Richmond and the ab- 
sorption of the Virginia State troops into the 
Confederate Army, all friction was terminated. 

An inspection made of the troops at Harper's 
Ferry and outposts on the 21st of May by Col. 
George Deas, mentioned the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Virginia, the Fourth 
Alabama, two Mississippi regiments, five com- 
panies of Virginia artillery, eight companies of 
Virginia cavalry, four companies of Kentucky 
infantry, and some small detachments, number- 
ing in all 7,700 men, nearly all well armed and 
available for active service. This force was 
soon afterwards increased to 20,000. 

Deas reports having visited Ashby's posi- 
tion at Point of Rocks, twelve miles below 
Harper's Ferry, where he found two compa- 
nies of Virginia cavalry, six pieces of light ar- 
tillery, and a company of riflemen, together 
with some Marylanders. Ashby had control of 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that point 
with his artillery and had mined the piers of the 
wagon bridge over the Potomac. 

Deas speaks of all the troops as raw and in- 
experienced; they could not well have been 
otherwise. 



14 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY 

The correspondence of the Confederate au- 
thorities of this early period shows a desire to 
avoid as long as possible any aggressive move- 
ments, every effort being made to organize, 
arm and equip an effective army. 

The region to the westward and northwest- 
ward of Harper's Ferry, at Berkeley (Bath), 
and beyond toward the Ohio River, was filled 
with Union men who resisted or fled from the 
Confederate recruiting officers. This was a 
great disappointment to the Richmond authori- 
ties, who counted upon getting control of the 
western branches of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, especially at Grafton and Parkers- 
burg. It was this section that afterwards be- 
came the State of West Virginia, by refusing 
to accept the ordinance of secession of the 
mother State and by organizing a separate 
Statehood. 

The country being mountainous, the inhab- 
itants, like the highlanders of Kentucky, Ten- 
nessee and North Carolina, were in the main 
very loyal to the United States, and furnished 
it a valuable body of troops and scouts. 

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston assumed command 
of the troops at Harper's Ferry on the 24th of 
May, pursuant to the orders of the Confederate 
Adjutant-General already mentioned. Colonel 
Jackson had not been notified of the coming of 
Johnston and at first demurred to yielding up 
the command, but when he received a commu- 
nication having the endorsement "referred to 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 15 

Gen. J. E. Johnston, commanding officer at 
Harper's Ferry. By order of Major-General 
Lee," etc., Colonel Jackson contended no lon- 
ger. 

Immediately on taking command, General 
Johnston reported the position at Harper's 
Ferry untenable except by a very large force, 
or against an enemy strong enough to turn it 
above or below. His outposts extended from 
Williamsport through Shepherdstown to Point 
of Rocks, a distance of about 40 miles. Gen- 
eral Johnston advised General Lee, that in case 
of a serious flank attack, the forces at Harper's 
Ferry and outposts be retired and employed as 
a screening army to oppose an enemy's advance 
into the lower valley, and that the troops at 
Harper's Ferry should never allow themselves 
to become invested. 

General Lee, on the 31st of May, authorized 
General Johnston, in case he should be attacked 
or threatened at Harper's Ferry, to take the 
field and oppose the advance of an enemy into 
the Shenandoah Valley. However, General 
Lee deprecated the abandonment of Harper's 
Ferry on account of the depressing effect it 
would have upon "the cause of the South." 

A column of Union troops from Ohio under 
General McClellan was expected by General 
Lee to push through eastward by the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, to effect a junction, east of 
Cumberland, with the Union army forming at 
Chambersburg, Pa. To prevent this expected 



1 6 SEIZURE OF HARPER'S FERRY 

junction of the two columns, General Lee sent 
Gen. R. S. Garnett, early in June, 1861, to 
Beverly, west of the Allegheny Mountains, via 
Staunton, the Greenbrier country, and Hut- 
tonsville, with some organized troops and local 
levies, to gain possession of, or at least to ob- 
struct, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad be- 
tween Grafton and Parkersburg. General Lee 
also sent a Colonel Angus MacDonald, with 
a light party of partisan cavalry, to break the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Cheat River, 
including roadbed, tunnels and bridges. Both 
of these movements were effectually prevented ; 
General Garnett reached Huttonsville on the 
14th of June, and was defeated soon after by 
McClellan near Beverly, while MacDonald's 
party never got farther than Romney. 

General Lee placed so much hope in the suc- 
cess of the two above-mentioned raids upon 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that he re- 
assured General Johnston at Harper's Ferry, 
on the 7th of June, as to the improbability of 
any immediate attack upon that position by the 
Federal Ohio column, and expressed the be- 
lief that General Johnston would have "merely 
to resist an attack in front from Pennsylvania." 

Mr. Jefferson Davis was particularly averse 
to the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, and so ex- 
pressed himself in a letter to General Beaure- 
gard at Manassas, dated June 13th, 1861, in 
reply to a suggestion of Beauregard that John- 
ston's troops might be joined to his, so that a 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 1 7 

forward aggressive movement might be made 
with a view to the capture of Alexandria and 
Arlington Heights. Mr. Davis discouraged 
that project with the argument that by with- 
drawing Johnston from the Valley of the Shen- 
andoah, the enemy would be left free to pass to 
Beauregard's rear, cut his communications 
with Richmond and attack him in reverse, 
while he (Beauregard) was occupied with the 
enemy in his front. 

On the same date, June 1 3th, authority to re- 
tire from Harper's Ferry, should he find it im- 
perative to do so, was given General Johnston 
by Adj. -Gen. Cooper, Johnston to destroy the 
bridge across the Potomac and everything he 
could not bring off, and then to fall back on 
Winchester. If necessary, Johnston was to 
still further retire toward Manassas along the 
railroad from Front Royal and endeavor to 
check the enemy at the passes of the Blue 
Ridge. 

On the 14th of June Johnston commenced to 
withdraw from Harper's Ferry, reaching 
Bunker Hill, 12 miles north of Winchester, on 
the 1 6th, to meet General Patterson's command 
of Union troops then moving from Hagers- 
town toward the Shenandoah Valley through 
Williamsport and Falling Waters. 

Johnston's main force at Bunker Hill was 
about 7,000 strong. He had an additional 
force of about 5,000 under T. J. Jackson at 

2 



1 8 SEIZURE OF HARPER'S FERRY 

Shepherdstown, in front of Martinsburg and 
along the Potomac. He also had with him a 
small force of cavalry under Lieut.-Col. J. E. B. 
Stuart, and over twenty pieces of field artil- 
lery. Winchester was then held by about 5.000 
militia and some newly arrived volunteers, all 
covered by field works, in which twelve bat- 
teries were placed; these troops were com- 
manded by Gen. J. H. Carson, of the Virginia 
State Militia. 

A force of Union troops having appeared at 
Romney, 43 miles west of Winchester, on the 
14th of June, Johnston detached three regi- 
ments under Col. A. P. Hill to meet it. 

The Confederate authorities had relinquish- 
ed Harper's Ferry with the greatest reluctance, 
principally because they still had hopes that 
there was sufficient disaffection in Maryland to 
carry that State over to the Confederacy and 
thus isolate Washington. These hopes had 
been greatly encouraged by the attack on the 
Sixth Massachusetts, while passing through 
Baltimore to Washington on the 19th of April, 
and the vacillating actions of the Maryland 
State authorities, particularly Governor Hicks, 
but especially by the action of both State and 
municipal authorities in resisting, or actually 
preventing, the approach of Northern troops to 
the relief of Washington through Baltimore or 
Maryland. Washington was thus isolated for 
three weeks. 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 1 9 

While holding Harper's Ferry the Confed- 
erate authorities at Richmond were in actual 
contact with their disaffected Maryland breth- 
ren, from whom they received supplies of all 
kinds, besides recruits for their armies, which 
were openly enlisted at Baltimore by Lieut.- 
Col. Geo. H. Steuart and others. Moreover, 
Harper's Ferry constituted the principal gate- 
way for an invasion of Pennsylvania from Vir- 
ginia when the time should be ripe to attempt it. 
It also throttled and prevented the use of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by the Federal 
authorities as a means of communication east 
and west. 

It was as important a point on their north- 
ern frontier for the Confederates to hold as 
Chattanooga afterwards became on their cen- 
tral line. Consequently, the troops guarding 
that important gateway were strengthened 
as rapidly as circumstances would permit, 
Johnston's army being justly regarded as sec- 
ond only in importance to that of Beauregard 
at Manassas, then threatening Washington. 

The Capital's position during May and June, 
1 86 1 was critical, the enemy's lines and out- 
posts being advanced almost to the fortifica- 
tions; the enemy's left flank extended to Lees- 
burg, with pickets along the Potomac from 
the Chain Bridge to Point of Rocks, threat- 
ening to cross at the many fords and ferries. 
General McDowell was placed in command of 
the troops in front of Washington on the 27th 



20 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY 

of May, the aged General Winfield Scott re- 
taining the direction of all the armies in the 
field. 

Communication with the North through 
Baltimore had then been effectually restored by 
Gen. B. F. Butler, who seized that city by a 
coup de main on May 14th, 1861, the citi- 
zens finding him in possession of Federal Hill 
when they opened their windows that morning. 
Their surprise was equaled only by that of Gen- 
eral Scott and the Washington authorities, who 
had given no orders for the movement; on the 
contrary, General Scott so much disapproved 
of General Butler's action that he relieved him 
from the command the following day and sent 
him to Fortress Monroe. Reinforcements for 
Washington were then rushed through Balti- 
more even to the extent of weakening Patter- 
son's column, then assembling at Chambers- 
burg to operate toward Harper's Ferry and 
Cumberland. 

A column of about 2,500 men under General 
Stone was organized at Washington on the 8th 
of June to proceed through Rockville, Mary- 
land, toward Edward's Ferry on the Potomac 
and Leesburg in Virginia, as a diversion in 
favor of Patterson's expected advance on Har- 
per's Ferry from Chambersburg. Stone made 
his headquarters at Poolesville and eventually 
extended his pickets to the Monocacy River 
and Noland's Ferry. He did not connect with 
Patterson's troops and had nothing on his 
right. 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 2i 

Another diversion in Patterson's favor was 
made from the center of McDowell's army as 
far as Vienna, Va., on the 17th of June, toward 
Leesburg, but which threatened to become so 
serious an affair and caused General Scott such 
uneasiness that he stopped General Patterson's 
movement south of the Potomac at Williams- 
port, ordered him to recross the river, and de- 
tached from him all his most experienced 
troops and all his artillery, for service at Wash- 
ington. This left Patterson with a force com- 
posed almost entirely of three-months' men 
and no artillery capable of being moved for 
lack of horses. 

McClellan's operations in West Virginia, 
from which so much assistance to Patterson's 
movement on Harper's Ferry had been expect- 
ed, failed of realization, although McClellan 
did succeed in reopening and firmly holding the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far eastward as 
Cumberland, to which point he pushed Col. Lew 
Wallace's Eleventh Indiana Regiment, but 
could not afterwards spare any other troops to 
support the position, as all of McClellan's then 
available force was being used in keeping open 
and securing the railroad west of Cumberland, 
besides operating against the troops of Garnett 
south of the railroad at Philippi, Buckhannon, 
Beverly, and Rich Mountain, where McClellan 
finally defeated Garnett and dispersed his com- 
mand on the nth of July and occupied Beverly 
on the 1 2th. 



22 SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY 

This was a beautiful strategic movement of 
two converging columns — one from Buckhan- 
non and the other from Philippi — on the 
enemy's two strong positions at Rich Mountain 
and Laurel Hill, covering Beverly, and resulted 
in the loss to the enemy of all his stores and 
artillery, a great part of his wagons, with 135 
killed, and over 800 prisoners, of whom a large 
number were wounded. 

Wallace, who reached Cumberland on the 
nth of June and communicated with Patter- 
son, made a reconnaissance southeastward to- 
ward Winchester, which reached Romney on 
the 14th, where he attacked and dispersed Mac- 
Donald's forces strengthened by two pieces of 
artillery, after which Wallace returned to Cum- 
berland. This was the Federal force mention- 
ed by Johnston and against which he detached 
Hill with three regiments. Wallace's move- 
ment proved serviceable to Patterson, as it 
alarmed the militia and other troops at Win- 
chester and attracted the attention of Johnston 
and Jackson at Bunker Hill and Martinsburg, 
who believed Wallace's forces to be the advance 
of McClellan's West Virginia column.- 

Wallace at Cumberland then became uneasy 
because of rumors (which afterwards proved 
unfounded) that he was to be attacked by a 
heavy force from the west and south. He call- 
ed on General Patterson, who had not then 
crossed the Potomac, for assistance. Patterson 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 23 

instructed Wallace to move toward Hancock, 
eastward, or, if that was not feasible, to retire 
northward into Bedford, Pa., unless he could 
hold his own at Cumberland. Patterson detach- 
ed Burnside's newly-arrived Rhode Island reg- 
iment and battery, on the 1 6th, to move to meet 
Wallace at Hancock; but Burnside was almost 
immediately recalled by orders from Washing- 
ton and sent to the latter point, together with 
all the regular troops and all the artillery form- 
ing a part of Patterson's column, to meet a 
threatened attack on the Capital. 

With the bulk of the remainder of his army, 
then reduced to barely 12,000 men, Patterson 
crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 
1 6th of June and advanced to find the enemy; 
but the same orders which called away the 
Rhode Island Regiment and all the regular 
troops, directed Patterson to recross the Poto- 
mac, which he did on the 17th and 18th, but 
not before he had driven the enemy southward 
through Martinsburg and also beyond Falling 
Waters. Johnston, with 12,000 men, then re- 
occupied Martinsburg and threatened to cross 
at Williamsport, which had the effect of delay- 
ing the sending off of the troops ordered to 
Washington, so that they did not all go until 
the 2 1 st of June. 

The aggressive movement into the Shenan- 
doah Valley was thus abandoned for the time 
being. Patterson established himself in front 
of Harper's Ferry, at Williamsport, Falling 



24 SEIZURE OE HARPER S FERRY 

Waters and Sharpsburg, his own headquarters 
being at Hagerstown. He was called upon by 
General Scott to project a new campaign, but 
to remain in front of Johnston's army. After 
persistent solicitation, Patterson succeeded in 
obtaining the Rhode Island battery once more, 
and Stone's Brigade of three regiments and 
a half from Poolesville ; he also got the harness 
he needed to move his only battery (Perkins's), 
so that on the 2d of July, with about 10,000 
men, he recrossed the Potomac into Virginia 
near Falling Waters and forced back T. J. 
Jackson's force of about 4,000 infantry, artil- 
lery and cavalry to beyond Martinsburg, 
which Patterson occupied again on the 3d of 
July and halted for supplies. Part of Stone's 
command joined Patterson there on the 8th of 
July, when preparations were at once made to 
move on Winchester, in which direction all of 
Johnston's army had retired, but finding sev- 
eral of his officers unfavorable to that move- 
ment, Patterson called a council of war on the 
9th, at which it was decided to remain in obser- 
vation of Johnston, but not to pursue him, as it 
was known he had been heavily reinforced, 
some extravagant estimates of Johnston's 
strength at Winchester being 40,000 men of all 
arms. 

On the 15th of July Patterson moved his 
army to Bunker Hill, and on the 17th to 
Charlestown; his base was then established at 
Harper's Ferry, ten miles away. The terms of 



AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 25 

service of his three-months' men commenced to 
expire and but very few would consent to re- 
main longer. 

McDowell commenced his advance from 
Washington toward Manassas on the 18th of 
July via Fairfax Court House. Naturally, 
great anxiety was felt as to the effect this move- 
ment would have upon Johnston's army in the 
Shenandoah. Patterson's instructions were to 
endeavor to detain Johnston, but if he went to- 
wards Manassas, Patterson was to cross the 
Shenandoah River near its mouth at Keyes's 
Ferry and march to McDowell's assistance via 
Hillsboro and Leesburg. Johnston did get away 
from Winchester without the knowledge of 
Patterson on the 18th (the same day that Mc- 
Dowell passed through Fairfax Court-House), 
and marched via Millwood and Ashby's Gap to 
Piedmont on the Manassas Gap Railway dur- 
ing the 19th and 20th, the last of his entire 
force arriving upon the Bull Run Battlefield 
during the 21st, his advance guard under Jack- 
son reaching Manassas as early as 4 p. m. of 
the 19th. 

Had McDowell's attack been hastened by but 
two days, Johnston could not have reached 
Beauregard in time to assist him. As it was he 
brought with him a reinforcement of over 10,- 
000 men. Patterson was too weak to have 
prevented him from going, even if he had 
known of Johnston's departure ; and he was too 
deficient in wagon transportation to have reach- 



26 SEIZURE OF HARPER'S FERRY 

ed McDowell before Johnston could get to 
Beauregard, particularly as he (Patterson) 
would be on an exterior line. 

After the Battle of Bull Run Major-General 
Banks was sent from Baltimore to relieve Pat- 
terson at Harper's Ferry, reaching there July 
25 ; Major-General McClellan was called from 
West Virginia to command the Division of the 
Potomac, superseding General McDowell, and 
assumed that command also on the 25th of 

July. 

The original order for Patterson's relief was 
dated July 19, before the Battle of Bull Run, to 
take effect July 27, "when his tour of duty will 
expire." The same order designated the Val- 
ley of Virginia as the future Department of the 
Shenandoah (G. O. 46, of 1861). Patterson 
held the commission of major-general of Penn- 
sylvania militia, which had been ordered out 
for three months' service in the field under the 
call of the President the day after the firing on 
Fort Sumter, April 14, 1861. 



CHAPTER II 

M'CLELLAN'S WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, IN- 
CLUDING THE BATTLE OF RICH MOUN- 
TAIN, JULY II, 1 86 1. 

With a small advance party General McClel- 
lan personally reached Grafton by rail from 
Ohio on the 23rd of June, his column consisting 
of seven regiments, three batteries, and one 
troop of cavalry closely following. Grafton had 
been occupied from Wheeling as early as May 
30 by Col. B. F. Kelley, First Virginia Volun- 
teers, supported by Col. J. Irvine's Sixteenth 
Ohio. The Fourteenth Ohio, Col. J. B. Steed- 
man, was sent at the same time from Marietta, 
Ohio, to occupy Parkersburg. Colonel Kel- 
ley then moved on Philippi, fifteen miles south 
of Grafton, where a Confederate force several 
hundred strong, under Col. George A. Porter- 
field, had collected. This latter force had been 
operating on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
north and west of Grafton, burning bridges, 
etc. Colonel Kelley received his orders from 
Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, who 
had reached Grafton with four Indiana regi- 
ments from Indianapolis on the 1st of June, 
and assumed command. 



28 m'clellan's w. va. campaign 

On the 2d of June two cooperating columns 
were sent by General Morris to Philippi; one, 
under Kelley, went by rail to a point 6 miles 
east of Grafton, and then, by a delayed night 
march, to Philippi; the other column, under 
Colonel Dumont, of the Seventh Indiana, went 
by rail to Webster, a few miles from Grafton, 
and then marched in the same direction as Kel- 
ley's column, but by a different route, both 
columns timing the movement so as to reach 
the vicinity of Philippi very early on the morn- 
ing of June 3d, Dumont to attract attention 
from Kelley's movements. The two columns 
reached Philippi almost simultaneously, sur- 
prising and routing. the enemy, who was pur- 
sued in the direction of Beverly and Huttons- 
ville, where Colonel Porterfield met reinforce- 
ments, and remained in command until super- 
seded, on the 14th of June, by Gen. R. S. Gar- 
nett, especially sent from Richmond by Gen- 
eral Lee. 

Immediately on assuming command of the 
Confederate troops at Huttonsville, General 
Garnett moved them northward through Bev- 
erly, where he established his depot, to the 
passes of the mountains westward through 
Rich Mountain on the Buckhannon road and 
northward on the Philippi road at Laurel Hill. 
Both positions were then fortified and some 
few pieces of artillery placed in the fortifica- 
tions. He had an outpost at Leadsville, on the 
St. George road, to protect his rear. 



BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 29 

General Garnett's instructions from General 
Lee were not only to impede McClellan's ad- 
vance eastward through the passes, but also to 
endeavor to break the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road effectually by destroying the Cheat River 
viaduct. The latter part of these orders Gar- 
nett was never able to accomplish, but to secure 
his own position in and about Beverly he block- 
ed all the mountain roads in the direction of the 
enemy as far north as St. George, the county- 
seat of Tucker County. He found the Union 
sentiment strongly in the ascendency among 
the people of the country, and complained to 
General Lee that he neither could get assist- 
ance from them nor prevent their giving infor- 
mation to the enemy of all his movements. His 
strength was about 10,000 men, with six pieces 
of artillery, as shown by his ration returns, 
when McClellan attacked him on the nth of 
July at Rich Mountain; but he had made the 
fatal mistake of dividing his force, although 
both of his main positions at Rich Mountain 
and at Laurel Hill were strong. 

After securing the position at Philippi with 
Morris's Brigade, and placing a force of 2,000 
men at Cheat River Bridge and Rowlesburg 
under Brig.-Gen. C. W. Hill, ample forces were 
kept by McClellan at Grafton, Webster, Clarks- 
burg and Parkersburg to maintain rail com- 
munication with Ohio. With the surplus regi- 
ments reaching him from Ohio and Indiana, 
McClellan organized at Buckhannon a column 



3° m'clellan's w. va. campaign 

of about 6,000 men to attack Garnett, with the 
expectation of driving him out toward Staun- 
ton. 

While McClellan attacked Garnett in front 
at Rich Mountain, Morris, with the forces at 
Philippi (about 6,000), was to move to Laurel 
Hill and capture that position if Garnett evacu- 
ated or weakened it. 

McClellan's column was organized into two 
brigades under Rosecrans and Schleich. Early 
on the morning of July 11 he sent Rosecrans 
with 2,000 men through the mountains south 
of the enemy's fortified position, by a circuitous 
route, which brought Rosecrans at noon into 
the turnpike, two or three miles to the enemy's 
rear, on the crest of Rich Mountain at Hart's 
Farm. With the other troops and twelve guns, 
McClellan moved directly on the fortified camp 
at the foot of Rich Mountain near Roaring 
Creek, but before McClellan attacked it Rose- 
crans's flank movement had forced its abandon- 
ment. 

Rosecrans had met with no resistance until 
he reached Hart's Farm, on the turnpike on top 
of the mountain, where the only casualties to 
McClellan's column occurred and these were 
but slight — only 12 killed and 49 wounded; 
whereas, the enemy's loss, there and in the pur- 
suit which followed, was 135 killed and 800 
prisoners, including among the latter Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Pegram, the commanding officer 
on that part of the line, who first endeavored 



BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 3 1 

to escape, but then surrendered with a party of 
593, including 33 officers. The remainder of 
the enemy's force was dispersed and pursued 
towards Huttonsville and Monterey southeast- 
ward through Beverly, which latter place, with 
all its stores, was captured on the 12th. Mc- 
Clellan pursued only as far as Cheat Moun- 
tain. 

While the attack on Rich Mountain was pro- 
gressing, Garnett, with the remainder of his 
troops, was at Laurel Hill, confronted by the 
Philippi troops under Morris. The distance 
from Beverly to Laurel Hill is 17 miles, and 
from Beverly to the fortified camp at the foot 
of Rich Mountain, 7 miles.. 

When Garnett found the enemy had gained 
his rear and his communications southward 
toward Staunton, he evacuated Laurel Hill, 
abandoned his camp equipage, and retreated 
northward through Leadsville to Cheat River, 
Morris following him with part of his force, 
but not with sufficient vigor to complete his 
destruction. Three of Morris's regiments and 
Barnett's Battery came up with the enemy, 
however, and engaged him in a spirited ac- 
tion at Carrick's Ford of Cheat River, 8 miles 
south of St. George. In this affair — a rear- 
guard action — Garnett was killed and many of 
his wagons captured. This part of the pursuit 
was then halted, 26 miles from Laurel Moun- 
tain, on the 13th instant. 



32 

As soon as General McClellan occupied Bev- 
erly, early on the 12th, and he ascertained that 
Garnett's main force was retreating northward 
through the mountains, he ordered General 
Hill, on the railroad, — at Grafton and Rowles- 
burg, — to collect a force of 5,000 men and en- 
deavor to head off the enemy toward St. 
George and eastward on the Northwestern 
turnpike. Hill had an outpost on that road at 
West Union, 13 miles east of Rowlesburg. An 
additional force of 500 men on the 12th had 
reached the Red House, 8 miles still farther 
east on the Northwestern turnpike, via Oak- 
land, on the railroad, and Chisholm's Mill, but 
through error had then gone on westward to 
join the troops at West Union instead of push- 
ing out southward toward St. George. 

Although Hill had reached Oakland on the 
night of the 13th by rail and hurriedly moved 
out 12 miles to the Red House with such of 
his forces as had arrived, they were entirely 
lacking in wagon transportation, and could ac- 
complish nothing beyond following the rem- 
nant of Garnett's army, which had already 
passed the Red House early on the 14th, avoid- 
ing West Union, and was moving southward 
on the Northwestern turnpike toward Peters- 
burg, West Virginia, Franklin and Monterey, 
in the valley of the South Fork of the Potomac. 
The few cavalry sent by Hill to try to take con- 
tact with the retreating enemy went as far as 



BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 33 

Stoney Creek and then turned back, having 
only seen a few stragglers in the distance. 

Another effort, with a stronger force, was 
made on the 15th by Hill to come up with the 
enemy toward Petersburg. This party went 
almost to Petersburg on the 17th, when it was 
recalled by a dispatch from McClellan to dis- 
continue the pursuit. 

While McClellan's operations from Buck- 
hannon and Philippi were proceeding, cotem- 
poraneously with Patterson's movement near 
Harper's Ferry, Gen. J. D. Cox, with five regi- 
ments, was ordered by McClellan from Ohio, 
into the Kanawha Valley, early in July, to clear 
that region of any enemy and to act as a col- 
lateral column to his own movements against 
Garnett. 

Cox's opponent in the Kanawha was Gen. 
Henry A. Wise, with a force estimated at about 
3,000 badly- organized men, known as the 
Wise Legion. In an engagement which took 
place at Scarey Creek, July 16, between Wise 
and Cox, the latter was defeated (very much 
to McClellan's disgust) and his advance 
checked until he could get reinforcements from 
Ohio, when he moved on again up the Ka- 
nawha, forcing Wise back beyond Charleston 
and the Gauley, Wise finally retreating to 
Lewisburg, August 1st, his movements being 
hastened by the threatening position of some of 
Rosecrans's troops at Weston and Summer- 
ville, on his right flank and rear, 



34 M CLELLAN S W. VA. CAMPAIGN 

The news of Cox's repulse at Scarey Creek, 
following upon Morris's dilatory pursuit of 
Garnett's forces on Pleasant Run and Cheat 
River, to which was added the fact that Gar- 
nett's retreating command had passed across 
the front of Hill's troops at the Red House, 
unmolested, caused McClellan intense disap- 
pointment. 

The results of these movements, however, 
were the chasing out of the enemy from the 
western slope of the Alleghenies in West Vir- 
ginia and the freeing of the Kanawha as high 
up as the Gauley, besides the securing of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Parkers- 
burg and Wheeling eastward to Cumberland. 
McClellan was then called east and Rosecrans 
succeeded to the command. 

The locations of the armies in Virginia (in- 
cluding West Virginia) August i, 1861, were 
as follows : 

Rosecrans, commanding McClellan's old 
army, holding Gauley Bridge, Summerville, 
Beverly and Cheat Mountain; Garnett's Con- 
federate army dispersed toward Staunton, but 
its remnants being collected at Monterey by 
Gen. W. W. Loring, strengthened by ten regi- 
ments and two batteries, with outposts at Elk 
and Middle Mountains and the crest of the Al- 
leghenies, drawing its supplies from Staunton 
by way of Millboro. 

Wise's Confederate Legion was at Lewis- 
burg, where Floyd was marching with troops 



BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 35 

from Dublin Depot on the Virginia and Ten- 
nessee Railroad to join him. 

Banks at Harper's Ferry, commanding Pat- 
terson's old army, with no enemy of conse- 
quence to confront him nearer than Winches- 
ter. 

McClellan at Washington, commanding the 
army that recently had been defeated at Bull 
Run under McDowell, and which was still 
closely threatened from the direction of Ma- 
nassas by the enemy under Beauregard and 
Johnston. 

Butler at Fortress Monroe, the Rip Raps, 
and Newport News, with several thousand 
men, unable to make any headway up the Pe- 
ninsula against Magruder at Yorktown. 

Norfolk and the Navy Yard were strongly 
held by the Confederates, while the Virginia 
and East Tennessee Railroad was not yet with- 
in striking distance of any Federal army. 

General Scott still retained direction of all 
the Union armies, although it was beginning 
to be recognized he was past the age for active, 
efficient service. 

It may not be amiss here to remark that Gen- 
erals R. E. Lee, McDowell, and McClellan had 
all three been especial favorites of General 
Scott when the war commenced in April, 1861, 
and also that General Scott was somewhat in- 
clined to permit the "wayward sisters [to] de- 
part in peace," 



CHAPTER III 

LEWISBURG, CHEAT MOUNTAIN AND ROMNEY, 

WEST VIRGINIA EVACUATION OF 

WINCHESTER AND MANASSAS 

On the ist of September, 1861, Gen. J. E. 
Johnston, who remained in command of the 
Confederate army at Manassas after the Bat- 
tle of Bull Run, recommended the reduction 
of Carson's Militia at Winchester to 2,500 men, 
as Banks had shown no disposition to advance 
from Harper's Ferry, and as all surplus men 
were needed to cultivate the Valley, where the 
percentage of slaves was very small. Consid- 
erable local agitation on the subject of getting 
the services of as many men as possible for 
agricultural purposes had existed for some 
weeks, culminating in strong appeals to Rich- 
mond from such local magnates as Randolph 
Tucker et al. 

McClellan's army, as well as Banks's, remain- 
ed strictly on the defensive throughout the 
summer and autumn of 1861 and until March, 
1862, with the exception of an occasional re- 
connaissance and consequent skirmish. The 
enemy was not prevented from obstructing the 



LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 37 

Potomac below Washington with batteries, 
notably at Evansport and at Matthias's Point, 
threatening to sever communication by water 
with Fortress Monroe. 

A serious engagement with the enemy on the 
2 1 st of October at Ball's Bluff, near Leesburg, 
had resulted in a disaster to the Federal troops 
before they could be withdrawn. 

The only activity was in West Virginia, 
where General Lee had gone in person to take 
command of the Confederates, after Garnett's 
defeat near Beverly and Wise's retreat east- 
ward from the Kanawha to Lewisburg. Lee 
called to Wise's assistance from the East Ten- 
nessee and Virginia Railroad a column of about 
4,000 men under Gen. J. B. Floyd (the former 
Secretary of War of the United States), which 
force marched northward through the valley of 
New River and then joined Wise at Lewisburg. 
This joint force of about 6,000 men under 
Floyd was then moved by General Lee back 
toward the Gauley, to endeavor to regain the 
territory lost by Wise, but found the position 
at Gauley Bridge too strongly held by Cox to 
justify attacking it. Besides, a movement of 
Rosecrans's force from Summerville towards 
Floyd's right flank at Carnifix Ferry, on the 
Gauley, diverted Floyd in that direction, re- 
sulting in Floyd being forced to retreat by 
Rosecrans at the last-named place on the 10th 
of September. By this affair Rosecrans pre- 
served his communications with Cox lower 



38 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 

down on the Gauley at its junction with New 
River, and Rosecrans, with Cox, then turned 
his attention toward breaking the enemy's rail 
communications between Virginia and Ten- 
nessee at New River Bridge, by sending an ex- 
pedition to Raleigh Court-House and beyond, 
which, however, never succeeded in getting 
farther than Princeton or in reaching the rail- 
road, although Floyd, in November, again re- 
treated from before Rosecrans toward the rail- 
road. 

Before going to direct the movements at 
Lewisburg, General Lee had assumed charge of 
the Confederate forces in the Allegheny Moun- 
tains at Monterey and Huntersville, command- 
ed by Generals H. R. Jackson and Loring. With 
these, on the 12th of September, he made a 
strong reconnaissance of the Federal positions 
on Cheat Mountain and toward Huttonsville, 
and, having satisfied himself of their strength, 
he then turned his attention to Lewisburg. 

While these movements were progressing, 
considerable activity was being shown by the 
Federal forces on the line of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad from about Cumberland toward 
Winchester. 

On the 24th of October Gen. B. F. Kelley, at 
Cumberland, under orders from Gen. Winfield 
Scott, formed an expedition of about twenty- 
two companies of infantry, a troop of cavalry, 
and two guns, at New Creek (now called Key- 
ser, but shown on the maps as Paddytown), on 



EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER,, ETC. 39 

the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to operate 
on Romney, 26 miles southeast. This force 
left New Creek at midnight of the 25th, and 
marched through Mechanicsburg Gap to within 
three miles of Romney without opposition. A 
supporting column from Patterson's Creek, 
consisting of the Second Maryland Infantry 
(Colonel Johns), also moved southward 
through Frankfort and Springfield toward 
Romney, but was met by the enemy at a bridge 
over the South Branch of the Potomac about 
eight miles from Romney, and there checked 
on the 26th. With his own column, however, 
General Kelley captured Romney after some 
resistance and pursued the enemy under Colo- 
nel MacDonald through and beyond the town, 
on the Winchester pike, capturing all his trains 
and artillery, camp equipage, etc. General Kel- 
ley then occupied Romney, where he remained 
until January, when he was threatened by Jack- 
son in force, and retired again toward New 
Creek Station. 

This occupation of Romney and the driving 
out of MacDonald's Confederates had created 
much uneasiness at Winchester and in the army 
at Manassas, as it was again supposed to be the 
advance of the Federal troops from West Vir- 
ginia endeavoring to form a junction with 
Banks, just as, earlier, in June, a similar move- 
ment on Romney by Wallace had been believed 
to be the advance of McClellan's West Virginia 
forces to cooperate with Patterson. This un- 



40 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 

easiness resulted in the sending of Gen. T. J. 
Jackson, on the ist of November, from the 
Manassas army to take charge of the opera- 
tions about Winchester and in the northern 
part of the Shenandoah Valley. 

Jackson first called out all the local militia 
belonging to Boggs's, Carson's and Meem's 
Brigades, many of these men having gone to 
their homes to attend to their farms, etc. He 
then was joined during November by his old 
brigade, composed of the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Twenty-seventh and Thirty-third Vir- 
ginia Volunteers, and, during December, by 
Taliaferro's Brigade and Loring's Division, 
which had been withdrawn via Staunton from 
about Monterey and Huntersville, in the Alle- 
gheny Mountains, where it had been found im- 
practicable to maintain and supply them in win- 
ter quarters. 

This reinforcement gave Jackson, besides the 
militia, sixteen regiments of infantry and three 
batteries of fairly well-seasoned artillery. He 
also had a respectable force of cavalry under 
Cols. Turner Ashby and Angus MacDonald (a 
partisan ranger). Banks still continued north 
of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, with his 
flanks extended to cover Williamsport and 
Point of Rocks. 

Jackson first turned his attention to disabling 
the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which follows 
the north shore of the Potomac, and did sue- 



EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 4 1 

ceed in breaking Dam No. 5 near Williamsport, 
on the 2 1st of December, but not irreparably. 

On the 1 st of January, 1862, Jackson, with 
about 8,500 men, moved from the vicinity of 
Winchester northward toward Bath (Berkeley 
Springs), which was taken on the 4th, the 
small party of Federal infantry and cavalry 
holding it retreating six miles to Hancock. 
Two regiments and a battery were sent by 
Jackson to destroy the railroad bridge over the 
Big Cacapon River. A brigade under Colonel 
Gilham was detached at Bath to pursue the 
Federals in the direction of Sir John's Run, a 
station on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
east of Hancock, but did not come up with 
them. However, the next day, January 5th, 
the entire force proceeded to destroy the rail- 
road below and opposite Hancock, the Federals 
in that town, which is on the north bank of the 
Potomac, refusing to surrender, while the 
party sent to Cacapon Bridge accomplished its 
destruction. Jackson says that "on the 6th the 
enemy [at Hancock] was reinforced to such 
an extent as to induce me to believe that my ob- 
ject could not be accomplished without a sacri- 
fice of life, which I felt unwilling to make; as 
Romney, the great object of the expedition, 
might require for its recovery, and especially 
for the capture of the troops in and near there, 
all the force at my disposal." 

So, on the 7th of January, Jackson, with his 
entire force of over 8,000 men, moved toward 



42 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 

Romney, via Unger's Store, at which latter 
place he halted "for several days;" but the Fed- 
eral forces evacuated Romney on the ioth and 
fell back to the railroad west of Patterson's 
Creek. 

Loring's Division was then placed by Jack- 
son in winter quarters at Romney, and the local 
militia sent to the vicinity of their homes, not 
far away. By extending southward up the 
South Branch of the Potomac, via Moorefield, 
connection was made with Gen. Edward John- 
son's Brigade at Monterey, and the entire re- 
gion secured against immediate attack from 
west of the Alleghenies. 

Carson's Brigade of Militia was posted at 
Bath and Meem's Brigade of Militia at Mar- 
tinsburg, while Jackson took his old brigade 
(now commanded by Gen. R. B. Garnett) back 
with him to Winchester as a reserve. 

Then arose one of those situations which the 
lack of discipline of the troops and the inter- 
meddling of politicians often causes discontent 
to self-respecting commanding generals. In 
this case it caused Jackson to tender his "con- 
ditional resignation," because the Acting Con- 
federate Secretary of War (Benjamin) order- 
ed Jackson to withdraw Loring's command 
from Romney and the South Branch of the Po- 
tomac, giving as a reason that they were in- 
formed at Richmond a movement by the Fed- 
erals was being made to cut Loring off. The 
true reason was that Loring's officers and Lor- 



EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 43 

ing himself did not fancy being kept at Rom- 
ney when they might be more comfortable and 
enjoy the social advantages of Winchester, only 
forty-three miles away, during the remainder 
of the winter. Hence their appeal to Rich- 
mond over Jackson's head. 

It required all the influence of Gen. Joseph 
E. Johnston, Governor Letcher and many of 
Jackson's brother officers to induce him finally 
to withdraw his resignation. His forebodings 
as to the result of withdrawing Loring from 
Romney proved true, for that place and Moore- 
field were almost immediately reoccupied by 
Kelley's command, the Federal outposts being 
advanced on the 14th of February to Bloomery 
Pass,, within twenty-one miles of Winchester, 
capturing there, after considerable resistance, 
sixty-five officers and privates of Sencendiver's 
(Carson's) Brigade. From Bloomery a dash 
was also made to Unger's Store. 

General Banks, whose headquarters were es- 
tablished at Frederick, Md., held the line of the 
upper Potomac from Hancock to Berlin. On the 
25th of February a detachment of fourteen 
companies of infantry, a squadron of the First 
Michigan Cavalry, and four guns was sent, 
under Col. John W. Geary, Twenty-eighth 
Pennsylvania, across the river at Harper's 
Ferry and then across the Shenandoah River 
and Loudoun Heights into Pleasant Valley 
eastward, small parties of Confederates retir- 
ing before Geary through Lovettsville and 



44 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 

Waterford toward Leesburg, which place was 
occupied by Colonel Geary at sunrise of March 
8th, the Confederate forces under D. H. Hill 
retreating southward through Middleburg. On 
the 1 2th Geary marched to Snickersville, after 
leaving a small garrison at Leesburg, and 
thence to Upperville on the 15th, reconnoiter- 
ing en route the gaps of the Blue Ridge and 
Front Royal, finally halting at Aldie on the 
24th of March, having cleared Loudoun 
County of the enemy. Johnston's army was 
then withdrawing from the Manassas line. 

The remainder of A. S. Williams's Brigade, 
to which Geary belonged, had advanced on the 
4th of March from Williamsport through Mar- 
tinsburg to Bunker Hill. Shields's Brigade fol- 
lowed Williams's.' 

On the 9th of March, 1862, Johnston's army 
fell back from Centerville, Manassas and Dum- 
fries to the line of the Rappahannock, the 
movement being evidently hastily made, as the 
valuable guns in the works at Cockpit Point and 
Evansport, on the Potomac, were abandoned; 
800 barrels of flour were destroyed at Dum- 
fries, besides a great quantity of general stores 
at Manassas. Gordonsville was then made the 
Confederate depot for supplies. This retro- 
grade movement was a great surprise to the 
Richmond authorities, as it was not ordered 
from there, although preparations for it had 
been made. 



EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 45 

The retirement of Johnston's army was 
closely followed up by the advance of McClel- 
lan's, Centerville being occupied by Kearney's 
Brigade on the ioth and Manassas by the 
Third and Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry on the 
14th. Repairs to the Manassas Gap Railroad 
and the railroad back to Alexandria were com- 
menced at once, under the direction of Col. D. 
C. McCallum. 

Johnston's withdrawal from Manassas and 
Banks' advance on Winchester caused Jackson 
to retire on Strasburg, which he accomplished 
on the 13th of March, Banks occupying Win- 
chester on that same date. Shields's Division of 
11,000 men, on the 19th, advanced to Stras- 
burg, 18 miles, Jackson retiring to Woodstock 
and thence to Mount Jackson, 23 miles farther 
up the Valley, where he had previously estab- 
lished his depot. 

Williams's Division of Banks's Corps had 
been ordered to Washington, via Harper's 
Ferry, thus leaving Shields alone in the Valley. 

On the 13th of March, 1862, Gen. R. E. Lee 
was placed by executive orders in command of 
all the armies of the Confederacy, with his 
headquarters "at the seat of government." This 
gave General Lee the same general authority 
over the Confederates for combined movements 
as was conferred upon General McClellan when 
he relieved General Scott on the 1st of Novem- 
ber, 1 86 1, of the command of all the armies of 
the United States, 



46 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 

McClellan had been busy all the autumn and 
winter of 1861 reorganizing the Army of the 
Potomac and supervising the campaigns of all 
the other armies then in the field, but he gave 
his principal attention to the army at Washing- 
ton and to its preparation for an offensive cam- 
paign as soon as the roads in Virginia would 
admit, or the general preparedness of his army 
would justify a forward movement. The delib- 
erative delay of McClellan in dealing with these 
problems caused so much impatient agitation 
by the newspaper press of the country, that the 
Government was compelled to urge McClellan 
to perfect his plans and move the Army of the 
Potomac aggressively upon the enemy. The 
strength of Johnston's army when at Center- 
ville, Manassas and Dumfries was greatly over- 
estimated as being 100,000 strong, whereas, 
Johnston never had more than 50,000 present, 
as his returns for February show, while Mc- 
Clellan on the same date had assembled at and 
in front of Washington a force of 222,000 
"present and absent." 

In announcing to the President his general 
plan for the movement of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, McClellan favored a scheme to avoid 
attacking Johnston's army and to move the 
bulk of his force by water down the Potomac 
into Chesapeake Bay, thence up the Rappahan- 
nock River to Urbana, making that a sub-base 
for attacking Richmond, via West Point, only 
three marches distant from Urbana, A large 



EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 47 

force was to be left at Washington to secure it 
beyond hazard. The movement to the Chesa- 
peake and thence toward Richmond by river 
was predicated upon using Fortress Monroe as 
the main base, having the cooperation of the 
navy in the rivers and on the bay, getting into a 
country where campaigning was more favor- 
able than in Northern Virginia in winter. This 
plan was afterwards changed to a movement 
up the Peninsula between the York and James 
Rivers to West Point and Richmond. 

On the 31st of January the President had 
ordered "that all the disposable force of the 
Army of the Potomac, after providing safely 
for the defense of Washington, be formed into 
an expedition for the immediate object of seiz- 
ing and occupying a point on the railroad 
southwestward of what is known as Manassas 
Junction, * * * the expedition to move on or 
before the 22d of February next" ; and while he 
disapproved McClellan's project of an expedi- 
tion to attack Richmond by way of Chesapeake 
Bay, he did not insist subsequently on the 
above order to move on the 226. of February 
being immediately executed, for means of 
transportation by water were being accumu- 
lated and other arrangements for the proposed 
Chesapeake Bay expedition, attention mean- 
while being given to reopening the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad from Cumberland east- 
ward, to do which it became necessary to throw 
Banks's command across the Potomac, force 



48 LEWISBURG, ETC., WEST VIRGINIA 

the evacuation of Martinsburg, and drive the 
enemy well up toward Winchester and Stras- 
burg. 

This heavy flanking movement, which has 
already been described, and McClellan's large 
army in front, caused first the withdrawal of 
the enemy from Leesburg, then Winchester, 
and finally Manassas and Centerville, including 
the abandonment of the batteries which had im- 
peded the navigation of the Potomac. 

On the same day that the enemy was 
withdrawing from Manassas and Winches- 
ter, March 9, 1862, there occurred in Hamp- 
ton Roads the celebrated defeat of the Merri- 
mac by the Monitor, and as there no longer ex- 
isted any serious obstacle to the carrying out of 
McClellan's Chesapeake Bay project, the Presi- 
dent consented to its execution after McClellan 
had pursued Johnston's retreating army as rap- 
idly as the terrible roads permitted, and had 
definitely located it in its new position beyond 
the Rappahannock, and near the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad. McClellan then embark- 
ed at Alexandria the troops constituting the 
Peninsula expedition, the vanguard leaving 
there on the 1st of April. 

General McClellan having taken the field 
with the Army of the Potomac, the President 
temporarily rearranged the other commands by 
placing Major-General Halleck in command of 
the armies operating in Kentucky, Tennessee 
and Missouri, designating that section as the 



EVACUATION OF WINCHESTER, ETC. 49 

Department of the Mississippi ; the army oper- 
ating west of the Shenandoah and east of Hal- 
leck's armies, in West Virginia principally, 
constituted the Mountain Department, under 
Ma j. -Gen. John C. Fremont. 

After McClellan's departure for his Penin- 
sula campaign, separate commands were made 
of the army left in front of Washington under 
McDowell and the force under Banks left to 
guard the northern part of the Shenandoah 
Valley (at Strasburg and toward Front Royal, 
on the Manassas Gap Railroad), for Stone- 
wall Jackson, with 6,500 men, still showed 
great activity in the Valley from near Mount 
Jackson. The separate commanders reported 
direct to the Secretary of War. 

Shields, who had followed Jackson on the 
19th of March in the direction of Mount Jack- 
son, first fell back to Strasburg and then, on the 
20th, to Winchester, Shields says, "to draw 
him [Jackson] from his position and support- 
ing force, if possible." In that Shields suc- 
ceeded, for Jackson followed him and attacked 
him on the 226. and 23d near Kernstown, im- 
mediately south of Winchester, with the result 
that Jackson was badly beaten, losing 80 killed, 
375 wounded, 270 missing and two guns, be- 
sides being forced to return again to Mount 
Jackson. Shields' own loss was 118 killed, 
450 wounded and 22 missing. 



CHAPTER IV 
jackson's campaign of 1862 

Twobrigadesof Williams's Divisionof Banks's 
Corps, that had already started on their march 
to Manassas, were recalled from Castleman's 
Ferry, of the Shenandoah, to assist Shields, but 
did not reach Winchester until the 24th, after 
the Battle of Kernstown; they took part, how- 
ever, in the pursuit of Jackson as far as Stras- 
bourg. 

On the 1st of April Banks, with five bri- 
gades (less the necessary garrisons left at strat- 
egic points and as guards at bridges, etc.), ad- 
vanced from Strasburg, 18 miles, to Edenburg, 
the enemy contesting his movement. At Eden- 
burg a halt for 1 5 days was made to bring for- 
ward supplies, scant wagon transportation be- 
ing given as the reason for the delay there. On 
the 17th of April another forward movement 
up the Valley turnpike was made through 
Mount Jackson to New Market, the latter place 
being twelve miles south of Edenburg. There 
Banks held his main body and established his 
headquarters temporarily, sending out his cav- 
alry and some of his infantry to seize and hold 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 51 

Columbia Bridge over the Shenandoah, 12 
miles eastward on the Luray road. Another 
and a larger party of cavalry and infantry went 
17 miles farther south, to Harrisonburg, on 
the 24th of April, where another halt was made 
to bring up supplies. At Harrisonburg Banks 
was within 25 miles of Staunton. 

Jackson had left Harrisonburg on the 19th 
of April and marched eastward 18 miles into 
Elk Run Valley, at Conrad's Store, east of the 
Shenandoah and at the foot of Swift Run Gap, 
in the Blue Ridge. In his new position Jackson 
was near support from Gordonsville and Cul- 
peper, via Stannardsville or Madison Court- 
House, which could come to him either through 
Swift Run Gap or one 17 miles farther north. 
This support had been provided by General 
Lee, and consisted of Ewell's Division, 8,000 
strong, which was marched from Culpeper 
toward Jackson and joined him west of the 
Blue Ridge, on the 30th of April, by way of 
Swift Run Gap. 

McClellan's movement to the Peninsula had 
required the reinforcement of Magruder's 
forces at Yorktown early in April, resulting 
in the withdrawal of Johnston's army toward 
Richmond from Central Virginia, except a 
body of 2,500 men left at Fredericksburg 
(which later also withdrew) and a force of 
8,000 under Ewell at Culpeper to observe the 
Federals at Warrenton, as well as defend the 
line of the Rapidan. 



52 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

Jackson entertained the hope that Banks 
might move toward Staunton, when it was his 
purpose to dash suddenly from Elk River Val- 
ley (Swift Run Gap) through the Massanut- 
ten Range, attack Banks in rear and sever his 
communication with Strasburg and Winches- 
ter ; but Banks's orders from McClellan were to 
proceed only to New Market and Harrisonburg 
with his main army, so Banks was not to be 
lured any farther south. 

Another column of Federals, under Milroy 
from west of the Alleghenies was, how- 
ever, threatening Staunton from the di- 
rection of Monterey, the Confederates under 
Gen. Edward Johnson, who had been holding 
Monterey, having been obliged to fall back to 
Buffalo Gap, near Staunton, before Milroy's 
advance ; Milroy reached McDowell in the Bull 
Pasture Valley on the 20th of April. He was 
then 26 miles from Staunton, on the Parkers- 
burg turnpike, where it crosses Shenandoah 
Mountain. 

Gen. R. C. Schenck's Brigade of Fremont's 
army (to which Milroy also belonged) was 
moving up the South Branch of the Potomac 
from Romney through Moorefield to Franklin, 
keeping parallel with Banks's movements up the 
Valley turnpike, Schenck's objective being a 
junction with Milroy in an attack on Staun- 
ton. Fremont himself, with an additional 
force which he had collected at New River 
Depot (now called Keyser), on the Baltimore 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 53 

and Ohio Railroad, and at Romney, moved to 
Petersburg, 25 miles north of Franklin, 
through the mountains, establishing there a sec- 
ondary base of supplies. All three columns had 
very limited wagon transportation and the 
roads were execrable. 

These were the positions during the first 
week in May, 1862, when Jackson quietly 
slipped away from Elk Run Valley, leaving the 
ubiquitous Col. Turner Ashby's cavalry to en- 
tertain Banks's forces at Harrisonburg and 
New Market. Ewell's Division replaced Jack- 
son's infantry near Conrad's Store and in Swift 
Run Gap, and remained there also to watch 
Banks at New Market and Harrisonburg. 

Jackson moved up the east side of the Shen- 
andoah to Brown's Gap, making very slow 
progress on account of the bad roads until he 
had passed through the Gap, but he conveyed 
the impression he had gone to reinforce Rich- 
mond. At Mechum's River Depot, near Char- 
lottesville on the Virginia Central Railroad, 
he placed his troops on cars and rapidly con- 
veyed them westward to Staunton, where, on 
the 5th of May, he effected a junction with Ed- 
ward Johnson's Brigade, that had retired be- 
fore Milroy from Monterey. The joint com- 
mand was then 9,000 strong, and with it Jack- 
son marched to McDowell, where he attacked 
Milroy on the 8th, Milroy being reinforced 
by about 1,500 men of Schenck's Brigade from 
Franklin shortly after the engagement opened, 



54 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

thus giving Milroy a force of about 3,500. Al- 
though outnumbered, Schenck and Milroy suc- 
cessfully resisted Jackson and Johnson through- 
out the day of the 8th, but retired slowly on 
Franklin, 30 miles, during the night and on the 
9th, 10th and nth, Jackson following and en- 
gaging them in their impregnable position at 
Franklin during the 12th and 13th, after which 
Jackson withdrew toward Staunton. 

At McDowell the casualties were 498 Con- 
federates (including 54 officers) and 256 Fed- 
erals, the engagement lasting four hours, but 
Jackson claimed it as a victory because he held 
the field and saved Staunton. He also pre- 
vented a junction of Fremont's forces with 
Banks. 

From Franklin, Jackson retraced his march 
through McDowell and came out of the moun- 
tains at Augusta Springs on the 15th of May, 
when, after resting his troops, he took the di- 
rect road to Harrisonburg via Mount Solon. 
He had taken the precaution to send parties 
along the eastern base of the Alleghenies north- 
ward to block the passes toward Moorefield, so 
that his flank would be secure against any at- 
tack that might come from the direction of 
Fremont's army at Franklin. On reaching the 
Valley Jackson ascertained that Banks's forces 
had all retired to Strasburg, leaving any move- 
ment he might make in that direction unop- 
posed. 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 55 

Jackson's departure from Elk Run Valley 
was only discovered by Banks through scouts, 
when, on the 5th of May, Banks fell back to 
New Market, under orders sent him by Mr. 
Stanton several days before, to retire his en- 
tire command to Strasburg, which latter place 
Banks reached on the 13th, leaving his cavalry 
at Woodstock, 12 miles south. Of Jackson's 
movement to Medium's Depot and thence by 
rail to Staunton, his junction with Edward 
Johnson's command and his attack on Milroy 
at McDowell, Banks was entirely ignorant until 
he received, on the 12th, a dispatch from Fre- 
mont to Stanton, written at Petersburg, W. 
Va., the day before, telling of Schenck's posi- 
tion at Franklin, and Banks did not ascertain 
Jackson's whereabouts when the latter returned 
to the Valley until the 20th, when Fremont tele- 
graphed him to that effect from Franklin, 
which information was corroborated the same 
day from New Market by Banks's own scouts. 

At Strasburg, Banks had detached Shields's 
Division and sent it over the Manassas Gap 
Railroad to report to General McDowell. 
Geary's Brigade of Williams's Division, 1,500 
strong, was guarding the railroad from Front 
Royal to Manassas, 52 miles, that line being 
visited occasionally by the enemy's cavalry 
from beyond the Rappahannock. Shields 
reached Manassas on the 18th of May, and 
marched from Catlett's, on the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad, toward Fredericksburg 



56 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

on the 2 1 st, reaching General McDowell at 
Fredericksburg on the 22d, where McDowell 
was concentrating a large force of 38,000 men 
to move on Richmond via Hanover Junction, in 
cooperation with McClellan's advance up the 
Peninsula. McDowell's only opponent would 
have been Gen. J. R. Anderson, with 11,000 
men, at Massaponax. 

Besides detaching Shields and Geary, Banks 
sent a regiment of Maryland infantry, 700 
strong, two guns and a party of cavalry, under 
Colonel Kenly, to hold Front Royal, and post- 
ed one regiment on the railroad between Front 
Royal and Strasburg. This left Banks on the 
2 1 st of May with only about 7,000 men at 
Strasburg. 

On the very day that Shields's Division reach- 
ed Fredericksburg, May 22d, Jackson's and 
Ewell's commands, 18,000 strong, were march- 
ing on Front Royal via Luray, east of the 
Shenandoah River. Front Royal was attacked 
on the 23d and easily carried, the Maryland 
regiment holding it being cut up and driven 
out across the river toward Winchester, the 
enemy pursuing and capturing many prison- 
ers. On the 24th, Jackson, with the main 
body, moved to Middletown from Cedarville, 
and placed his command on the turnpike five 
miles north of Strasburg and thirteen miles 
south of Winchester, expecting to interpose 
between Winchester and Banks at Strasburg, 
but the latter place was evacuated sufficiently 



JACKSON^S CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 57 

early in the day to enable Banks to reach Win- 
chester by 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 
24th, in advance of Jackson, saving the greater 
part of his trains, but losing some prisoners, 
being fiercely attacked while passing Middle- 
town, Newtown and Kernstown. 

Ewell, with part of the command, moved 
directly from Cedarville on Winchester. Both 
commands converging on Winchester were de- 
layed by the resistance of Banks's retreating 
forces during the evening of the 24th and 
throughout the 25th until late in the day, when 
they entered Winchester, the Federals retiring 
toward Martinsburg, which they all reached 
during the afternoon, marching 22 miles, the 
enemy not pursuing with vigor. 

Reaching the Potomac at Williamsport on 
the 26th, Banks safely crossed his trains and 
troops. His losses in killed, wounded and 
missing were 2,010. The enemy occupied Mar- 
tinsburg with two regiments of cavalry, but 
his main force proceeded toward Harper's 
Ferry via Charlestown, reaching Halltown, 
three miles from Harper's Ferry, on the 28th, 
where he remained one day, but, beyond mak- 
ing a demonstration on Harper's Ferry, did 
not attack. 

Then Jackson became uneasy, for both Mc- 
Dowell from the east and Fremont from the 
west, were marching to the relief of Banks, 
the former via Manassas and Front Royal, the 
latter from Franklin via Moorefield, while a 



5^ jackson's campaign of 1862. 

large force — some 6,000 men — had been hasti- 
ly assembled at Harper's Ferry under Gen. 
Rufus Saxton, to contest Jackson's further 
progress, and Banks was fast restoring his 
battered army at Williamsport. 

The formation of McDowell's large force at 
Fredericksburg had caused General Lee, at 
Richmond, much uneasiness, for, with the ex- 
ception of Ewell's command at Swift Run Gap, 
and Anderson's force near Fredericksburg, 
Northern Virginia had been depleted of Con- 
federate troops. He sent two additional bri- 
gades to Gordonsville from Richmond (Branch 
and Mahone) early in May. McClellan had 
then reached the "White House," on the Pa- 
munkey, and Lee desired at all hazards to pre- 
vent McDowell's advance to a junction with 
McClellan. 

When Banks withdrew to Strasburg Lee be- 
lieved it was for the purpose of abandoning the 
Valley and going to McDowell's army. Lee 
had already consulted Ewell and Jackson, be- 
fore the latter went on his expedition against 
Milroy, concerning the expediency of a hurried 
joint movement towards Warrenton and Fred- 
ericksburg, especially in view of Banks's inert- 
ness, but Jackson held fast to his project of 
striking in detail first Milroy and then Banks. 

The possibility of Banks leaving the Valley 
and joining McDowell or McClellan by way of 
Staunton was also considered, Jackson from 
Elk Run Valley, when reinforced by Ewell, in- 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 59 

tending, in case Banks pushed south from Har- 
risonburg, to move rapidly westward on New 
Market, and not only place himself across 
Banks's route of supply but attack him in rear 
as well. 

So, when Jackson had returned to the valley 
at Mount Solon, after having forced Milroy 
and Schenck back to Franklin, and he had 
learned of Banks's withdrawal to Strasburg, he 
Hastily moved to the east side of the Shenan- 
doah, and, taking Ewell with him, marched on 
Front Royal instead of directly on Strasburg, 
intending, no doubt, at least to prevent Banks 
from reaching McDowell across the Blue 
Ridge. Indeed, this scheme had been virtually 
communicated to Ewell by General Lee, during 
Jackson's absence, in a letter dated May 8th, 
and again to Jackson in a letter dated May 
1 6th; furthermore, urging the breaking up of 
the Manassas Gap Railroad so as to prevent 
Banks's troops leaving the Valley by that route, 
but Shields had already passed through Front 
Royal eastward on the 16th. 

A possible invasion of Maryland had been 
considered as feasible for Jackson in case 
Banks's army could have been overtaken and 
defeated. Accordingly, possibly to find and 
effect an unopposed crossing of the Potomac, 
Taylor's Brigade of Ewell's Division was de- 
tached by Jackson as he moved up towards 
Harper's Ferry, and sent into Loudoun County 
east of the Blue Ridge. It was probably part 



/ 



60 JACKSON^S CAMPAIGN OF l8o2. 

of this force that attacked Geary's posts along 
the Manassas Gap Railroad. 

Jackson also detached Ashby's Cavalry to 
proceed toward Moorefield, from which direc- 
tion Fremont was reported to be coming ; then, 
on the 31st of May, Jackson withdrew his main 
body from Halltown, marched rapidly through 
Winchester and Strasburg during the 1st of 
June, and thence up the Valley turnpike toward 
Harrisonburg, carrying with him 2,300 prison- 
ers, 10,000 small arms and two pieces of ar- 
tillery complete, captured principally from 
Banks's depots, Fremont's approach from near 
Wardensville being meanwhile effectually 
checked by Ewell's troops. 

When Fremont joined Schenck and Milroy 
at Franklin, on the 13th of May, with Ban- 
ker's Division (then reduced to 6,000 men), 
Fremont's entire force numbered only 12,000. 
Blenker's Division, originally 10,000 strong, 
when detached from the Second Army Corps 
by McClellan, on the eve of his departure for 
the Peninsula, was composed mainly of Ger- 
mans, and was sent to join Fremont by the 
President's direct order, evidently on account 
of some political pressure. To reach Fremont, 
Blenker had to march across country from Ma- 
nassas to Harper's Ferry, thence to Winches- 
ter and Romney, mostly over bad roads, and 
with very defective transportation, camp equip- 
age and clothing. So that when the division 
finally reached Fremont at Petersburg, W. Va., 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 61 

on the 9th day of May, it was in bad condition 
every way. 

Fremont remained at Franklin until May 
25th, getting his command in order, contem- 
plating an expedition to break the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad somewhere between Salem 
and Newbern, then to turn toward Richmond. 
But on the 24th orders to move to Banks's as- 
sistance in the Shenandoah Valley were receiv- 
ed, and Fremont moved in that direction via 
Moorefield and Wardensville, his advance 
reaching the later point on the 31st. He was 
then 15 miles west of Strasburg. Fremont 
was originally ordered to go to Harrisonburg 
from Franklin via Brock's Gap, but he came via 
Moorefield toward Strasburg instead. 

On the 24th, also, McDowell at Fredericks- 
burg was, very much to his disappointment, 
ordered to suspend his contemplated movement 
on Richmond via Hanover, and, instead, to de- 
tach 20,000 men to move westward to the suc- 
cor of Banks via Front Royal, in which direc- 
tion Shields started on the 25th to retrace his 
march; he reached Front Royal on the 30th, 
driving out the enemy and capturing 156 pris- 
oners. Front Royal is 12 miles east of Stras- 
burg. He sent his cavalry under Bayard to- 
ward Strasburg and moved his infantry up the 
Luray road to Conrad's Store, but Jackson had 
destroyed the bridges over the Shenandoah and 
the river was unfordable. Shields's advance 
was at Luray on the 6th of June. 



62 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

Meanwhile, Fremont had moved into the val~ 
ley near Strasburg, and on the 2d of June took 
up the pursuit of Jackson, who had eluded him, 
but whom he drove steadily before him through 
Woodstock, Edenburg and Mount Jackson, 
finally reaching Harrisonburg on the 6th. The 
enemy retreated to Port Republic, having aban- 
doned much captured property and many pris- 
oners during the pursuit, besides suffering 
many losses in killed and wounded during the 
many rear-guard actions, in one of which the 
gallant Ashby was among the killed, just be- 
yond Harrisonburg, June 6th. 

Fremont continued the march toward Port 
Republic on the 8th and became seriously en- 
gaged with the enemy at Cross Keys through- 
out the day, the losses on both sides being very 
large. The next day, the 9th, Fremont received 
delayed orders from Washington to halt at 
Harrisonburg. 

Banks's army moving to the support of Fre- 
mont had made very slow progress from Wil- 
liamsport. On the 8th of June it had only 
reached Winchester, where orders were sent 
Banks to move to Front Royal, sending troops 
to guard the Manassas Gap Railway eastward 
and to place an advance post at Luray. 

On that date General Orders No. 62 of the 
War Department, series of 1862, was issued, 
changing the geographical limits of both Fre- 
mont's and Banks's commands as follows : 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 63 

"The Mountain Department is extended east- 
ward to the road running from Williamsport 
to Martinsburg, Winchester, Strasburg, Harri- 
sonburg and Staunton, including that place; 
thence in the same direction southward until it 
reaches the Blue Ridge chain of mountains; 
thence with the line of the Blue Ridge to the 
southern boundary of the State of Virginia. 

"The Department of the Shenandoah is ex- 
tended eastward to include the Piedmont Dis- 
trict and the Bull Run Mountain Range." 

An additional division of troops, 6,000 
strong, under Ma j. -Gen. Franz Sigel, reached 
Winchester via Harper's Ferry on the 4th of 
June, under orders to join Banks, but Sigel got 
to Winchester in advance of Banks, who was 
slowly marching there from Williamsport and 
Martinsburg. 

Under his new orders Banks moved his main 
force to Front Royal, Shields's Division, as al- 
ready noted, being at Luray and beyond. Mc- 
Dowell's troops, except Shields's, were then all 
withdrawn eastward. 

While Fremont was engaging Jackson at 
Cross Keys, the head of Shields's Division was 
approaching Port Republic from the direction 
of Luray. His troops, in their effort to hasten 
the march, had become greatly attenuated and 
had lost cohesion. On the 9th the leading bri- 
gade, Tyler's, neared Port Republic, on the op- 
posite side of the Shenandoah from Fremont. 



64 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

The enemy, after engaging Fremont, had 
moved from Cross Keys into Port Republic 
during the night and had destroyed the only 
bridge by which Fremont could cross and fol- 
low him. 

Jackson then turned on Shields's approach- 
ing brigade and engaged it with such vigor 
that he forced it to retire upon the main body 
at Conrad's Store, after quite a spirited resist- 
ance and considerable loss, including seven 
guns. 

Fremont established communication across 
the river with Shields's retreating troops and 
found they had received preparatory orders to 
return to Fredericksburg. The orders of the 
9th to Fremont to withdraw to Harrisonburg 
and there act on the defensive, had only just 
reached him when he ascertained Shields's lo- 
cation and new orders. Considering the loca- 
tion of Harrisonburg imperfect for defensive 
purposes, and being seriously crippled by his 
losses at Cross Keys, besides hearing nothing 
from Banks, Fremont decided to retire to 
Mount Jackson where he arrived on the 12th 
of June, his action receiving the President's ap- 
proval. 

Subsequently, on the 24th of June, Banks 
withdrew to Middletown, and on the 27th he 
asked to be relieved from service under Major- 
General Pope, who, by orders of the President, 
dated June 26th, had been called from the West 
and placed in command of all the troops cover- 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 65 

ing Washington, including those in the Shen- 
andoah Valley. 

During this campaign, from May 23 to June 
9, 1862, Jackson's troops had over 1,500 casu- 
alties. Fremont's losses were 684, Banks's 
2,019 an< 3 Shields's 1,018. 

As Fremont withdrew from Port Republic 
Jackson followed him closely with his cavalry, 
now commanded by Munford, making always 
a show of strength and never losing contact. 
Jackson's infantry, which had certainly been 
overworked both by marching and by fighting, 
was concentrated at and near Mount Meridian, 
where they were enabled to get a few days of 
rest before being moved again, this time, by 
Lee's orders, toward Richmond and the Pa- 
munkey River, whither, whilst great secrecy 
covered the movement, they were rapidly trans- 
ferred by rail and by marching, and arrived at 
Ashland, near their destination, on the 25th of 
June. 

Fremont (12,000) was then at Middletown, 
Banks (12,500) at and near Front Royal, Mc- 
Dowell was gathering a new army at Freder- 
icksburg and McClellan was on the Chicka- 
hominy. The only Confederate troops left in 
the Valley were some of Munford's cavalry, 
which, later, were also withdrawn. 

Jackson's correspondence with General Lee 
and his instructions to his Chief of Cavalry, 
Munford, reveal how great was the desire of 
the Richmond authorities that Jackson should 



66 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

retire from the Shenandoah as secretly and as 
rapidly as possible, to reinforce the Confederate 
Army confronting McClellan before Rich- 
mond. The Union records show how success- 
ful Jackson and his subordinates were in im- 
pressing Fremont, Banks and Stanton that an- 
other invasion of the lower Valley was impend- 
ing, long after Jackson had taken off all his in- 
fantry and artillery toward Richmond, includ- 
ing Lawton's and Whiting's Brigades, which 
had recently come to Jackson as reinforcements 
from Lee's army. With his own and Ewell's 
Divisions, strengthened by Lawton's and Whit- 
ing's Brigades ( 14 regiments of about 8,500 
men), Jackson carried to Lee an army of over 
25,000. He left his cavalry, under Munford 
and about 5,000 strong, supported by some few 
infantry and dismounted men, to demonstrate 
down the Valley and at New Market or Luray, 
toward Fremont's and Shields's retiring col- 
umns at Strasburg and Front Royal. Munford 
allowed only those to pass his lines northward 
who were sent purposely to take false informa- 
tion of the most exaggerated character, to cover 
and conceal the movement of Jackson toward 
Lee. How little true information the Federal 
troops received during the ten days following 
Jackson's departure is shown by the dispatches 
sent to and from Washington by Stanton, Fre- 
mont and Banks. 

By the 20th of June Fremont had his army 
of 12,000 men at and west of Strasburg, while 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 67 

Banks at Middletown had his two divisions 
(Sigel and Williams) about 13,000 strong ex- 
tended along the north bank of the Shenandoah 
and Cedar Creek, from Front Royal to Middle- 
town. Later, all this force except one small 
brigade kept at Winchester, another brigade at 
Martinsburg and still another at Harper's 
Ferry, was sent east of the Blue Ridge to Pope, 
who had been assigned, June 26th, by the Presi- 
dent to a new command, designated the Army 
of Virginia, and embracing the troops in the 
Valley, of Fremont and Banks, together with 
those of McDowell, between the Blue Ridge 
and Fredericksburg. Fremont was relieved, at 
his own request, from the subordinate com- 
mand contemplated by the President's order, 
and left the army in the field. Banks and Mc- 
Dowell loyally accepted their new assignments 
as corps commanders under Pope, although 
they, as well as Fremont, had previously been 
commanding separate departments, now abol- 
ished. 

The Confederates relieved Munford's cav- 
alry with Robertson's, at Harrisonburg and 
New Market, so as to enable the former to re- 
join Jackson. 

The Valley then enjoyed comparative quiet 
throughout July and August of 1862, but in 
September, with Lee's advance to the Rapidan 
and Pope's subsequent defeat at Bull Run, came 
a renewal of the disturbed conditions for which 
the Shenandoah had become famous. 



68 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

table of distances 



Miles. 



Mount Jackson to Strasburg 22 

Strasburg to Winchester 18 

Winchester to Harper's Ferry 28 

Strasburg to Elk Run Valley 50 

Elk Run Valley to Medium's Station .... 60 
Staunton to Bull Pasture Mountain (Mc- 
dowell) 32 

Bull Pasture Mountain to Franklin 30 

Bull Pasture Mountain to Augusta 

Springs 10 

Augusta Springs to New Market 42 

New Market to Luray 12 

Luray to Front Royal 29 

Front Royal to Harper's Ferry 57 

Strasburg to Woodstock 12 

Woodstock to Mount Jackson 12 

Mount Jackson to New Market 7 

New Market to Port Republic 30 

Port Republic to Brown's Gap 12 

Brown's Gap to Mount Meridian 10 

Mount Meridian to Ashland 120 

Looking backward, after forty years, at this 
wonderful Valley campaign of 1862, the mili- 
tary student cannot fail to be impressed with 
the audacity and strategical eminence of Stone- 
wall Jackson, as compared with the lack of ca- 
pacity and want of cohesion on the part of his 
opponents. 



jackson's campaign of 1862. 69 

On the Federal side the day had not yet 
dawned for the military leaders to disappear 
who had been sent to command armies in the 
field through political or social influence. La- 
tent military talent had not yet sufficiently de- 
veloped itself among those having neither po- 
litical nor social influence to justify the au- 
thorities at Washington to call it to the chief 
commands, and, unfortunately, those same au- 
thorities had not yet recovered from the shock 
and surprises of the year before ; they were still 
groping for suitable commanders for the thou- 
sands of ardent but inexperienced soldiers who 
only asked to be led against the enemy. 

For a past-master in the art of war like Jack- 
son to handle an army, no matter how inferior 
in strength, against generals of the military 
calibre of Patterson, Banks, Fremont, or Pope, 
was not difficult, for he was of the Cromwellian 
type, who fought as sincerely as he prayed, and 
looked for no ulterior reward; whereas those 
leaders against whom he operated had been se- 
lected either to gratify a political faction or to 
please a military clique, and who hoped to se- 
cure either professional advancement or politi- 
cal preferment. 

Taking into consideration Jackson's situa- 
tion May 29th and 30th, with his army of 
16,000 men thundering away at Halltown for 
possession of Harper's Ferry, only three miles 
distant, and threatening to cross into Maryland 
or attack Washington through the passes of the 



70 jackson's campaign of 1862. 

Blue Ridge; with Banks's shattered army of 
7,000 men reorganizing at Williamsport, but 
threatening Jackson on his left flank and front ; 
Saxton, with a hastily gathered but incongru- 
ous force of 6,000 men, sturdily barring Jack- 
son's progress at Harper's Ferry; McDowell, 
with 20,000 men, on his right rear, approach- 
ing Front Royal from Manassas; while Fre- 
mont, with 12,000 men, was debouching into 
the Valley from Wardensville on his left rear, 
— a weak-hearted, incompetent commander 
would then have made a precipitate retreat 
toward his base, with consequent demoraliza- 
tion and disaster. 

Not so Jackson, for when he found his posi- 
tion no longer tenable in front of Harper's 
Ferry he rapidly, but no less cohesively, re- 
traced his march through Winchester and 
Strasburg to Mount Jackson and Harrison- 
burg, taking with him safely an immense 
wagon train of munitions of war and 2,300 
prisoners, captured from the enemy. 

With all this impedimenta he was passing 
Strasburg on the 1st of June, when Fremont 
was only ten miles away toward Wardensville 
on his right and McDowell was at Front Royal 
only twelve miles away on his left, but the Val- 
ley was clear ahead of him and Banks made no 
effort to fall upon his rear. A more desperate 
situation, so successfully solved, would be dif- 
ficult to find in the annals of war. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 

Pope's army had been defeated at Bull Run 
during the last days of August, 1862, and had 
sought shelter within the defenses of Wash- 
ington, where it was reorganized by McClellan 
and made ready to take the field again, this 
time north of the Potomac. 

After dispersing Pope's command, and real- 
izing the futility of either attacking the fortifi- 
cations of Washington or of besieging that 
city, Lee determined upon an invasion of 
Maryland and possibly of Pennsylvania. 

In his letters to President Davis of Septem- 
ber 3 and 4, 1862, Lee states his opinion that 
the time was then propitious for such a move- 
ment, "to give material aid to Maryland and 
afford her an opportunity of throwing off the 
oppression to which she is now subject." On 
the 3d of September this project was com- 
menced by Lee moving his elated army to Lees- 
burg, where, from the 4th to the 7th, his troops 
crossed the Potomac at the fords and ferries of 
that vicinity and headed for Frederick, with- 
out demonstrating toward either Washington 
or Baltimore. 



72 CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 

As early as September 2, before Lee's north- 
ern march had commenced, General Halleck 
ordered the troops occupying Winchester to re- 
tire down the Valley to Harper's Ferry and 
prepare to hold that position as well as Mar- 
tinsburg, at least temporarily. But this ar- 
rangement was contrary to the expectation of 
General Lee, who had believed that his move- 
ment into Maryland would force the entire 
evacuation of the Shenandoah and give him an 
unobstructed route of communication through 
the Valley to Richmond. To remove this ob- 
struction became imperative. 

McClellan, meanwhile, became aware of 
Lee's movement into Maryland and prepared 
to cover Washington and Baltimore from at- 
tack north of the Potomac by interposing his 
army between those cities and Lee's forces, 
until Lee's ultimate intentions could be dis- 
closed. A large force was left to defend Wash- 
ington, in case Lee's Maryland movement 
should prove only a feint to attack, with an- 
other force, the Capital itself. These precau- 
tions rendered the advance of McClellan to- 
ward Lee very slow, as he moved his army west- 
ward toward Frederick, between the Potomac 
and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, so that it 
was only late on the 12th that McClellan's ad- 
vanced troops entered Frederick, unopposed, 
Lee having moved two days before through 
Hagerstown, westward into the passes of 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 73 

South Mountain (a continuation of the Blue 
Ridge north of the Potomac). 

All this while the position at Harper's Ferry 
gave the authorities at Washington great un- 
easiness, especially when it became known to 
them that Lee, at Frederick, on the ioth or 
September, had detached a very large force 
under Jackson (Stonewall) to recross the Po- 
tomac at Williamsport, to operate against Har- 
per's Ferry and clear a route for Lee's possible 
return to Virginia. 

McClellan, on the nth, at Rockville, when 
it was already too late, asked Halleck to order 
the garrison of Harper's Ferry to join him, but 
this Halleck declined to do, although the next 
day (the 12th) Halleck transferred that garri- 
son from Wool's Department to McClellan's, 
to take effect as soon as he (McClellan) "could 
open communication" with the place. 

The Federal commander of Harper's Ferry 
(Col. Dixon S. Miles), with a garrison of 
10,000 men, had strict instructions from Wool 
to hold the place at all hazards, at least until 
he could be succored from McClellan's advanc- 
ing army. Maryland Heights, overlooking 
Harper's Ferry, had been partly fortified and 
was occupied by a small detachment of Miles's 
troops, the remainder of his forces being en- 
trenched on Bolivar Heights and in the town 
of Harper's Ferry. 

No one could be more familiar with the pos- 
sibilities of defending Harper's Ferry, or of its 



74 CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 

untenableness, than was Jackson, for he had 
been sent there early in 1861, and, after fully 
studying the situation, had advised against its 
retention except by an exceedingly strong force- 
It is therefore presumable that when Lee se- 
lected him to reduce the position, he (Jackson) 
insisted on being provided with a heavy body 
of troops. So Lee sent from Frederick one- 
half of his army, six divisions (A. P. Hill's, 
E well's and Starke's), to move via Williams- 
port and Martinsburg, while McLaws's Divi- 
sion, supported by Anderson's, occupied Mary- 
land Heights from the north, and Walker's 
Division was ordered by way of Cheek's Ford 
of the Potomac to occupy Loudoun Heights. 
Walker was prevented "by the enemy" from 
crossing at Cheek's, so he crossed at Point of 
Rocks during the night of the 10th instead, and 
got into position on Loudoun Heights, which 
he found unoccupied, during the night of the 
13th, effectually barring any escape of the gar- 
rison of Harper's Ferry down the south side of 
the Potomac. 

McLaws, with his own and Anderson's Divi- 
sion, moved on the 10th (via Crampton's Gap 
of South Mountain and Pleasant Valley, Mary- 
land) to take position on Maryland Heights 
and the debouche of the Valley along the Po- 
tomac at Sandy Hook and Weverton. He 
forced the retreat into Harper's Ferry of the 
troops on Maryland Heights, after some resist- 
ance, on the 13th, and succeeded in getting 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 75 

some guns into position there, after consider- 
able labor, that effectually commanded Har- 
per's Ferry. His troops in Pleasant Valley 
moved forward to the Potomac and thus closed 
all egress north or east to Miles's forces, north 
of the Potomac. 

On the 14th Franklin's Corps of McClellan's 
army reached and forced the passage of Cramp- 
ton's Gap, only seven miles north of Maryland 
Heights, and advanced a short distance down 
Pleasant Valley toward Harper's Ferry, when 
Franklin most unaccountably halted, went into 
camp and did not attack McLaws on the 15th, 
although McLaws had drawn up six small 
brigades across the Valley near Crampton's 
Gap and invited attack. McLaws also had 
four brigades at Weverton and Sandy Hook, 
besides the force on top of Maryland Heights, 
which latter was firing down into Harper's 
Ferry. 

This Federal force in Pleasant Valley on the 
14th and 15th consisted of Franklin's (Sixth) 
Army Corps and Crouch's Division (three 
large divisions of three brigades each), and 
was 20,000 strong. It did not even follow up 
McLaws' weaker force when, on the 15th, the 
latter crossed his troops and trains into Har- 
per's Ferry after the capitulation. 

The main movement to reduce Harper's 
Ferry was conducted by Jackson in person, and 
consisted, as already mentioned, of three divi- 
sions, which, after crossing the Potomac at 



76 CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 

Williamsport on the nth, moved on Martins- 
burg and down the south side of the river. The 
Federal garrison of Martinsburg, under Gen. 
Julius White, evacuated the place during the 
night of the nth, safely reached Harper's 
Ferry on the 12th, closely followed by Jack- 
son's troops, however, who reached Halltown, 
three miles south of Harper's Ferry, on the 
13th, where Miles's forces were found drawn 
up on Bolivar Heights nearby. 

The withdrawal of the garrisons of Win- 
chester and Martinsburg gave Miles at Har- 
per's Ferry a force of nearly 13,000 men. The 
six divisions of the enemy, surrounding him 
on all sides, could not have numbered less than 
30,000, for they were all composed of more 
than three brigades each, some having five or 
six. 

On joining Miles, for some magnanimous 
reason which Miles seems to have greatly ap- 
preciated, General White presented the most 
unusual example of not claiming command of 
all the Federal troops at Harper's Ferry, by 
virtue of his superior rank, but generously 
waived it, instead, on the ground that Miles 
was more thoroughly familiar with the situa- 
tion and had already made all preparations to 
defend the place. White then most loyally as- 
sumed command of only part of the line and 
gave Miles conscientious support to the end. 

That end came on the morning of the 15th, 
when the Confederate lines had been more 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 77 

closely drawn around the position, which was 
also enfiladed from several directions by the 
enemy's artillery. At Miles's request, after tak- 
ing a unanimous vote of his council of war, 
White negotiated with Jackson the terms of 
capitulation, which surrendered over 11,000 
men as prisoners of war, besides a vast quanti- 
ty of arms and stores. It was after the white 
flags of surrender had actually gone up that 
Miles was mortally wounded by a shell fired 
from one of the Confederate batteries and the 
command then devolved on White. 

Lee, in his report, says that "the advance of 
the Federal army was so slow at the time we 
left Fredericktown [September 10] as to jus- 
tify the belief that the reduction of Harper's 
Ferry could be accomplished and our troops 
concentrated before they would be called upon 
to meet it." Lee retained with him only 
Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's and his cavalry 
corps, after detaching Jackson's three divisions, 
as well as McLaws's, Anderson's and Walker's. 
On the 13th and 14th Lee was attacked by Mc- 
Clellan's advance at the Gap in South Moun- 
tain on the Boonesborough pike, during the 
absence of his six divisions operating against 
Harper's Ferry, but as McClellan did not push 
his attack with sufficient vigor, Lee succeeded 
in checking McClellan as well as preventing 
any relief going to Harper's Ferry. He became 
uneasy, however, and dispatched couriers to 
hasten the return of all his detachments, Jack- 



78 CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 

son rejoining him at Sharpsburg on the 16th, 
where Lee had retreated on the 15th. Jackson 
left A. P. Hill's Division temporarily at Har- 
per's Ferry, but Hill's, as well as McLaws's, 
Anderson's and Walker's Divisions, returned 
to Lee's main army at Sharpsburg on the 16th 
and 17th. 

McClellan's army came up to the Antietam 
during the afternoon of the 15th, but made no 
attack on Lee beyond some artillery firing until 
late on the 16th, after Jackson and Walker had 
rejoined Longstreet and D. H. Hill at Sharps- 
burg. The Battle of Antietam came off on 
the 17th. 

Lee says, "The resistance that had been of- 
fered to the enemy at Boonesborough Gap se- 
cured sufficient time to enable General Jackson 
to complete the reduction of Harper's Ferry." 
The engagement at Boonesborough is known 
to us officially as the Battle of South Mountain. 
It certainly enabled Lee to reunite his troops 
and meet McClellan behind the Antietam. 

During the night of the 18th Lee's army re- 
crossed the Potomac into Virginia, near Shep- 
herdstown ; he was covered by his cavalry under 
J. E. B. Stuart. An effort of Porter's Federal 
Corps to cross and pursue was repulsed by A. 
P. Hill's Division on the 20th. Lee then moved 
his army slowly to Martinsburer, Bunker Hill 
and Winchester, the Federals reoccupying the 
line of the Potomac and Harper's Ferry, but 
made no other forward movement. It was dur- 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 79 

ing this period of inactivity, in the early days 
of October, that Stuart crossed the Potomac 
above Williamsport with his cavalry, about 
1,500 strong, and made his successful raid on 
Chambersburg, recrossing again into Virginia 
below Harper's Ferry, without loss or inter- 
ference by the Federal cavalry. Stuart passed 
entirely around McClellan's army, just as he 
had done earlier in the summer on the Penin- 
sula. 

No amount of urging, ordering or pleading 
by Lincoln could induce McClellan to move 
south of the upper Potomac until the last days 
of October, when he crossed his army at Berlin, 
below Harper's Ferry, and moved south along 
the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, occupying 
some of the gaps as far south as Snicker's, to 
protect his flanks, but not to threaten Lee, 
whose army still remained near Winchester. 
McClellan's objective point was still Richmond, 
but as he moved with characteristic ponderous- 
ness and elaboration, Lee immediately sent 
Longstreet's Corps (half his army) by Front 
Royal through Chester Gap to Culpeper Court- 
House, to which point he transferred his own 
headquarters on the 6th of November, leaving 
Jackson (with the other half of his army) in 
the Valley to threaten either another invasion 
of Maryland or McClellan's flank and his com- 
munications with Washington, should the lat- 
ter advance far enough southward. 



80 CAPITULATION OF HARPER'S FERRY 

McClellan left Slocum's Corps to hold Har- 
per's Ferry and placed three additional brigades 
at Sharpsburg, Williamsport and above. These 
troops were intended mainly to observe and 
guard the crossings of the Potomac, but they 
also made an occasional reconnaissance toward 
the enemy at Berryville, Winchester or Mar- 
tinsburg. 

From Snicker's Gap McClellan deflected his 
army to the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad 
and fixed his own headquarters first at Rector- 
town. His base was then at Alexandria, whence 
his supplies came by rial. On the 9th of No- 
vember General McClellan was superseded in 
command of the Army of the Potomac, at 
Warrenton, by General Burnside. 

Lee still retained Jackson in the Valley about 
Berryville and Winchester, but prepared to rap- 
idly move through the upper passes of the Blue 
Ridge to unite with Longstreet at Culpeper, 
should Burnside attempt to interpose between 
them by moving on Culpeper in force, or, in 
case Burnside moved on Fredericksburg, down 
the Rappahannock, Jackson was to rejoin Lee 
by the shortest practicable route. Jackson drew 
his supplies from Staunton and Lee from Rich- 
mond. 

On the 19th of November and again on the 
23d, Lee wrote to Jackson that he considered 
it advisable for him to leave the Valley and 
bring his corps of 35,000 men east of the Blue 
Ridge to a point nearer Fredericksburg, where 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER S FERRY 01 

Lee had gone in person, and from which point 
it was expected Burnside's assembled army 
would try to force its way to Richmond. 

Jackson left a small force, principally Mary- 
landers under Steuart, and some cavalry, to 
hold Winchester and the lower Valley, and then 
moved up the Valley through Strasburg and 
New Market to Swift Run Gap, where he 
crossed the Blue Ridge and reported his troops 
to Lee from Orange Court-House on the 27th 
of November. The next day General Lee di- 
rected Jackson to move his command to a po- 
sition near the railroad from Fredericksburg 
to Richmond, on Massaponax Creek, as at that 
time Lee did not believe Burnside would en- 
deavor to cross the Rappahannock at Freder- 
icksburg, but would select a crossing at some 
point below — possibly Port Royal. 

A strong reconnaissance, sent out December 
1 from Harper's Ferry, under Geary, went 
through Charlestown to Berryville and thence 
to Winchester, returning to Harper's Ferry via 
Bunker Hill and Smithfield. Geary encounter- 
ed some resistance along his route from the 
Seventh and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, the in- 
fantry troops (about 2,000 Marylanders) 
evacuating Winchester and moving south to- 
ward Strasburg when Geary entered Winches- 
ter on the 4th of December. Geary soon with- 
drew and the Confederates reoccupied the town. 

A small reconnaissance made from New 
Creek to Mooreneld, on the same dates as the 



82 CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 

above, found two companies of partisan cav- 
alry under McDonald, which were dispersed, 
after killing two, wounding several and cap- 
turing ten. 

Another small cavalry reconnaissance through 
Martinsburg, toward Darkesville, on the nth 
of December, captured thirteen prisoners and 
dispersed three companies of the Seventh Con- 
federate Cavalry to Bunker Hill. 

On the 9th of December General Burnside 
ordered Slocum to withdraw his troops from 
Harper's Ferry and march via Leesburg to 
Centerville where he was to report to General 
Sigel as part of the reserve of Burnside's army. 
Morell, who, from his headquarters at Hagers- 
town, commanded the defenses of the upper 
Potomac, was directed to replace Slocum's 
troops at Harper's Ferry with Kenly's brigade 
of Marylanders, and at the same time another 
force was to reoccupy Martinsburg. On the 
1 6th of December Morell was relieved by Gen. 
B. F. Kelley, whose command at Cumberland 
was extended to include all the line of the Bal- 
timore and Ohio Railroad from New Creek 
(now Keyser) to Harper's Ferry. The rail- 
road was then being rebuilt into Martinsburg 
from the west. 

Kelley fixed his headquarters mostly at Har- 
per's Ferry. He had, besides his own brigade 
and local garrisons between Cumberland and 
Grafton and Kenly's Maryland Brigade at 
Harper's Ferry, a force of eight regiments 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 83 

under Milroy, recently arrived at New Creek 
from the region between Monterey and Bev- 
erly, west of the Alleghenies. Milroy was 
sent to reinforce the troops on the railroad east 
of Cumberland when Jackson was still about 
Winchester, and who threatened further inter- 
ruption of the railroad west of Martinsburg 
as well as to carry out Jackson's favorite hobby 
of an invasion of the territory in West Virginia 
containing his original home, at Clarksburg. 

From New Creek Kelley sent, December 6, 
one brigade from this column of Milroy's to 
reoccupy Petersburg, W. Va., southeast from 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad toward 
Franklin and Monterey, and later sent the re- 
mainder of Milroy's command in the same gen- 
eral direction, so that by the end of December 
Milroy's forces occupied Romney, Moorefield, 
Petersburg and up the valley of the south fork 
of the Potomac, while with his mounted troops 
under Cluseret (later celebrated as one of the 
leaders of the Commune in France), he took 
possession of Winchester. Kelley also repaired 
and reopened the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
eastward from Hancock to Harper's Ferry. 

The inaction of the Army of the Potomac 
under Burnside, after his unsuccessful assault 
at Fredericksburg, might have enabled Lee to 
dispatch troops for service elsewhere. Notwith- 
standing the severity of the winter and the 
dreadful condition of the roads, some enter- 
prising cavalry raids were made by Lee's troops 



84 CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 

to the rear of Burnside's army, one small party 
under Rosser penetrating into the Shenandoah 
almost to Martinsburg, but returning east of 
the Blue Ridge immediately 

The Confederate forces in the Shenandoah 
consisted mainly of cavalry, supported by some 
Maryland infantry, all under command of Gen. 
W. E. Jones, and numbering about 2,500 in all. 
This force had retired to New Market late in 
December of 1862, but early in January, by 
General Lee's orders, made an unsuccessful at- 
tempt to drive back the Federal forces at Moore- 
field and Petersburg, having McNeill's Com- 
pany of Imboden's partisan cavalry from the 
direction of Monterey, to cooperate with him. 

Realizing the difficulty of maintaining too 
many detached positions, General Kelley re- 
moved the troops from Petersburg and Moore- 
field to strengthen those at Romney, soon after 
Jones was beaten off, recognizing the impor- 
tance of Romney and Winchester as outposts 
for the protection of the newly-reconstructed 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from the west 
through Martinsburg. Again, Romney was 
only 26 miles east from New Creek, whence 
the command drew its supplies, and was as im- 
portant an outpost for New Creek and Cumber- 
land as it was for Winchester. From Romney 
cavalry could penetrate southward, up the fer- 
tile valley of the south fork of the Potomac, as 
far as Monterey, and thence to the Virginia 
Central Railroad. 



CAPITULATION OF HARPER^ FERRY 85 

On the 19th of January, 1863, all movements 
south of the Winchester line were ordered 
stopped, as the Washington authorities did not 
desire any cause to be given Lee to detach any 
portion of his army then confronting Burn- 
side. 

The reoccupation of the lower Valley by 
the Union forces and the reopening of the Bal- 
timore and Ohio Railroad gave General Lee 
great concern, so he endeavored, as the winter 
closed in, to detach to the support of his troops 
about New Market, up the Valley, such of the 
Confederate forces at Staunton and the Lewis- 
burg or Huttonsville lines as could be spared. 
Burnside's rapidly increasing army in his front, 
though inactive, perplexed Lee. 

On the 25th of January, 1863, orders were 
issued, by direction of the President, supersed- 
ing General Burnside in command of the Army 
of the Potomac by Gen. Joseph Hooker. 



CHAPTER VI 

jones's and imboden's raid into west Vir- 
ginia 

Both armies remained inactive at Fredericks- 
burg, after Hooker assumed command of the 
Federal army, until the latter part of April, 
1863, when Hooker attempted to turn Lee's left 
flank and was badly defeated at Chancellors- 
ville. 

Meanwhile, the small force of Confederates 
in the Valley, under Col. W. E. Jones, was as 
active as the severe weather and their weak 
strength permitted, while Milroy had his head- 
quarters and main force at Winchester, with 
outposts at Berryville, Strasburg, and Romney, 
throughout the winter of i862-'63. 

Jones had his headquarters first at New Mar- 
ket and then at Lacey Springs, near Harrison- 
burg, from either place being within communi- 
cation with J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry headquar- 
ters at Culpeper, on the Orange and Alexandria 
/ Railroad. 

During the winter General Lee organized an 
expedition, to be sent from the Valley as soon 



jones's and imboden's raid 87 

as the spring opened, to destroy the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad west of Cumberland. It 
had been General Lee's unremitting endeavor 
from the beginning of hostilities to interrupt 
Federal communication with the West by that 
railroad, especially at the Cheat River viaduct 
at Rowlesburg. 

The expedition for 1863 was to consist of 
two cooperating columns, one under W. E. 
Jones to move via Brock's Gap and Lost River 
down the South Fork of the Potomac through 
Moorefield, and thence toward Cheat River 
Viaduct; the other, under a noted "partisan 
ranger," Imboden, to be formed near Monterey 
and Hightown, on the Parkersburg turnpike, 
to move over the mountains northwest through 
Beverly in the same general direction as the 
Jones column, which was to move on the 
Northwestern turnpike. 

In the correspondence of General Lee of this 
period it appears he was becoming very much 
impressed with the feats of a noted guerilla (or 
partisan) named J. H. McNeill, who operated 
in the region about Moorefield and Romney. 
McNeill was one of Imboden's captains and 
had made several daring and successful forays. 

To get an understanding of the status of the 
Confederate "partisan rangers," as distinguish- 
ed from the regular soldier, consultation of 
Confederate legislation and the correspondence 
arising therefrom, is necessary. There was 
nothing similar in the United States service. 



y 



88 jones's and imboden's raid 

We find first that Virginia as early as March 
2.7, 1862, by an act of the General Assembly, 
authorized the forming "of ten or more com- 
panies of rangers," of 100 men each, "to be 
composed exclusively of men whose homes are 
in the districts overrun by the public enemy, 
within the limits of said counties, who shall en- 
list for twelve months in the service of this 
Commonwealth, to act as rangers and scouts 
on our exposed frontier near the lines of the 
enemy. * * * The said officers and privates 
shall receive the same pay as is allowed to the 
privates and officers by the Confederate States. 
* * * Shall be under the command of the Gov- 
ernor, and shall conform their operations to the 
usages of civilized warfare. * * * Whenever 
the said rangers shall be in the neighborhood of 
a Confederate army, they shall be subject to the 
orders of the commandant of the same and 
shall always cooperate with the movements of 
said army when ordered to do so. * * * " 
/ Within a month, April 21, 1862, the Confed- 
erate Congress passed an act "to organize 
bands of partisan rangers throughout the Con- 
federacy, in companies, battalions, or regi- 
ments, either as infantry or cavalry," and to 
"be entitled to the same pay, rations and quar- 
ters * * * as other soldiers. That for any arms 
and munitions of war captured from the enemy 
by any body of partisan rangers and delivered 
to any quartermaster * * * the rangers shall be 
paid their full value. * * * " 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA 89 

It will be observed, by the last clause of the 
foregoing act, the rangers received a premium 
for capturing property not allowed "other sol- 
diers." Also that they were not required to 
confine their operations to any particular re- 
gion of the country, but might enter the 
enemy's territory at will. 

Then, too, the Confederate Congress was si- 
lent about the ranger conforming his opera- 
tions "to the usages of civilized warfare." The 
"public defense" acts absorbed into the Con- 
federate army all troops that had been raised 
under State authority, including the rangers, 
although these latter were never brigaded with 
other troops, but operated, under their own of- 
ficers, independently. 

These independent commands, with their 
freedom from all the restraints and discipline 
of the line, soon made the partisan service 
very popular to serve in, so much so that the 
Confederate War Department found it neces- 
sary to restrict the partisan service to persons 
not liable to conscription and to forbid any 
transfer from other branches of the army. Also 
to endeavor to exclude from the partisan corps 
deserters from the regulars, of whom there 
were already great numbers in hiding through- 
out the Confederacy as early as 1862. 

The Virginia Assembly, on the 28th of Feb- 
ruary, 1863, transferred all State troops and 
rangers to the Confederate Government and 



go JONES S AND IMBODEN S RAID 

stopped their further enlistments under State 
authority. 

There were ninety-five companies of rangers 
registered at the Confederate War Department 
on the 1 2th of September, 1863, with many 
more in process of formation. 

The operation of the Ranger Act was not 
long in making itself felt to the detriment of 
the Confederate Army, as shown by the reports 
and correspondence of both army and civilian 
officials, but all attacks upon the system proved 
unavailing until the acts organizing these guer- 
illa forces were revoked by the Confederate 
Congress, February 17, 1864, exception being 
then made to retain such as were acting as 
regular cavalry. Of these, McNeill's Company 
and Mosby's Battalion were continued in serv- 
ice as partisans. 

It is presumed the action taken by the Con- 
federate Congress was finally reached through 
consideration of the annual report of the Sec- 
retary of War, James A. Seddon, dated Rich- 
mond, November 26, 1863, where he mentions 
the rangers as follows : 

"The advantages anticipated from the allow- 
ance of corps of partisan rangers, with peculiar 
privileges of prize to stimulate their zeal and 
activity, have been very partially realized, while 
from their independent organization and the 
facilities and temptations thereby afforded to 
license and depredations, grave mischiefs have 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA 9 1 

resulted. They have, indeed, when under inef- 
ficient officers and operating within our own 
limits, come to be regarded as more formidable 
and destructive to our own people than to the 
enemy. The opportunities, too, afforded them 
of profit by their captures, as well as the lighter 
bonds of discipline under which they are held, 
serve to dissatisfy the trained soldiers of the 
Provisional Army, who, encountering greater 
perils and privations, are denied similar indul- 
gences. There are certainly some honorable 
exceptions to the general estimate thus held of 
the partisan corps, and in several instances par- 
tisan leaders have distinguished themselves and 
their corps by services as eminent as their 
achievements have been daring and brilliant. 
They constitute only notable exceptions, and 
experience of the general inefficiency and even 
mischief of the organizations would recom- 
mend that they either be merged in the troops 
of the line or be disbanded and conscripted. To 
preserve the few that are valuable coadjutors 
to the general service, discretion may be in- 
trusted to the Department." 

General Lee was very much of the same 
opinion, for April i, 1864, he writes to Adju- 
tant-General Cooper, recommending that all 
rangers, except Mosby's Battalion, be disband- 
ed, and saying : 

"Experience has convinced me that it is al- 
most impossible, under the best officers even, 



92 jones's and imboden's raid 

to have discipline in these bands of partisan 
rangers, or to prevent them from becoming an 
injury instead of a benefit to the service, and 
even where this is accomplished, the system 
gives license to many deserters and marauders, 
who assume to belong to these authorized com- 
panies, and commit depredations on friend and 
foe alike. Another great objection to them is 
the bad effect upon the discipline of the army, 
from the constant desire of the men to leave 
their regiments and enjoy the great license al- 
lowed in these bands. * * * " 

It was to one of these partisan leaders, how- 
ever, that General Lee entrusted in April, 1863, 
the main column for the raid on the Baltimore 
/ and Ohio Railroad, as we find in his corre- 
spondence with Col. J. D. Imboden, Capt. J. H. 
McNeill (both partisans), and with the two 
Joneses (both regulars). 

Imboden, at Staunton, had in June, 1862, 
raised four full companies of the ranger regi- 
ment he had been authorized to recruit, and 
was told by the Secretary of War to organize 
the men he already had into a battalion and aft- 
erwards increase it to a regiment. He was get- 
ting his recruits mainly from the mountain dis- 
tricts east and west of the Alleghenies. 

On the 3d of February, 1863, General Lee 
addressed a letter to Imboden, as "General 
Commanding Northwest Brigade," congratu- 
lating him on his promotion and urging him 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA 93 

"to bring out all the men subject to military- 
duty in the Northwest. I think it unnecessary 
to caution you against receiving men who have 
deserted from other companies or regiments. 
* * * " Referring to the enemy, General Lee 
continues : "He cannot during the winter move 
with any large infantry force across the moun- 
tains against you. * * * I am very anxious to 
drive him out of the Valley, and desire you to 
be prepared to cooperate with Gen. W. E. Jones 
whenever an opportunity occurs." 

On the 2d of March, Imboden, from his 
camps near McDowell and Monterey, submit- 
ted to General Lee a plan of an expedition to 
destroy all the bridges of the Baltimore and/ 
Ohio Railroad between Oakland and Grafton, 
and then to move against the enemy at Beverly, 
Philippi, and Buckhannon, in West Virginia, 
the enemy at that period not being in strong 
force at any point on that line. Imboden pro- 
posed to start with 2,500 men and extra arms 
for 1,500 additional, whom he expected would 
join him as soon as he reached Beverly and be- 
yond. For the latter purpose, Imboden asked 
that the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia 
Infantry, composed mainly of refugees from 
that section of country, be sent to him for the 
movement, and whose ranks, as well as those 
of his own rangers, Imboden hoped to fill up 
while in West Virginia. 

As a collateral movement, Gen. W. E. Jones, 
commanding the Valley District, was to press 



94 jones's and imboden's raid 

the enemy down the Shenandoah toward Win- 
chester and then move rapidly on Romney, 
New Creek (Keyser), and Cumberland. While 
Jones was doing this Imboden was to send a 
mounted flying column of 500 men, probably 
under the celebrated J. H. McNeill, to move 
/ through Moorefield to Oakland on the railroad 
by the Northwest turnpike, but avoiding the 
enemy at New Creek. Meanwhile, Imboden, 
with his infantry and artillery, would move 
from Monterey on Huttonsville and Beverly, 
west of the mountains, while his cavalry with 
McNeill was cutting and destroying the Cheat 
v River Viaduct and the trestle work on the rail- 
road. The enemy at Beverly was to be forced 
out toward Weston or Clarksburg, so as to en- 
able the party operating on the railroad to re- 
join the dismounted men south of Grafton. 

If successful, Imboden expected to be joined 
by thousands of recruits and to collect for the 
Confederate Army large numbers of horses and 
cattle. 

This plan was promptly approved by General 
Lee and preparations for its execution com- 
menced as early as March 11, but the severe 
winter and the condition of the mountain roads 
and streams delayed the departure of either Im- 
boden or Jones until the last week in April, and 
then with the original plan somewhat modified. 
Gen. Sam Jones, commanding the Department 
of West Virginia, was ordered to supply some 
troops to Imboden and otherwise assist him by 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA 95 

threatening the enemy's positions on the Ka- 
nawha, and preventing reinforcements going 
from that point to the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad. 

So much did General Lee have in mind the 
regaining of the lower Valley that, while writ- 
ing confidentially from Fredericksburg to 
President Davis of army matters generally, he 
says, on the 26. of April, "when the roads per- 
mit of our moving, unless in the meantime 
General Hooker takes the aggressive, I propose 
to make a blow at Milroy, which, I think, will 
draw General Hooker out, or at least prevent 
further reinforcements being sent to the West." 
At that time Burnside had taken 20,000 men 
of the Ninth Army Corps from the east to Cin- 
cinnati by rail, where he was organizing an ex- 
pedition to march on Knoxville, in cooperation 
with a forward movement from Murfreesbor- 
ough, in Middle Tennessee, by Rosecrans's 
army. 

At that same time General Lee was having 
great trouble in subsisting his army, so that he 
urged upon all the detached commanders in the 
field, especially "the partisans," to collect 
horses, cattle, provisions, etc., from the coun- 
try in which they operated. As "munitions of 
war" had been construed by the Confederate 
authorities to include everything needed by an 
army, an additional incentive for indiscrimi- 
nate plundering was held out to the partisans, 
for, by the law creating them, they received 



96 jones's and imboden's raid 

prize money for all stores captured by them and 
turned in to proper authority. 

Imboden finally got started on the 20th of 
April, 1863, from Shenandoah Mountain and 
Monterey, over the main range of the Alle- 
gheny Mountains toward Beverly. He had a 
mixed command of nearly 3,500 men, regulars 
and partisans (of which latter 700 were mount- 
ed) and he had six guns. About half this force 
had been furnished by Gen. Sam Jones. 

W. E. Jones moved from Lacey Springs, in 
the Upper Shenandoah Valley, on the 21st of 
April, by way of Brock's Gap and Lost River, 
toward Moorefleld. The plan submitted by 
Imboden had been modified, so that, instead of 
pressing the enemy toward Winchester and 
then passing through Romney, Jones was to 
avoid both those places, as well as New Creek, 
and move rapidly for the railroad at Oakland. 
Jones says he took "all my [his] available 
strength in cavalry, infantry and artillery,'' 
but fails to mention his actual strength, which 
was probably not less than 3,500 men. Of 
these, he sent back about 1,000 from Moore- 
field, when he could not get all his command 
over the Potomac on account of high water. 
Before starting, all men and horses unfit for a 
hard campaign were left behind in the Valley, 
under Lieut.-Col. O. R. Funsten, Eleventh 
Virginia Cavalry, who had his outposts ex- 
tended well toward Strasburg, and where, on 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA 97 

the 28th of April, he had a brisk skirmish with 
some of Milroy's troops. 

Jones reached Moorefield on the 24th of 
April, the same day that Imboden, on the other 
side of the mountains, was attacking Beverly. 
Jones found no enemy at Moorefield but the 
river was too high to cross, so he was forced 
to make a detour of eleven miles up stream to 
Petersburg, where he succeeded in getting most 
of his mounted men over after considerable dif- 
ficulty. The dismounted men, artillery and 
trains, as well as some three hundred of his 
cavalry, not being able to cross at all, were 
sent back to the Shenandoah Valley by way 
of Franklin, gathering up all surplus bacon, 
etc., along the route. With the bulk of his 
mounted force, consisting of the First Mary- 
land and White's Virginia Battalions, the 
Sixth, Seventh and Twelfth Virginia, and 
some of McNeill's partisans, in all about 2,500 
men, Jones resumed his movement on Oakland. 

He was obliged to pass through Greenland 
Gap, in the Knobley Mountain, 20 miles west 
of Moorefield, to get onto the Northwestern 
turnpike and to avoid the strong force of Fed- 
eral troops at New Creek (Keyser). Most 
unexpectedly, Jones found at the Gap a small 
and stubborn detachment of eighty- three In- 
fantry, under Capt. Martin Wallace of the 
Twenty-third Illinois (Irish Brigade), who, 
from a church and a log house in the Gap, de- 
layed Jones half a day on the 25th and only 



98 jones's and imboden's raid 

yielded when the buildings were set on fire by 
Jones's men, after darkness enabled them to 
crawl up close enough. Three previous assaults 
had been repulsed with considerable loss to the 
Confederates, including Col. R. H. Dulaney, 
Seventh Virginia Cavalry, wounded, and sev- 
eral of his officers. Wallace says the Confed- 
erates lost 104 killed and wounded, while his 
own loss was two killed and six wounded. 
Jones admits his casualties to have been seven 
killed and twenty-two wounded. 

These delays enabled Federal reinforcements 

/ to be sent west over the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, to points threatened by Imboden's 
strong column, before the raiding parties from 
Jones's command succeeded in interrupting rail 
communication at Oakland, but Jones after- 
wards passed one column of his troops through 
Oakland to Kingwood and thence to Morgan- 
town on the Monongahela, during the 26th, 
while his main party went direct to Rowles- 
burg, at Cheat River Bridge on the railroad, 
by way of the Northwestern turnpike through 
West Union. 

The column Jones sent to the railroad at 
Oakland also destroyed some small bridges 
farther east, at Altamont, stopping for a while 
traffic on that part of the line, but the party 
which went to Rowlesburg, April 26, to cap- 
ture the small garrison there and then destroy 

v/ the massive railroad viaduct and the trestle 
work near by, failed in its attempt. Jones, with 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA 99 

his main party, went as far as Evansville, where 
he found meat and forage, and endeavored to 
communicate with Imboden from whom he 
could get no news. Jones then crossed to the 
north of the railroad from Evansville, destroy- 
ing a two-span bridge at Independence, and, 
on the 28th, having been joined by the column 
he had sent through Oakland, reached Morgan- 
town, on the Monongahela, north of Grafton. 
He crossed to the west side of the river over 
the suspension bridge and then turned south on 
Fairmont and captured the garrison at that 
place on the 29th, by making a slight detour 
to the west. An unsuccessful effort to save the 
garrison and the railroad bridge was made by / 
rail from Grafton, but came too late. Jones 
drove off this succoring party and then thor- 
oughly destroyed the fine railroad bridge at 
Fairmont (on the Wheeling and Grafton 
branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad). / 
He sent a small party as far as Mannington. 

During the night of the 29th and on the 30th, 
Jones continued his march southward from 
Fairmont, searching for Imboden but avoiding 
Clarksburg, where the Federal troops were in 
strength. He crossed to the south of the rail- S 
road at Bridgeport, five miles east of Clarks- 
burg, capturing the small garrison there, con- 
sisting of 47 men, and destroyed the railroad 
bridge nearby, besides a railroad train which 
was run into Simpson's Creek. He reached 
Philippi at noon of May 1st, where he disen- 

rLofC.i 



IOO JONES S AND IMBODEN S RAID 

cumbered himself of all impedimenta in the 
shape of captured animals, wagons, beef cattle, 
etc. These he sent to Beverly, under escort of 
the Sixth Virginia Cavalry, and with his main 
force moved leisurely to Buckhannon, where he 
found Imboden's command on the 2d of May, 
preparing to move on Weston, in which direc- 
tion the joint command then marched. Their 
route was unobstructed except for the bad con- 
dition of the roads, as Gen. B. S. Roberts, in 
command of the Federal forces, had withdrawn 
to Clarksburg and Grafton all the small garri- 
sons that had held Beverly, Philippi, Buckhan- 
non and Weston, on Imboden's approach to 
those places, destroying vast quantities of 
stores, but still leaving much to fall into Im- 
boden's hands. 

Roberts was more apprehensive of the enemy 
under Jones getting possession of Clarksburg 
and Grafton, with all the military stores and 
railroad material accumulated there, than he 
was of attack from Imboden separately, but 
with a junction of Jones's and Imboden's two 
columns impending, with communication by 
rail already severed east and north by Jones's 
raid, thus cutting him off from all immediate 
reinforcement, Roberts very wisely decided to 
draw in to the railroad, at the two points above 
mentioned, all his scattered garrisons to the 
southward. This he succeeded in accomplish- 
ing by the 28th of April, he himself taking into 
Clarksburg everything from the Weston line 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA IOI 

that he did not destroy, while Colonel Mulligan 
retired into Grafton with the force from 
Philippi. 

Imboden, after getting possession of Beverly, 
on the 24th of April, followed the retreating 
garrison a few miles toward Philippi and then 
discontinued the pursuit. He had previously 
secured possession of the direct road from Bev- 
erly to Buckhannon over Rich Mountain (the 
scene of General McClellan's brilliant opera- 
tions in July, 1861), so that the Beverly garri- 
son was forced to retreat on Buckhannon by a 
detour through Philippi, which it safely ac- 
complished on the 26th, although Imboden had 
pushed out to the Buckhannon River, midway 
between Philippi and Buckhannon, but too late 
to intercept the movement. 

Colonel Mulligan, the Federal commander at 
Grafton, having been reinforced from the east 
by two Maryland regiments from New Creek 
before Jones broke the railroad at Altamont - 
and Oakland, and acting under instructions 
from General Roberts, had reoccupied Philippi 
on the 26th, when the Beverly garrison under 
Colonel Latham had already left for Buckhan- 
non, Mulligan being sent to Philippi to help 
Latham's retirement; but finding Latham was 
safe and that Grafton was being threatened by 
Jones's troopers, Mulligan returned to Grafton 
on the 27th. 

The country north of the Baltimore and j 
Ohio Railroad in West Virginia, and even as 



102 JONES S AND IMBODEN S RAID 

far away as Harrisburg from the region being 
raided, was in an uproarious panic, which was 
greatly intensified by the telegraph operators 
along the railroad sending broadcast alarming 
messages concerning the raiders, before aban- 
doning their posts. The commanding officer at 
Clarksburg, Col. N. Wilkinson, contributed no 
little to the panic by erroneously reporting to 
Roberts the capture of Grafton and Webster, 
and adding that he was preparing to abandon 
Clarksburg. Indeed, it was only after consid- 
erable urging that Roberts induced Wilkinson 
to hold on at Clarksburg until Roberts could 
reach there with the troops on the Buckhannon 
and Weston lines. 

At Wheeling, on the 28th, the banks and the 
postal authorities were packing up their valua- 
bles ready for removal, while the United States 
Ordnance Officer stationed there asked for au- 
thority to "blow up the depot in case it is nec- 
essary" (meaning the Ordnance Depot). Jones 
was then at Morgantown, threatening Pitts- 
burg as well as Wheeling, and his troops, 2,000 
strong, were about to destroy the bridge at 
Fairmont, only twelve miles north of Grafton, 
on the railroad to Wheeling, besides sending a 
detachment to Mannington, only twelve miles 
from Wheeling. To intensify the situation, the 
commanding officer at Clarksburg, Colonel 
Wilkinson, had deemed it prudent two days 
before to destroy a bridge on the railroad five 
miles east of Clarksburg, thereby severing rail 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA I03 

communication with Grafton and obstructing 
any reinforcement to Clarksburg from the 
East. 

The enemy under Jones and Imboden, hav- 
ing joined their forces at Weston, on the 4th 
of May, and withdrawn their raiding parties 
from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of ' 
Clarksburg, an attack on Clarksburg with the 
joint command, then about 6,000 strong, was 
contemplated, but abandoned when information 
had been received of the arrival there of ma- 
terial reinforcements from Harper's Ferry, 
Winchester and New Creek. It was decided, 
instead, that Imboden (whose troops were 
mostly dismounted) should move south, while 
Jones, with his cavalry, should raid the railroad 
west toward Parkersburg. 

This latter movement was commenced on the 
6th of May by sending the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Regiments and part of the Thirty- 
fourth Virginia Cavalry, all under Col. A. W. 
Harman (Twelfth Virginia Cavalry), to West 
Union, while, with the remainder of his com- 
mand, Jones moved westward on the Parkers- 
burg turnpike. Harman destroyed several small 
bridges on the railroad before reuniting with 
the main column under Jones at Cairo, where ' 
several more bridges were burned. From 
Cairo the command went to Oiltown, on the 
Little Kanawha, where, on the 9th of May, it 
destroyed the extensive oilworks and an im- 
mense quantity of the oil. From Oiltown 



104 JONES* S AND IMBODEN^ RAID 

Jones marched southeastward via Glenville and 
Sutton to Summerville, where he again re- 
joined Imboden on the 31st of May, and thence 
returned leisurely to the upper Shenandoah by 
way of the Greenbrier Valley. His losses were 
10 killed, 42 wounded and 15 missing. He 
brought out 1,250 head of cattle and 1,200 
horses, but was unincumbered by wagons dur- 
ing a march of about 700 miles. He claims to 
have killed about 25 of the enemy and wounded 
about 75, besides capturing about 700 prisoners 
with their small arms and one piece of artillery, 
two trains of cars, sixteen railroad bridges 
and a vast quantity of oil, with appurtenances, 
were burned. But he failed to destroy the Cheat 
River Viaduct, which was the main object of 
the expedition. 

Imboden, after sending his sick and stores to 
Monterey by way of Beverly, had moved on 
the 6th south toward Summerville, over very 
bad roads daily made worse by the rains, pass- 
ing through Bulltown and Suttonville.- His 
advance guard, on the 12th of May, captured 
part of the rear guard and train of the Federal 
troops, six miles beyond Summerville, about 
two hours after they had evacuated the town. 

From Summerville Imboden sent part of his 
force to cross the Gauley River at Hughes' 
Ferry and thence via Meadow Bluff to Lewis- 
burg, while the main force marched up the 
Gauley and by the Cold Knob road, both par- 
ties eventually reaching Buffalo Gap near 



INTO WEST VIRGINIA I05 

Staunton. Imboden's losses were only 16 men, 
besides about 200 deserters, but he recruited 
about 500 for his own and W. L. Jackson's 
regiments and brought out about $100,000 
worth of captured horses, mules, wagons and 
arms, besides purchasing, in the country passed 
over, 3,100 head of fine cattle for the Commis- 
sary Department of the Confederate Army. 
The expectation that a considerable part of the 
people of West Virginia would flock to his flag 
was not realized. 

While this double raid from the Shenandoah 
into West Virginia was occurring, Hooker's 
unsuccessful movement across the Rappahan- 
nock above Fredericksburg and the Battle of 
Chancellorsville (May 1, 2 and 3, 1863,) took 
place. In the latter battle the celebrated Gen- 
eral (Stonewall) Jackson was mortally wound- 
ed, his death following a week later. 

It had been Jackson's dream, since the be- 
ginning of hostilities, to lead an expedition to 
Clarksburg, W. Va., which had been his home 
in early life. On the day Jackson's final sum- 
mons reached him (May 10) the Jones-Imbo- 
den raid to the vicinity of Clarksburg had be- 
come an accomplished fact. 

To the comparatively small amount of dam- 
age done by Jones's and Imboden's raid into 
West Virginia, Stoneman's great and destruc- 
tive cavalry raid to the vicinity of Gordons- 
ville and Richmond, at about the same period, 
and his burning of railroad bridges as well 



106 jones's and imboden's raid 

as the commotion he caused, was more than an 
offset. It so disturbed General Lee that, in a 
letter of May 9th to Gen. Sam Jones, he says : 
"You see how General Stoneman has been run- 
ning wild over the State, cutting our railroads, 
etc., and even going to within sight of Rich- 
mond. * * * He must be restricted in his opera- 
tions or we shall be ruined. * * * " 

Had Hooker, with his still preponderating 
force, immediately renewed his attack on Lee 
at Fredericksburg, while Stoneman, with 28 
regiments of cavalry, was operating well to the 
rear on Lee's communications, an important re- 
sult might have been obtained. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND SECOND BAT- 
TLE OF WINCHESTER 

On his return to the Shenandoah Valley, 
Gen. W. E. Jones's Brigade of Cavalry was or- 
dered east of the Blue Ridge by General Lee, 
to join Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry command 
in the region of Culpeper Court-House. Gen, 
A. G. Jenkins's Brigade of Cavalry, from Gen. 
Sam Jones's Department of West Virginia, re- 
placed W. E. Jones's Brigade in the Valley. In 
addition to Jenkins's cavalry, there were then 
in the upper Valley a battalion of Maryland 
cavalry and about a regiment of Maryland in- 
fantry, besides Imboden's Brigade of Partisan 
Rangers at Monterey and local garrisons of 
depot troops, these latter mainly at Staunton, 
the supply point. The aggregate strength of 
the troops in the Valley District May 30, 1863, 
was about 8,000, and Ma j. -Gen. I. R. Trimble 
was assigned to command them. 

The Federal troops, under Milroy, occupied 
Berryville, Winchester and Romney, with out- 
posts toward Strasburg and Front Royal. Har- 
per's Ferry and Maryland Heights, Martins- 
burg, Williamsport and posts westward to 



IOS THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

Cumberland and New Creek were held in 
strength by troops belonging to Gen. B. F. Kel- 
ley's command. 

As early as May 19 General Lee commenced 
his preparations for his second invasion of 
Maryland, which culminated in the Battle of 
Gettysburg. He had been hampered by the 
difficulty of finding troops to meet the threat- 
ening Federal concentrations, not only in his 
own front on the Rappahannock but to meet 
the advance toward Richmond, south of the 
James from Suffolk as well as a concentration 
made at West Point, on York River. 

Burnside, in Kentucky, was already at Som- 
erset on the Cumberland River, having Knox- 
ville as his objective, and the powerful army 
of Rosecrans at Murfreesborough, in Tennes- 
see, was preparing to attack Bragg at Tulla- 
homa and force its way toward Chattanooga. 
Then, too, General Grant had already com- 
menced his Vicksburg campaign on the Mis- 
sissippi, and on the South Atlantic coast troops 
were sorely needed to defend Charleston, Wil- 
mington and intermediate points, so Lee could 
draw no reinforcements from these places. 

It was to divert Federal attention, as well as 
to draw away Federal troops from the threaten- 
ing movements above mentioned, that General 
Lee's second Maryland and the Gettysburg 
campaign were conceived, notwithstanding that 
General Hooker with a vastly superior force 
was immediately confronting him at Freder- 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER IO9 

icksburg, the relative strength of the two ar- 
mies being as 90,000 Confederates to over 
100,000 Federals. 

General Lee reorganized the infantry of his 
Army of Northern Virginia into three army 
corps instead of two, commanded respectively 
by Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. He had 
found that 30,000 men was too large a com- 
mand for any corps commander to handle, es- 
pecially when operating in broken countries. 
His cavalry, under J. E. B. Stuart, was also 
rearranged within brigades, these brigades be- 
ing commanded as before by Wade Hampton, 
Fitz Hugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, W. E. Jones; 
A. G. Jenkins's Brigade being on detached duty 
in the Valley of Virginia (the Shenandoah), 
and Robertson's Brigade still in North Caro- 
lina. The artillery, which was organized by 
battalions and counted altogether 270 guns, 
was assigned by battalions to the three army 
corps, each battalion consisting of four batter- 
ies, usually of four guns each. This gave each 
division of the three army corps a battalion of 
artillery, with an artillery reserve of two bat- 
talions to each corps. 

During the latter part of May information 
came to the Federal authorities that General 
Lee was undoubtedly preparing for some ag- 
gressive movement, indications being that it 
would consist, first, of turning General Hook • 
er's right flank by way of the Upper Rappa- 
hannock. These rumors were confirmed when 



HO THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

Stuart's Cavalry, covering Ewell's and Long- 
street's Corps, advanced on the 7th of June 
from the region of Culpeper Court-House to- 
ward the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and 
above. 

Ewell's Corps had previously been moved, 
on the 4th of June, from Hamilton's Crossing, 
of the Rappahannock, below Fredericksburg, 
across country, via Verdierville and Somer- 
ville Ford, of the Rapidan, to Culpeper, which 
was reached on the 7th of June. Longstreet's 
Corps had been moved also to Culpeper from 
Fredericksburg on the 3d of June. Stuart's 
Cavalry had then been pushed out toward the 
Upper Rappahannock from the vicinity of Cul- 
peper. Stuart was attacked by all of Hooker's 
Cavalry, under Gen. Alfred Pleasanton, sup- 
ported by about 1,500 infantry, the two col- 
umns under Pleasanton having crossed the 
Rappahannock, on the 9th of June, at Beverly 
and Kelly's Fords, and converged toward 
/Brandy Station of the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad. 

From this reconnaissance ensued the. brilliant 
cavalry engagement, on the 9th, known by the 
Confederates as the Battle of Fleetwood and 
by the Federal troops as that of Beverly Ford. 
The movement developed the fact that the Con- 
federates were in very heavy force beyond 
Hooker's right flank, south of the Rappahan- 
nock, and, from papers captured in Stuart's 
camp, that Stuart was to have started on a raid 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER HI 

into Maryland that very day, June 9th, but 
that expedition was then deferred until later. 

Enough was ascertained of the enemy's 
movements, however, to cause Hooker at once 
to move the bulk of his army from in front of 
Fredericksburg toward his right, up the north 
bank of the Rappahannock, so as to be prepared 
to cover Washington while operating on an in- 
terior line to that of the enemy, should the lat- 
ter intend another invasion of Maryland by 
way of the upper Potomac. 

General Lee, who had already moved his 
headquarters to Culpeper, from which point 
he was watching the effect on Hooker's forces 
of the withdrawal of two of his three army 
corps from Fredericksburg, had determined on 
the 7th of June to commence that parr of his 
projected movement which embraced the clear- 
ing of a way through the lower Shenandoah 
Valley, by forcing out of Winchester and 
Berryville the troops then in occupation, under 
Milroy. 

Accordingly, on the 7th of June, he sent or- 
ders to Imboden, then near Monterey with his 
Partisan Ranger Brigade, to move on Roin- 
ney, by way of the South Branch of the Poto- 
mac, through Franklin and Mooreneld On 
the same day he sent orders to Gen. A. G. Jen- 
kins, with his brigade of regular cavalry, to 
move down the Valley of the Shenandoah and 
"to be concentrated at Strasburg or Front 
Royal, or any point in front of either, by Wed- 



112 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

nesday, the ioth instant, with a view to co- 
operate with a force of infantry. Your pickets 
can be kept in advance as far as you may deem 
best toward Winchester. * * * " 

Imboden's movement was intended mainly 
"to attract the enemy's attention in Hampshire 
County," and to detain "whatever force they 
may have at New Creek, Cumberland, Caca- 
pon, etc." ; but Imboden's general instructions 
were : "Of course, do them all the injury in 
your power, by striking them a damaging blow 
at any point where opportunity offers, and 
where you deem most practicable. It will be 
important, if you can accomplish it, to destroy 
some of the bridges, so as to prevent communi- 
cation and the transfer of reinforcements to 
Martinsburg." Imboden, with his force of 
2,500 men, was then to "cooperate with any 
troops that he might find operating in the 
Shenandoah Valley" ; he was also "to collect 
in the country passed through all the cattle and 
recruits possible." General Lee had kept Im- 
boden's brigade of partisans independent of all 
other commands and had him report directly to 
himself (General Lee) for orders. Imboden's 
command was made up mainly of mountaineers 
recruited in the Alleghenies, thoroughly famil- 
iar with every valley, stream or cattle track. 
Moreover, under the Confederate Partisan 
Ranger Act of April 21, 1862, they enjoyed 
immunity from the treatment usually accorded 
the ordinary guerilla, and, besides, were given 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 1 13 

a bonus for all property (munitions of war) 
captured by them and turned over to the regu- 
larly constituted Confederate agents. Their 
loyalty and zeal were thus doubly stimulated. 

The day following the cavalry engagement 
at Beverly Ford of the Upper Rappahannock, 
Ewell's Corps was set in motion from near 
Culpeper for the Shenandoah, moving via 
Gaines's Cross-Roads, Flint Hill and Front 
Royal, reaching Cedarville in the Valley on the 
1 2th of June. There, on the 13th, Ewell de- 
tached Rodes's Division, with Jenkin's Cav- 
alry Brigade, to move on Berryville and en- 
deavor to capture McReynolds's Brigade of 
Milroy's Division, about 2,000 strong, which 
had been in position there for several months, 
but McReynolds made good his retirement on 
Winchester where he joined Milroy's main 
force. 

Ewell sent Early's Division toward Win- 
chester via Newtown and the Valley turnpike, 
while Edward Johnson's Division moved upon 
Winchester by the direct road from Front 
Royal. The three divisions were all in posi- 
tion before Winchester on the morning of June 
14. Part of the outer works on the west side 
of the town, near the Pughtown road, were 
captured by some of Early's troops late in the 
afternoon and the main works thereby ren- 
dered untenable by Milroy's forces, who, dur- 
ing the night, endeavored to retire on Martins- 
burg. This, Ewell claims to have foreseen and 



114 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

provided against, by sending Johnson's Divi- 
sion late in the evening to place himself on the 
Martinsburg turnpike about two and a half 
miles north of Winchester, but Johnson could 
not reach the position assigned him until after 
Milroy's retreat had commenced, and when 
Milroy endeavored to cut through, the head of 
Johnson's column, near the Martinsburg pike, 
was ready to receive him and fired into Mil- 
roy's right flank, eventually throwing him into 
confusion. General Milroy, with a small party 
only, succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry, al- 
though many other small parties of fugitives 
reached that place the following day. 

By the abandonment of Winchester on the 
night of June 14, twenty-three pieces of ar- 
tillery, 4,000 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, 
more than 300 horses and a quantity of stores 
fell into the hands of the Confederates; their 
loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 miss- 
ing. Anticipating some such disaster, General 
Halleck from Washington had on the nth of 
June, as soon as General Lee's threatened 
movement into the Shenandoah Valley became 
probable, ordered Gen. Robert C. Schenck at 
Baltimore, to withdraw General Milroy's com- 
mand from Winchester to Harper's Ferry, but 
the order had not been carried out when Ewell 
attacked there. 

Although Rodes's Division of Ewell's Corps 
met some little resistance to his movement on 
Berryville, the troops of McReynolds's Fed- 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 115 

eral Brigade succeeded in reaching Winchester 
by a roundabout way, safely, on the 13th. 
Rodes then moved on Martinsburg, sending 
Jenkins's cavalry through Bunker Hill. Mar- 
tinsburg was evacuated during the evening of 
the 14th, the Federal infantry troops retiring 
unmolested toward Shepherdstown and Har- 
per's Ferry, while the artillery, with a small in- 
fantry support, endeavored to reach Williams- 
port, but lost in the attempt five out of six guns 
and about 200 prisoners. On the 15th Rodes had 
crossed his three brigades at Williamsport and 
had sent Jenkins's Cavalry Brigade forward 
toward Chambersburg. On the 19th Rodes 
moved to Hagerstown and went into camp on 
the Boonsborough road, while Johnson crossed 
to Sharpsburg and Early moved from Win- 
chester to Shepherdstown, to threaten Harper's 
Ferry, which still held out. Otherwise, the en- 
tire Shenandoah was once more in possession 
of the Confederates. 

It was peculiarly fitting that General Lee 
should have entrusted to E well's Corps (for- 
merly Jackson's) the recovery of that section 
of country, for the year previous Ewell had 
operated with Stonewall Jackson by way of 
Front Royal on Winchester, Martinsburg and 
Harper's Ferry, and he, as well as his troops, 
was thoroughly familiar with the terrain. 

The cooperation of Imboden, by way of the 
valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, 
through Franklin, Moorefield and Romney, was 



Il6 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

also very fruitful of results and proved to be an 
invaluable flanking party to Ewell's more se- 
rious column. On the 18th of June Imboden 
reported to General Lee from French's Depot, 
v on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, that he 
had destroyed all the important bridges on that 
railroad, with water tanks, depots and engines, 
between the Little Cacapon River and Cumber- 
land. Also that he had collected and sent back 
a large quantity of horses and cattle. General 
Lee then authorized Imboden to move north on 
the left flank of Ewell's Corps. 

General Lee, on the 16th, had moved his 
own headquarters from Culpeper to Millwood, 
near Winchester, and then to Berryville, where 
he perfected the subsequent movements of his 
army into Maryland and Pennsylvania. He 
maintained communication with Richmond by 
way of the Valley to Staunton and thence via 
Gordonsville. 

Longstreet's Corps was put in motion from 
Culpeper toward Winchester via Front Royal 
on the 15th, and A. P. Hill's Corps was all 
withdrawn from Fredericksburg by the 17th, 
as soon as it was definitely ascertained that 
Hooker's entire army had been marched away 
from that front and that Richmond was no 
longer threatened from that direction. Hill 
moved across country by way of Germanna 
Ford of the Rapidan to Culpeper and thence 
followed the route of Longstreet's Corps. 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 1 17 

Stuart's cavalry moved on the right flank of 
Longstreet's column, effectually screening the 
latter's movements, being repeatedly required 
to repel the enterprising efforts of Pleasanton's 
Federal cavalry from penetrating to the passes 
of the Blue Ridge at Ashby's and Snicker's 
Gaps, which Longstreet held. Spirited cavalry 
fighting occurred at Aldie, Middleburg and 
Upperville on the 17th, 19th and 21st of June, 
both bodies of cavalry being engaged in mask- 
ing the location of their respective main ar- 
mies, in which for several days each was very 
successful. Stuart was eventually forced back 
beyond Upperville and into Ashby's Gap. 

On the 1 6th of June Hooker had his own 
headquarters at Fairfax Station, and concen- 
trated his entire army near the old Bull Run 
battlefields, at Manassas, Centreville and Fair- 
fax Court-House. It was Lee's announced in- 
tention to attack Hooker in case he took up any 
faulty position after being drawn away from 
the line of the Rappahannock, and, with this in 
view, Stuart's cavalry, supported by Long- 
street's infantry, was specially zealous in his 
efforts to develop Hooker's whereabouts. 

At Harper's Ferry, on the 15th of June, were 
concentrated the remnants of Milroy's Division 
from Berryville and Winchester, Tyler's Bri- 
gade from Martinsburg, and the original garri- 
son of Harpers Ferry, in all a force of about 
6,000 men, which was placed mainly upon 
Maryland Heights, on the north bank of the 



Il8 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

Potomac, a strong grandguard only occupying 
the town. The whole was placed under the com- 
mand of Gen. Dan Tyler, Milroy being relieved 
for his delay in leaving Winchester and for 
the disaster to his command which thereby en- 
sued. Milroy's conduct was soon afterwards 
investigated by a court of inquiry, which ac- 
quitted Milroy of all blame, as his immediate 
commander, Gen. R. C. Schenck, had author- 
ized Milroy only to prepare to evacuate but to 
then await further orders, which never came. 

With the capture of Winchester and the ap- 
pearance of so large a portion of Lee's army 
north of the Potomac, at Williamsport and be- 
yond, any doubts that may have remained of 
Lee's intentions were dispelled from the minds 
of President Lincoln and his advisers. At this 
time the relations between General Hooker and 
the General-in-Chief of the Army ( General Hal- 
leck) had become so strained that the former 
never communicated with the latter if he could 
avoid it. In a dispatch to the President of 
June 16th, n a. m., Hooker says: "You have 
long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not 
enjoyed the confidence of the Major-General 
commanding the army, and I assure you so 
long as this continues we may look in vain for 
success, especially as future operations will re- 
quire our relations to be more dependent upon 
each other than heretofore. * * * " . 

At 10 p. m. that same night (June 16) Mr. 
Lincoln telegraphed General Hooker : "To re- 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER Il<) 

move all misunderstanding, I now place you in 
the strict military relation to General Halleck 
of a commander of one of the armies to the 
General-in-Chief of all the armies. I have not 
intended differently, but as it seems to be dif- 
ferently understood, I shall direct him to give 
you orders and you to obey them." 

Almost simultaneously, at 10.15 p - M v Gen- 
eral Halleck directed General Hooker to move 
a strong column of his army to Leesburg, "to 
ascertain where the enemy is and then move to 
the relief of Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, as 
circumstances might require. With the re- 
mainder of your force in proper position to sup- 
port this, I want you to push your cavalry to 
ascertain something definite about the enemy." 

It has been seen that Hooker's cavalry was 
already in motion to endeavor to locate Lee's 
main army, and that it became hotly engaged 
with the Confederate cavalry at Aldie, on the 
17th, but could not penetrate the screen suffi- 
ciently far to develop the infantry supports of 
Longstreet's Corps, then holding the passes of 
the Blue Ridge. On that date Tyler, with 
about 10,000 men, was on Maryland Heights, 
opposite Harper's Ferry, unmolested, although 
threatened by Ewell's Corps and Jenkins's cav- 
alry, which had crossed the Potomac northwest 
of him two days before. On the 17th, also, the 
Twelfth Corps of Hooker's Army, under Slo- 
cum, was put in motion for Leesburg, the re- 
mainder of his army being strung out on a line 



120 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

that passed through Gum Springs, Centreville, 
and Sangster's Station. In the absence of defi- 
nite information of the whereabouts of Lee's 
main army or of the latter's intentions, it was 
not deemed prudent either by General Halleck 
or by General Hooker to move any portion of 
the Army of the Potomac north into Maryland, 
and it was only on the 25th, when Lee's un- 
doubted movement on Harrisburg became con- 
firmed, for all his infantry had then crossed 
the Potomac, that Hooker's army was also 
moved across the Potomac at Leesburg and 
Edward's Ferry in pursuit of Lee. At Pooles- 
ville, in Maryland, on the 25th of June, Gen- 
eral Hooker reported his strength at 105,000 
men. On the 27th he requested to be relieved 
of the command of the Army of the Potomac, 
owing to a new disagreement with General 
Halleck. His request was complied with at 
once and Gen. George G. Meade designated as 
his successor. Under the latter the Army of 
the Potomac was marched to Gettysburg, 
where Lee had concentrated his army, and 
where was fought what is considered the blood- 
iest battle of the war, resulting in Lee's defeat 
and the retreat of his army back to the south 
side of the Potomac at Falling Waters, which 
was safely accomplished on the 14th of July. 

On leaving Winchester to move into Mary- 
land, on the 1 8th of June, Early left the Thir- 
teenth Virginia Infantry to garrison the town, 
having previously sent the Fifty-fourth North 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 121 

Carolina and the Fifty-eighth Virginia back to 
Staunton to escort the prisoners, about 3,000 in 
number, taken from Milroy and Tyler. 

On the 1 6th of July, after his return from 
Pennsylvania, Lee's army was encamped 
around Bunker Hill, Va., between Winchester 
and Harper's Ferry. He reported to President 
Davis he did not need any more troops, and 
recommended that such as had been collected 
be kept in front of Richmond as a protection 
to that city. Lee also wrote : "I learn the 
enemy has thrown a pontoon bridge over the 
Potomac at Harper's Ferry. Should he follow 
us in this direction, I shall lead him up the Val- 
ley, and endeavor to attack him as far from his 
base as possible." 

From Culpeper, on the 24th of July, Gen- 
eral Lee reported that his intention had been to 
move his army into Loudoun County, but the 
high water in the Shenandoah River had first 
prevented that movement and then the enemy 
had occupied in such strong force the passes of 
the Blue Ridge that they could not easily be 
forced, and, besides, he threatened a movement 
on Richmond. This determined Lee to move 
up the Valley and cross the Blue Ridge at 
Chester's and Thornton's Gaps. 

While threatened by Meade's main army on 
one flank from the Blue Ridge, Lee had also 
been more or less annoyed by the Federal forces 
sent after him by way of Harper's Ferry, and 
by a column which Gen. B. F. Kelley had hasti- 



122 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

ly gathered in West Virginia, and had moved 
via Hancock, where he crossed the Potomac, 
on Lee's other flank. At Hedgesville, on the 
19th of July, Kelley had a brisk engagement 
with some of the enemy's forces holding Mar- 
tinsburg; he reoccupied Martinsburg with Av- 
erell's Brigade on the 25th and Winchester on 
the 26th. 

Gen. John D. Imboden, on the 21st of July, 
had been assigned to command the Valley Dis- 
trict by Lee, in recognition of his valuable serv- 
ices during the Gettysburg campaign and be- 
cause of his great familiarity with the country. 
His troops consisted of his own partisan bri- 
grade of infantry, cavalry and artillery, known 
as the Northwestern Brigade and numbering 
about 2,500 men. His headquarters were in 
the upper Valley. General Lee's instructions 
to Imboden were to be vigilant and to seize 
every opportunity to strike the enemy a blow, 
"and annoy him all in your power." On the 
26th of July Imboden was near Woodstock 
with his command, when he was urged by Gen- 
eral Lee to make "a rapid movement upon Pied- 
mont or some point higher up the railroad." 
Imboden undertook the above-mentioned raid 
in September, of which mention will be made 
later on. 

Averell had moved his brigade away from 
Winchester altogether, on the 5th of August, 
to Moorefield via Wardensville, and to the 
Upper Valley of the South Branch of the Po- 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 1 23 

tomac, on an expedition toward Lewisburg 
which finally reached the vicinity of White Sul- 
phur Springs, in Greenbrier County, where, at 
Rocky Gap, on the 26th of August, Averell 
met a force under Gen. Echols, of Gen. Sam 
Jones's command, too strong for him to drive 
out, and which forced him to retire through 
Huntersville to Beverly, where he arrived and 
took station on the 31st of August. He was 
again within the limits of the territory assigned 
him to command. 

Winchester was not then reoccupied in force 
by Federal troops, being only visited occasion- 
ally by patrols sent out from Harper's Ferry 
or Martinsburg. At Harper's Ferry there was 
a force of 5,500 men under Gen. Henry H. 
Lockwood. A brigade under McReynolds was 
stationed at Martinsburg, and a brigade under 
Col. J. A. Mulligan was sent from New 
Creek to occupy Moorefield and Petersburg, in 
the South Potomac Valley, after Averell had 
passed south, as an outpost from New Creek on 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. A small 
force was also posted by General Kelley at 
Romney, 27 miles down the South Branch of 
the Potomac from Moorefield. 

The Department of West Virginia, com- 
manded by Gen. B. F. Kelley, had been extend- 
ed on the 9th of August so as to include all the 
State of Maryland west of the Monocacy River, 
and that portion of Virginia in the vicinity of 
Harper's Ferry. By the tri-monthly return of 



124 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND 

August io, 1863, the troops therein numbered 
18,114 present for duty, soon afterwards in- 
creased to nearly 30,000. These were dis- 
tributed as follows : Maryland Heights Divi- 
sion, 5,000; Martinsburg, 3,000; Sir John's 
Run and Romney, 1,000; New Creek (Key- 
ser), 3,000; Petersburg, 3,000; Grafton and 
Parkersburg, 3,000; Kanawha, 6,000; Beverly, 
4,000, and several small scattered commands. 

v The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was thus 
securely guarded throughout its entire length, 
and direct communication maintained with the 
West. 

This was a period of great depression in the 
North as well as at the South. Following 
Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, in July, and his es- 
cape back to his old position, near Culpeper, 
came the draft riots in New York and the nec- 
essary detachment of a large force from 
Meade's army to quell them. For the time be- 
ing all eyes were then turned toward East Ten- 
nessee, where Burnside had succeeded in reach- 
ing and establishing himself at Knoxville, 
while Rosecrans, moving on Burnside's flank 
farther west, had crossed the Tennessee River, 
and was seeking to gain possession of Chat- 
tanooga. To arrest the progress of Rosecrans, 
Lee detached from his army Longstreet's en- 

v tire Army Corps, and hurried it by rail through 
North Carolina and Atlanta to reinforce 
Bragg's army in Northern Georgia. 



SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 1 25 

All the Confederate armies had become 
greatly weakened by the enormous losses inci- 
dent to the campaigns and battles of the pre- 
ceding two years, to which should be added the 
appalling number of desertions of those whom 
the terrible experiences of the war had disheart- 
ened. It had already become almost entirely 
impossible to procure recruits, even by the ex- 
traordinary methods of conscription, the age 
limit even being extended so as to take in boys 
of eighteen and men of forty-five. 

In the hope that many of those hiding in de- 
sertion might be induced to return to the ranks, 
President Davis, in August, proclaimed am- 
nesty to such as would rejoin within twenty 
days, the women of the Confederacy being con- 
jured to use their all-powerful influence to aid 
the measure. Meanwhile, patrols were actively 
searching every possible hiding place of those 
recreant, but generally meeting armed resist- 
ance. 

General Lee himself, in a letter to President 
Davis from Orange Court-House, August 8, 
gives the following despondent view of the 
situation : "We must expect reverses, even de- 
feats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and 
prudence. * * * I know how prone we are to 
censure and how ready to blame others for the 
non-fulfillment of our expectations. This is un- 
becoming in a generous people, and I grieve to 
see its expression. The general remedy for the 
want of success in a military commander is his 
removal. This is natural, and, in many in- 



126 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 

stances, proper. * * * I have been prompted by 
these reflections more than once since my re- 
turn from Pennsylvania to propose to Your 
Excellency the propriety of selecting another 
commander for this army. I have seen and 
heard expression of discontent in the public 
journals as the result of the expedition. I do 
not know how far this feeling extends to the 
army. * * * I, therefore, in all sincerity, request 
Your Excellency to take measures to supply 
my place. * * * I hope Your Excellency will 
attribute my request to the true reason, the de- 
sire to serve my country, and to do all in my 
power to insure the success of her righteous 
cause. * * * " 

This request of General Lee, however, was 
never granted. 

At the North, also, great dissatisfaction had 
been expressed in the newspapers at General 
Meade's failure to attack and destroy Lee's 
army when he found it still north of the Poto- 
mac, ten days after the Battle of Gettysburg, 
and trying to cross that swollen river in the 
vicinity of Williamsport. The explanation 
made by General Meade, why Lee was not at- 
tacked in his perilous position, apparently sat- 
isfied the Washington authorities, for Meade 
was continued in command of the Army of the 
Potomac until the close of the war. When 
General Grant was brought from the Middle 
West, in March, 1864, and placed in command 
of all the armies in the field, he selected the 
Army of the Potomac to supervise in particular. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

With a view to carrying out General Lee's 
instructions "to seize every opportunity to 
strike the enemy a blow and annoy him all in 
your power," Imboden, on the 13th of Septem- 
ber, 1863, from near Brock's Gap in the upper 
Valley, reported several minor engagements of 
his Rangers in the Valley District, which in- 
cluded a foray through Winchester to Bath 
(Berkeley Springs) on the 6th, killing, wound- 
ing and capturing part of Wynkoop's Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry at the latter place. Also an af- 
fair between four companies of Imboden's cav- 
alry and a small force of Federal infantry and 
cavalry, on the nth, near Moorefield, killing 
and capturing, with small loss, about 150 of the 
latter by surprise. Imboden stated : "I am 
so well convinced of the utility of this mode of 
warfare on the border, that day after to-mor- 
row I start out two parties, one of 100 men 
under Major Lang, Sixty-second Virginia Reg- 
iment, to penetrate the enemy's country north 
of Beverly on foot, and harass the enemy two 



128 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

or three weeks in Barbour and Randolph; the 
other, a single company, under Captain Nelson, 
to go to the North Fork, in Pendleton, and try 
to clear out Snyder's gang of Union robbers 
and murderers, known as 'Swamp Dragoons.' 
All remains quiet in the lower Valley. Only a 
small force of the enemy at Martinsburg and 
Harper's Ferry, and they stick to the railroad 
very closely. * * *" 

The most serious of these small affairs was 
the capture of 356 officers and men, mostly of 
the Ninth Maryland Infantry (Colonel Simp- 
son), at Charlestown, ten miles southwest of 
Harper's Ferry, on the 18th of October, by a 
force of about 1,500 men belonging to Imbo- 
den's, Gilmor's and White's commands, with 
artillery. This Confederate party was in turn 
attacked by a force, sent out from Harper's 
Ferry by Gen. Jer. C. Sullivan, who had suc- 
ceeded to that command when General Lock- 
wood was relieved. Imboden was driven 
through Charlestown to near Berryville, the 
Federals capturing twenty-one prisoners and 
killing or wounding about as many more. 

This movement by Imboden was in pursu- 
ance of orders sent him by General Lee on the 
9th of October, when Lee commenced his flank- 
ing march around Meade's army at Culpeper, 
and which forced the latter to retire north of 
Bull Run. Lee in his report, dated October 23, 
says : "General Imboden was instructed to ad- 
vance down the Valley and guard the gaps on 
our left." 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 29 

Imboden fell back from Berryville, first, to 
Front Royal, and then to the upper Valley by 
way of Powell's Fort Valley, to meet an ex- 
pected expedition under Averell, which was re- 
ported to be forming near Huttonsville, in Ty- 
gart's River Valley, west of the main Alleghen- 
ies, and threatening to move either upon Staun- 
ton or Lewisburg. 

This movement was started by Averell, by 
orders from Gen. B. F. Kelley, on the ist of 
November, and proceeded over Cheat Moun- 
tain into the Valley of the Greenbrier, via Camp 
Bartow, to Huntersville, which it reached on 
the 4th. It consisted of Averell's entire bri- 
gade, except about 400 men, left to hold Bev- 
erly; about half of it was mounted infantry. 
Averell attacked the Confederates under Gen. 
John Echols on Droop Mountain, twenty miles 
north of Lewisburg, on the 6th, completely de- 
feating him and driving him out in the direc- 
tion of Lewisburg, where Averell followed him 
through the town on the 7th, Echols's men 
retreating toward Union and the narrows of 
New River, blockading the roads behind them. 

On reaching Lewisburg, Averell found Duf- 
fle's Federal cavalry brigade, which had just 
arrived from Meadow Bluff and the Kanawha 
to the westward, but not in time to intercept the 
Confederate fugitives from Droop Mountain. 
Averell's instructions from Kelley contempla- 
ted a further movement from Lewisburg toward 
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dub- 



I30 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

lin, to destroy an important bridge at that 
point, but discretion was left to Averell as to 
that further movement after he should have 
reached Lewisburg and been joined there by 
Duffie. 

On the 8th, Averell, with Duffie, again push- 
ed forward toward Dublin via Union, but after 
going a few miles he found the road so formi- 
dably blockaded that it was necessary to cut out 
a passage. Here General Duffie reported his 
men as being unfit for further operations, hav- 
ing only one day's rations left and so exhausted 
as to be able to march only ten miles per day. 
This decided Averell to abandon further pur- 
suit of Echols and to send Duffie back to Mea- 
dow Bluff, while he (Averell) should send his 
dismounted troops (two regiments) and one 
battery back to Beverly, escorting the prison- 
ers, captured property, etc. With his mounted 
troops, Averell then proceeded to carry out the 
remainder of Kelley's instructions, which were 
to "move by any route you may think best, into 
the Valley of the South Branch (of the Poto- 
mac), and down that to New Creek, where 
supplies will be in readiness for you." 

Accordingly, with his mounted troops (four 
regiments) and Ewing's Battery, Averell 
marched through White Sulphur Springs and 
the August battle-ground of Dry Creek 
(Rocky Gap), picking up his wounded who 
had been cared for by the Confederates since 
August, and reached Callaghan's, on the road 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 131 

to Covington, early on the 9th of November. 
He was then on the east side of the main Alle- 
gheny Mountains. Learning that Imboden, 
with a small force of about 1,500 men, was at 
Covington, he sent a small mounted party to 
brush him away from his line of march, cap- 
turing a few prisoners. 

From Callaghan's the march northward was 
continued by Gatewood's into the Valley of 
Back Creek (a branch of Jackson's River), 
thence up that stream and through Hightown 
and Monterey to Franklin, in the South Branch 
Valley, and to Petersburg, which latter place 
was reached on the 13th and supplies found 
for the command. On the 17th Averell arrived 
at New Creek (Keyser), bringing with him 
about 150 captured horses, several hundred 
head of cattle and 27 prisoners, taken in addi- 
tion to those already sent to Beverly. Averell' s 
losses at Droop Mountain aggregated 119 kill- 
ed, wounded and missing ; those of the enemy, 
as stated by General Echols, were 275. 

The part taken by Imboden in the foregoing 
operations was important only as one of ob- 
servation. He was at Goshen, on the railroad, 
a few miles west of Staunton, on the 6th of 
November, with most of his command, and at 
Covington on the 8th; from there he returned 
to Goshen via Clifton Forge on the 10th and 
to Buffalo Gap, near Staunton, on the nth, 
which place he feared might receive a visit 
from Averell by way of Monterey. That not 



I3 2 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

coming off, Imboden moved his command far- 
ther down the Valley to near Mount Jackson, 
sending occasional scouting parties toward 
Berryville, Strasburg, and Moorefield. 

Having rested and refitted his brigade at 
New Creek (Keyser) since his arrival there, 
on the 17th of November, General Averell 
started out again on another expedition into the 
enemy's country on the 8th of December. His 
general instructions from Gen. B. F. Kelley, 
commanding the Department of West Vir- 
ginia, were to proceed via Petersburg, Frank- 
lin and Monterey, by the most practicable 
route to the line of the Virginia and Tennessee 
Railroad at Bonsack's Station, in Botetourt 
County, or Salem, in Roanoke County, or, by 
dividing his command, move on both points at 
the same time. The object was to destroy or 
cripple that railroad. At Petersburg, Averell 
was to pick up two regiments of infantry and a 
battery belonging to Thoburn's Brigade, carry- 
ing them with him as far as Monterey, at the 
head of the South Branch Valley, where he 
was to leave them to guard his train and await 
his return. Having accomplished the object of 
his expedition, Averell was to return to the Bal- 
timore and Ohio Railroad, at any point he 
might deem best, between Harper's Ferry and 
New Creek. 

After receiving these orders, Averell secured 
from General Kelley several modifications of 
them, which proved of great value as coopera- 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 33 

tions or diversions. One was that, simultane- 
ously with his own movement, Scammon 
should move his forces in the Kanawha region 
eastward to Lewisburg, as a protection against 
any forces of the enemy coming in from the 
north, and then to operate to the southward, on 
Union or beyond. The date fixed for Scam- 
mon to be at Lewisburg was December 12th, 
and he was to remain in that vicinity until 
the 1 8th. 

Moor's Brigade was to move forward from 
Beverly toward Droop Mountain, reaching that 
vicinity also on the 12th, and to remain until 
the 1 8th, when he was to withdraw, bringing 
off the wounded left behind near there after the 
battle of the 6th November. 

Sullivan's Division, at Harper's Ferry, was 
to move up to Woodstock, in the Valley, so as 
to get there by the 12th of December, and re- 
main near there until the 18th, when he was to 
move still farther toward Staunton and threat- 
en that place, in cooperation with Thoburn's 
forces from the direction of Monterey. 

It will thus be seen that all of General Kel- 
ley's troops were intended to be in motion to- 
ward a common center simultaneously, except 
those guarding the railroad at and west of 
Grafton. 

Averell's own brigade was essentially a fly- 
ing column, being composed of the Second, 
Third and Eighth West Virginia Mounted In- 
fantry, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Gib- 



134 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

son's Battalion of Cavalry and Ewing's Light 
Battery. He and Thoburn reached Monterey 
on the 1 2th, where Thoburn, with all the 
wagons except about forty, was sent to Mc- 
Dowell, on the Parkersburg road to Staunton, 
while Averell with his flying column and the 
forty wagons proceeded down Back Creek, a 
fork of Jackson's River, where, at Gatewood's, 
on the 13th, he came upon the rear-guard of 
W. L. Jackson's regiment (the Nineteenth Vir- 
ginia) retreating from the Greenbrier coun- 
try, west of the mountains, whence they had 
been driven out by Moor's Brigade from Bev- 
erly, as intended they should be. 

Pushing on to Callaghan's, which he reach- 
ed on the 14th, Averell got information that 
Scammon had carried out his part of the gen- 
eral movement and was at Lewisburg, whence 
he had driven the Confederates, under Echols, 
and who were then retreating on Union and the 
Narrows of New River. 

Early on the 15th of December Averell made 
a demonstration toward Covington as a feint 
to cover his main movement toward Salem, on 
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, by way 
of Sweet Sulphur Springs and New Castle. 
Salem was reached early on the 16th, just in 
time to partially tear up the railroad near the 
depot before a train loaded with troops ap- 
proached from the direction of Lynchburg, 
which, by a few well-directed artillery shots, 
was forced to run back again. Parties were 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 135 

then sent out by Averell several miles to the 
eastward and westward to more thoroughly de- 
stroy the railroad, while everything that could 
be of value to the enemy in the vicinity of Sa- 
lem was destroyed during the next six hours, 
when the command withdrew about seven miles 
on the New Castle road, by which it had come, 
and went into camp after a march of about 
80 miles in 30 hours. A heavy rain then came 
up which made the return to New Castle very 
dangerous as well as difficult in the swollen 
creek bottoms, so that it was sundown of the 
1 8th when New Castle was reached, and, as 
Averell says, with ammunition wet and the 
command "drenched, muddy and hungry * * * 
in miserable condition to make the march be- 
fore us." 

At New Castle, Averell learned that Fitz- 
hugh Lee, with his own and Imboden's troops, 
besides some cadets and militia from Lexing- 
ton, Va., was near Fincastle, a few miles east 
of New Castle, and that Sam. Jones, with 
troops from Union, was on the Sweet Springs 
road, north and west of him. With his ammu- 
nition virtually destroyed by the recent storms, 
Averell realized the necessity of avoiding a bat- 
tle with either of the enemy's converging 
columns, so he determined to retreat to Coving- 
ton in a northeasterly direction, which he suc- 
ceeded in doing, although with some slight op- 
position from a mounted force of Confederates 
when still eight miles from Jackson's River. 



I36 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

A captured dispatch of the 19th from Gem 
Sam. Jones to General Early, the latter being 
then at Millborough on the railroad between 
Covington and Staunton, informed Averell of 
the large force that had been sent by General 
Lee to intercept him, in addition to W. L. Jack- 
son's command at Clifton Forge and Fitzhugh 
Lee's forces, above mentioned. 

Averell succeeded in getting all his com- 
mand, except one regiment and his small wagon 
train, across Jackson's River and through Cov- 
ington during the night of the 19th, although 
sharply attacked by Jackson's troops in their 
efforts to destroy the bridges and thus cut him 
off. This isolated regiment (the Fourteenth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry) forded the river the 
following day, losing, however, over 120 pris- 
oners and several men drowned, besides all the 
wagons and ambulances, but rejoined Averell 
at Callaghan's. 

By following the very blind and seldom-used 
Cold Knob road, Averell then took his com- 
mand over the main Allegheny Mountains and 
across the Greenbrier Valley to the northern 
slope of Droop Mountain, where he encamped 
on the night of the 21st, successfully avoiding 
contact with the advanced parties of Ewell's 
column, then reported to be at Gatewood's, only 
twenty miles to the eastward. At Droop Moun- 
tain, Averell expected to hear of Colonel 
Moor's command, which he had ordered to re- 
main there until the 18th before withdrawing, 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 137 

but who had retired on the 14th by General 
Kelley's order. So Averell pushed on for Ed- 
ray and Beverly with his very tired command 
of 2,500 men, over execrable roads, but unmo- 
lested by any enemy except a slight rear-guard 
action near Edray on the 22d. He reached 
Beverly safely on the 24th of December, having 
marched over 400 miles. 

The country passed through by Averell is 
the most broken and mountainous of any in 
the Eastern United States, and the difficulty of 
campaigning in it can only be appreciated by 
a visit. 

The valleys run nearly north and south, en- 
closed on the east and west by superb mountain 
ranges, most entrancing in summer but very 
forbidding in winter. The large streams be- 
come torrents in the rainy season, when wag- 
oning is both difficult and hazardous. The 
bottom lands are very fertile and furnish large 
crops, while cattle, sheep and horses are abun- 
dant. 

As above mentioned, Scammon with the Ka- 
nawha troops left Lewisburg sooner than Av- 
erell expected, and while he was still far within 
the enemy's country at Salem with his flying 
column, beyond all possible support. This left 
the enemy free to act from the direction of 
Union. Colonel Moor, who was to remain near 
Droop Mountain and Frankford until the 18th 
of December, was withdrawn several days be- 
fore that date. Thoburn, with 700 men, who 



I3§ THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

had been detached at Monterey on the 12th and 
sent toward McDowell and Staunton on the 
Parkersburg pike to attract the enemy's atten- 
tion from Averell's main movement, after ac- 
complishing that mission returned to his sta- 
tion at Petersburg. The force sent directly up 
the Shenandoah Valley from Sullivan's com- 
mand at Harper's Ferry went as far as Harri- 
sonburg, threatening Staunton, 25 miles far- 
ther to the southward, and for a few days held 
the attention of Imboden's forces, as well as 
Early's and Fitzhugh Lee's, from Averell's 
movements on Salem. The enemy attempted 
to cut off this detachment by sending Colonel 
Rosser from Lee's army with a brigade of cav- 
alry to fall upon its rear by way of Front Royal, 
but could not cross the Shenandoah River by 
reason of high water. Sullivan's detachment 
returned to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry 
on the 24th of December, the same day that 
Averell reached Beverly. Early, with his two 
brigades of infantry and Lee's two brigades of 
cavalry, having given up all hope of intercept- 
ing Averell's retreat, followed Sullivan's troops 
down the Valley through Harrisonburg to New 
Market, at which latter place, on the 24th of 
December, Early reported to General Lee the 
failure of all the Confederate columns, about 
15,000 men in all, to head off or get contact 
with Averell. On this report Gen. R. E. Lee 
endorsed: "High water and erroneous re- 
ports, with untoward events, prevented the sue- 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 139 

cess of the arrangements that I had hoped 
would have resulted in Averell's capture." 

After a short rest at Beverly, Averell march- 
ed his brigade to Webster via Philippi, where 
he put it on the cars and moved to Martins- 
burg, which place he reached on the 31st of 
December, 1863, just in time to prepare for the 
enemy under Imboden, Fitzhugh Lee and Ros- 
ser, who were demonstrating from the direc- 
tion of Winchester to cover a movement the 
last two named were making on Moorefield and 
Petersburg by way of Wardensville, which 
was eventually extended to the vicinity of New 
Creek and the. railroad',; but this movement 
failed of success on account of the high streams 
and the bitterly cold weather, so that Lee 
returned to Harrisonburg via Romney, Lost 
River and Brock's Gap. The only success Lee 
had was the capture of a small wagon train of 
artillery ammunition, about 100 prisoners and 
as many cattle. He reported there were very 
few supplies to be found in the region passed 
over, as it had long been occupied by an enemy. 

With the appearance of Early's forces in the 
lower Valley, a brigade of infantry was sent 
from General Meade's army to strengthen the 
troops holding points between Harper's Ferry 
and Cumberland. 

A new epoch may then be stated to have 
taken place in the Valley, commencing with 
Gen. Jubal A. Early's being placed in command 
there at the beginning of Averell's third raid 



14° THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

and dating from December 15, 1863, when, by 
S. O. 308, Headquarters Army of Northern 
Virginia, General Lee directed Early to "pro- 
ceed to Staunton, Va., and assume command of 
all the troops there and in the Valley of Vir- 
ginia, and make the best disposition of the 
same to resist the advance of the enemy." This 
order, of course, was primarily to protect 
Staunton, with its extensive military depots, 
from the raiders under Averell or his cooper- 
ators. When that raid ended and the Upper 
Shenandoah region had been cleared of Fed- 
eral troops, General Lee, under date of Decem- 
ber 22, 1863, wrote General Early, then at 
New Market, as follows : 

"I wish you to avail yourself of the present 
opportunity to collect and bring away every- 
thing that can be made useful to the army 
from those regions that are open to the enemy. 
* * * I hear that in the lower Valley, and par- 
ticularly in the country on the South Branch of 
the Potomac, there are a good many cattle, 
sheep, horses and hogs, * * * and all these sup- 
plies are accessible to and can be used by the 
enemy. I desire to secure all of them that it is 
in our power to get, and you will use your 
command for the purpose of keeping back the 
enemy while the work is being done. * * * 
Where you cannot buy, you must impress. * * * 
Of course, you will not take what is necessary 
for the subsistence of the people, but leave 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 14 1 

enough for that. * * * While so engaged, I 
wish you to subsist the troops on those supplies 
that are most difficult of transportation, such as 
bacon, potatoes, and other vegetables, * * * 
sending back those that are easy to transport, 
such as cattle, particularly sheep and hogs. * * * 
"P. S. — You will give out that your move- 
ment is intended as a military one against the 
enemy, and, of course, will do them all the 
harm you can. You will use all the troops, 
including those of Imboden and Gilmor, that 
you may require." 

At this time all the Confederate armies were 
in sore straits for subsistence. So much so that, 
most reluctantly, resort was had to impress- 
ment where purchases were impossible, mainly 
by reason of prohibitive prices. This impress- 
ment was made under the provisions of the Act 
of March 26, 1863, and its subsequent amend- 
ments. 

Early's force in the Valley consisted of two 
brigades of infantry (H. H. Walker's and 
Thomas's) from his old division in Ewell's 
Corps; Imboden's Brigade of Partisans; Gil- 
mor's and White's Battalions (also partisans) ; 
W. L. Jackson's Brigade of Infantry ; some ar- 
tillery and Rosser's Brigade of Cavalry. The 
remainder of Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry Division 
was withdrawn to Charlottesville during the 
latter part of January, 1864. 

Throughout the winter and spring of 1864 
Early kept his troops active in the lower Valley, 



142 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

foraging mainly, but occasionally making 
dashes into Winchester, the lower valley of the 
South Branch of the Potomac, and even as far 
as the vicinity of New Creek or toward Cum- 
berland, sometimes breaking the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad but never very seriously. These 
forays compelled the strengthening of the Fed- 
eral garrisons along the line of the railway, es- 
pecially at Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg and 
New Creek. The garrison at Petersburg was 
withdrawn to New Creek January 31st, for the 
reason that its exposed position and distance 
from New Creek rendered it very difficult to 
maintain, especially in stormy weather, over 
the mountain roads. On the 29th of January, 
1864, two brigades of Confederates under 
Early and Rosser, which had come over from 
the Shenandoah, captured an important wagon 
train near Medley, on the road from New Creek 
to Petersburg, dispersing the wagon guard and 
driving it back to New Creek. The following 
day the troops at Petersburg having discovered 
the presence of so strong a force of Confeder- 
ates approaching from Moorefield, and being 
nearly out of provisions, fell back to New Creek 
by way of Greenland Gap, followed by the 
enemy, who, however, did not attack there, but 
turned off toward Burlington and Patterson's 
Creek to the railroad, where Rosser destroyed 
two bridges within eight miles of Cumberland, 
after capturing the guards, and then made good 
his escape by way of Sheet's Mill and Romney, 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 1 43 

up the South Branch of the Potomac, rejoin- 
ing Early at Moorefield and eluding a force of 
Federal cavalry sent from Martinsburg to 
Wardensville and Romney to intercept the raid- 
ers. All the force from New Creek that could be 
spared moved out toward Moorefield via Pur- 
gittsville, where a junction was made with the 
mounted troops from Martinsburg, but too late 
to recover either the captured wagons or the 
prisoners, who, covered by their escort of in- 
fantry, cavalry and artillery, effected their es- 
cape up the South Fork Valley and thence over 
to Lost River and the Shenandoah via Brock's 
Gap. This was the last raid made by the Con- 
federates in that direction until later in the 
year. Early claims they brought out, besides 
the 50 wagons and their teams, 1,200 cattle, 
500 sheep and 78 prisoners. 

Few of those who campaigned during the 
Civil War through these beautiful valleys, 
whether they wore the gray or the blue, were 
aware they were on historic ground, where 
Washington in his youth, first as a surveyor 
and then as a soldier, had already penetrated. 
The beetling crags that frown upon the radiant 
valley of the South Branch of the Potomac had 
seen George Washington first come into those 
undisturbed fastnesses a young lad of sixteen, 
with transit and surveyor's chain, to define for 
Lord Fairfax the western limits of his vast 
land grant. 

Those same mountains saw Washington 
come there again in 1753, at the age of twenty- 



144 THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 

one, a major and adjutant-general of the Vir- 
ginia militia, but sent by Governor Dinwiddie 
to warn off the French troops sent from Can- 
ada to establish themselves in the Ohio River 
Valley. Washington's errand took him through 
Winchester, then already a flourishing frontier 
town, to Will's Creek (now the City of Cum- 
berland), where, with a few companions, he 
plunged farther into the wilderness northward 
toward Lake Erie, until he came to the fort, 
within fifteen miles of the lake, where was 
found the commanding officer of the French 
expedition, M. de St. Pierre, and to whom 
Washington delivered the Governor's notice, 
which De St. Pierre forwarded to the Governor 
of Canada, the Marquis Duquesne. 

No attention being paid to Governor Din- 
widdie's warning, and the intended encroach- 
ments of the French into what was claimed by 
the colonies as British crown lands, having be- 
come well defined, the colonies, under the lead 
of Virginia, prepared to dispute with the 
French and their savage Indian allies the pos- 
session of the Valley of the Ohio. Washing- 
ton, as lieutenant-colonel, commanded a small 
force of four companies at Will's Creek, after- 
wards called Fort Cumberland, then the most 
exposed and advanced post on the frontier, 
confronted by a much stronger party of French, 
who had established themselves on the Ohio 
River, where Pittsburg stands now, but which 
was then called Fort Duquesne and afterwards 
Fort Pitt. This was in 1754. 



THE AVERELL RAIDS OF 1 863 145 

At the age of twenty-three we find Wash- 
ington again at Winchester as a volunteer aide- 
de-camp to General Braddock, who had been 
sent out from England w T ith two regiments of 
regular troops to operate from Fort Cumber- 
land against the French and Indians in the 
Ohio country. The disastrous march to Fort 
Duquesne soon followed and Braddock's defeat 
was the result. Braddock himself was mor- 
tally wounded and died four days after, his 
troops became panic-stricken and precipitately 
retreated to Fort Cumberland. 

Virginia then provided a new army of six- 
teen companies and gave the command to 
Washington, who fixed his h'eadquarters ' at 
Winchester, with advanced parties along the 
frontier from Fort Cumberland south to Fort 
Dinwiddie, on Jackson's River. This line must 
have extended up the South Branch Valley to 
its head, where Monterey now stands, and then 
down Jackson's River to Covington. Sparks, 
in his "Life of Washington," says "he per- 
formed a tour of inspection among the moun- 
tains, visiting all the outposts along the fron- 
tier." So all the country raided through by 
Averell in 1863 and defended by Sam. Jones, 
Imboden, W. L. Jackson, Echols, and others 
was more than a hundred years before pa- 
trolled by Washington and his hardy troopers. 
A large fort was built by Washington at Win- 
chester in 1756 which was called Fort Lou- 
doun in honor of thte Earl of Loudoun, who 

10 



146 THE AVERELL RAIDS OV 1 863 

had come out from England to command all 
the troops in the American colonies. 

Fort Duquesne was abandoned by the French 
in November, 1758, and destroyed, the garri- 
son escaping down the Ohio River in boats ; a 
small force of two hundred Virginians was left 
there and the name changed to Fort Pitt. The 
remainder of the Virginia troops returned to 
Winchester. Washington resigned his com- 
mission in the Virginia militia the last week in 
December, 1758, when he was only twenty-six 
years of age, and settled down again at Mount 
Vernon until h'e was called to command the 
Continental Army, June 15, 1775. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET AND LYNCH- 
BURG CAMPAIGNS 

On the 29th of February, 1864, a special or- 
der, by direction of the President, was issued 
assigning Maj.-Gen. Franz Sigel to the com- 
mand of the Department of West Virginia, 
and that officer assumed command on the 10th 
of March, thus superseding Maj.-Gen. B. F. 
Kelley. The headquarters of the Department 
were located at Cumberland, Md. 

On the 10th of March, also, Lieut-Gen. U. 
S. Grant was assigned by the President to the 
command of the armies of the United States, 
pursuant to an Act of Congress, approved Feb- 
ruary 29, 1864, by which Grant was made a 
Lieutenant-General. Major-General Halleck, 
at his own request, was relieved from duty as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but was re- 
tained as Chief of Staff. General Meade was 
also retained in command of the Army of the 
Potomac, although General Grant, during the 
remainder of the war, made his headquarters 
with and personally directed the movements of 
that army. 



148 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

From his headquarters at Cumberland, Gen- 
eral Sigel at once proceeded to reorganize and 
partially redistribute his troops, preparatory to 
taking the field. He placed all his mounted 
troops belonging to the First and Fourth Divi- 
sions under General Averell, commanding the 
Fourth Division, which then became known as 
the Cavalry Division, at Martinsburg, and took 
away Averell's infantry, which he gave to Sul- 
livan's Division at Harper's Ferry. He re- 
tained Mulligan's Division unchanged, at New 
Creek, and Moor's two regiments at Beverly. 

About this period Early's Division of infan- 
try and Rosser's Brigade of cavalry were with- 
drawn from the Valley and rejoined Lee at 
Gordonsville, leaving Imboden, together with 
Mosby's, White's and Gilmor's battalions (all 
rangers) to operate in the Shenandoah region. 

General Grant, on assuming command of all 
the armies, proceeded first to reorganize and 
consolidate the Army of the Potomac into 
three army corps (the Second, Fifth and 
Sixth, commanded respectively by Generals 
Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick), and made 
preparations for an early advance on Richmond 
from the line of the Rapidan. Among other 
collateral movements contemplated was an ex- 
pedition from Beverly, W. Va., and one from 
the Kanawha, to break the Virginia and Ten- 
nessee Railroad in Southwestern Virginia. Of 
the first named he gave the command to Gen. 
E. O. C. Ord and the latter to Gen. George 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS H9 

Crook. Although the troops composing both 
expeditions were to be taken from General 
Sigel's Department of West Virginia, both Ord 
and Crook received their instructions direct 
from General Grant. 

On the 29th of March Sigel reported the 
strength and location of the troops of the De- 
partment of West Virginia, as follows : 

Infantry, 15,680; cavalry, 5,441; artillery, 
2,276 — divided into three infantry divisions 
and one of cavalry. 

The Cavalry Division, under Averell, in 
front of Martinsburg, with a line of outposts 
from the Shenandoah River to Back Creek, 
sending out patrols for thirty miles south, 
southwest, and west. 

The First Infantry Division (Sullivan's), 
occupying Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, Fred- 
erick and the line of the railroad from Monoc-^/ 
acy River to Sleepy Creek. 

The Second Infantry Division (Mulligan's), 
scattered along the railroad from Sleepy Creek / 
(near Hancock) to Parkersburg, with ad- 
vanced posts at Philippi, Buckhannon, Bull- 
town, Glenville and Wirt Court-House. There 
were two regiments of infantry holding Bev- 
erly, under Colonel Moor, temporarily attach- 
ed to Averell's Cavalry Division, but New 
Creek was the most important point on this 
line. 

The remainder of Sigel's troops constituted 
a Third Division, under Crook, who occupied 



I50 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

the Kanawha and Gauley River region, with 
an outpost at Fayette Court-House. Only a 
few of the above-mentioned positions were for- 
tified with guns mounted. 

On the same day that Sigel made the report 
of the location of the troops of his depart- 
ment, General Grant directed him to concen- 
trate at Beverly and Charleston the troops to 
make up the two expeditions under Ord and 
Crook, those at Beverly to number not less 
than 8,000 infantry, three batteries and 1,500 
cavalry. Crook, from Charleston on the Ka- 
nawha, was to move at the same time as Ord, 
throwing his infantry as far south as the passes 
in the mountains held by the Confederates, to 
prevent them coming north, and, with his cav- 
alry, Crook was to force his way through to the 
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, then move 
eastward to join Ord. 

The Confederate commander of the region 
to be passed over by these expeditions was 
Ma j. -Gen. John C. Breckinridge, who, by an 
order dated Richmond, February 25, 1864, had 
relieved Gen. Sam. Jones of what was known 
as the Trans-Allegheny, or Western Depart- 
ment of Virginia. It contained an aggregate 
of 7,000 troops present, organized into two 
brigades of infantry (Echols's and McCaus- 
land's) and W. L. Jackson's Brigade of cav- 
alry, with seven batteries. Echols was station- 
ed between Union and Lewisburg, and Mc- 
Causland at the Narrows of New River. Their 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 151 

main base was at Dublin Depot, on the Vir- 
ginia and Tennessee Railroad. Jackson's cav- 
alry was in the vicinity of Warm Springs, Bath 
County, watching the approaches by way of the 
valleys of the South Branch of the Potomac and 
the Greenbrier. 

By the middle of March all these troops 
were on the alert for any Federal raids, al- 
ready reported by Confederate scouts as being 
in preparation ; the passes through that difficult 
mountain region were not blockaded by fallen 
timber, were fortified, and arrangements made 
to organize and call out the "minute men" of 
the entire region bordering upon the eastern 
slope of the Allegheny Mountains, as far south 
as the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. 

These "minute men" were first provided for 
by an Act of the Confederate Congress ap- 
proved April 16, 1862, known as the Public 
Defense Act, by which all men of the ages be- 
tween eighteen and thirty-five were called to 
arms for three years, but where an excess of 
such men existed in any State over the number 
required to fill to a maximum the regiments al- 
ready organized from that State, the surplus 
were to be held as reserves for any future calls 
from that State. By an Act, approved Febru- 
ary 17, 1864, the age limit was made to include 
all white men between the ages of seventeen and 
fifty, those only being called to the ranks who 
were between eighteen and forty-five, and all 
others held as reserves or for local defense, or, 
as General Lee called them, "minute men." 



152 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

In a letter to Gen. Braxton Bragg, who, on 
the 24th of February, 1864, was assigned to 
direct all the armies of the Confederate States, 
General Lee says (April 7) : "I think it ap- 
parent that the enemy is making" large prepara- 
tions for the approaching campaign in Vir- 
ginia. * * * I think every preparation should 
be made to meet the approaching storm, which 
will apparently burst on Virginia, and unless 
its force can be diverted by an attack in the 
West, that troops should be collected to oppose 
it. * * * With our present supplies on hand, 
the interruption of the trains on the Southern 
roads would cause the abandonment of Vir- 
ginia. * * * " 

Longstreet's Corps, which, after its bitter ex- 
perience at Chickamauga and at Knoxville, had 
wintered at Morristown and Newmarket, in 
upper East Tennessee, was ordered on the 7th 
of April to rejoin Lee via Lynchburg. Ran- 
som's Division was left in East Tennessee. 

The Federal prisoners and all paroled Con- 
federates were removed from Richmond, as 
well as much of the useless population, so as to 
diminish the number of mouths to feed and en- 
able the accumulation of subsistence there for 
the combatants. 

The preparations for an advance of all the 
Federal armies simultaneously were perfected 
by General Grant during the month of April, 
to take place early in May, and included a force 
of about 25,000 men, under Gen. B. F. Butler, 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 153 

from the direction of Norfolk and Fortress 
Monroe, who was to move on Richmond along 
the south side of the James River and establish 
a base on that river at City Point. This was 
accomplished on the 5th of May. 

We have already seen the arrangement for 
the two expeditions, from Beverly and the Ka- 
nawha, to cut the Virginia and Tennessee Rail- / 
road in Southwestern Virginia, where the two 
commands were to join and then move north- 
ward toward the Army of the Potomac by way 
of Lynchburg. 

General Grant himself, with the Army of the 
Potomac, greatly strengthened by the return of 
convalescents and furloughed men as well as 
by new troops, was to move directly upon Gen- 
eral Lee's army and force it to accept battle or 
to retire upon Richmond. 

To secure against any strengthening of Lee's 
army from other Confederate armies, especially 
from the direction of Georgia, General Sher- 
man, with a powerful force of over 100,000 
men, made up from troops from East Tennes- 
see and Mississippi, with Thomas's splendid 
army at Chattanooga as a nucleus, was to move 
upon Gen. Joe Johnston's army at Dalton 
simultaneously with Grant's and Butler's move- 
ments upon Richmond, and "to get into the 
interior of the enemy's country as far as you 
can." 

Still another factor in Grant's general scheme 
was a movement on Mobile by Banks's army 



154 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

from the direction of New Orleans, but this 
part of the plan had to be abandoned because of 
the delay in getting Banks's army back from 
his Red River expedition into Texas, which 
had proved such a dismal failure. The gen- 
eral project thus consisted originally of a grand 
left wheel simultaneously by all the armies in 
the field east of the Mississippi River, with 
the Army of the Potomac as a pivot, or, as 
General Grant in his letters to Sherman stated 
it, "to work all parts of the army together, and 
somewhat toward a common center." 

All of the foregoing movements were to be 
made simultaneously on a telegraphic signal 
from Grant. 

During April the weather was so stormy and 
the roads through the mountains of West Vir- 
ginia were so unpromisingly bad, that General 
Grant, on General Sigel's advice, abandoned 
that part of his plan which related to the expe- 
dition under General Ord from Beverly south- 
ward via Covington to cut the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad, and General Ord, on the 
19th of April, was relieved from the command 
at his own request, although the troops who 
were to compose the movements had already 
been concentrated at Grafton, Webster and 
Beverly, thus leaving the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad east of Cumberland very much de- 
pleted of its guarding forces. 

As a substitute for the Ord expedition from 
Beverly, General Grant at the last moment au- 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 155 

thorized Sigel, at that general's suggestion, to 
organize a force of about 7,000 men for an ag- 
gressive movement up the Shenandoah Valley 
on Staunton and beyond, where he could be 
joined by Crook's column of 10,000 men from 
the Kanawha. Sigel's column was concen- 
trated at Martinsburg by the 28th of April, 
and moved out toward Winchester and Stras- 
burg on the 26. of May, Crook's expedition 
from Charleston, W. Va., starting the same 
day, one column through Logan Court-House 
toward Saltville and another through Fayette 
Court-House toward the Virginia and Tennes- 
see Railroad. 

The Sigel column, marching up the Shenan- 
doah, soon came to grief. At the very outset 
Mosby, with his ranger battalion (known as 
the Forty-third Virginia Cavalry), harassed 
Sigel on his left flank and rear, at Bunker Hill, 
Martinsburg, Winchester and Front Royal, 
capturing wagons, animals and prisoners. 

The partisans under Imboden and McNeill 
also took advantage of the weakening of the 
Federal garrisons along the railroad from New 
Creek westward to raid that section success- 
fully early in May, and destroyed considerable 
railroad property at Piedmont, capturing the 
guards. Another and larger party on the 10th 
of May, under Imboden in person, attacked a 
small party of Federal cavalry from the direc- 
tion of Lost River and Brock's Gap on the road 
leading from Wardensville to Moorefield, driv- 



156 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

ing the Federals out toward Romney and 
Springfield. The Federal train was lost but 
most of the horses were saved. The Federal 
party, under Colonel Higgins, of the Twenty- 
second Pennsylvania Cavalry, lost also about 
fifty men killed, wounded and missing. Im- 
boden then withdrew hastily to Mount Jackson, 
in the upper Shenandoah Valley, by way of 
Brock's Gap. 

After some preliminary cavalry skirmishing 
at Rude's Hill and the town of New Market, 
Sigel engaged the enemy under Breckinridge, 
two miles south of the latter place, on the 
morning of the 15th of May, and was repulsed 
with the loss of five guns, about 600 killed and 
wounded and 50 prisoners. Sigel then safely 
retreated to Strasburg and behind Cedar Creek. 
His force in the action consisted of Moor's and 
Thoburn's Brigades of infantry, a brigade and 
a half of cavalry and five batteries of artillery, 
in all less than 6,000 men. Breckinridge's 
command consisted of Echols's and Wharton's 
infantry brigades (which had been hastily 
brought from near Union and the Narrows of 
New River, West Virginia, to Staunton), a 
battalion of cadets from the Lexington (Va.) 
Military Institute, Imboden's Brigade, White's 
and Gilmor's Battalions of mounted partisans, 
and several batteries of artillery, in all about 
8,000 men. Except the partisans, these were 
all concentrated by Breckinridge at Staunton 
and marched from there down the Valley 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 157 

through Harrisonburg to meet Sigel's ap- 
proach. 

After his defeat at New Market, Sigel was 
superseded in command of the Shenandoah 
column by General David Hunter on the 21st 
of May, but Sigel was retained in command 
of the Reserve Division, holding the line of 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from the Mo- 
nocacy to Cumberland. 

Hunter on taking command immediately 
resumed the march on Staunton through Har- 
risonburg and Port Republic, avoiding Breck- 
inridge's forces at Mount Crawford on the di- 
rect route. Staunton was reached on the 6th of 
June after a very spirited engagement with the 
Confederates, about 6,000 strong, under com- 
mand of W. E. Jones, at a small town called 
Piedmont, seven miles southwest of Port Re- 
public. This battle lasted all day of the 5th 
of June, finally resulting in the complete de- 
feat and dispersion of the Confederates, with 
a loss to them of about 600 killed and wound- 
ed (Gen. W. E. Jones being left dead upon the 
field), over 1,000 prisoners (including 60 of- 
ficers), and a large number of fugitives. The 
remnant of the command, under Gen. J. C. 
Vaughn, then retreated on Waynesborough to 
the eastward through Fisherville. Hunter's 
losses did not exceed 500 in killed, wounded 
and missing. 

The reason why Breckinridge was not in 
command of the Confederate troops at Pied- 



15^ THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

mont was that he had been ordered by Gen- 
eral Lee, on the 17th of May, to bring his com- 
mand by rail from Staunton to Hanover Junc- 
tion, after leaving a guard for the Valley. That 
guard consisted of Imboden's Brigade, 3,000 
strong. 

W. E. Jones' and Vaughn's Brigades, after 
Crook had turned north again from the line of 
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Chris- 
tiansburg, were ordered by General Lee to move 
by rail from their stations at Glade Spring and 
Dublin Depot, on the 30th of May, with all 
their available forces, to the assistance of Im- 
boden in the Valley, against whom Hunter's 
column was then advancing. Jones, being the 
senior in rank, assumed the command of 
Vaughn's, Imboden's, and his own Brigades, 
in the absence of General Breckinridge with 
Echols's and Wharton's Brigades, which had 
reported to General Lee at Hanover Junction 
on the 2 1st of May and had afterwards par- 
ticipated in the Battles of Cold Harbor. 

Staunton was occupied without opposition, 
as it had been entirely depleted of regular 
troops. Indeed, there was no Confederate 
force left in the Valley except Gilmor's and 
McNeill's small parties of partisans, who were 
operating near Winchester and Moorefield. At 
Staunton, Hunter paroled several hundred sick 
and wounded Confederates and destroyed much 
Confederate property and supplies, besides ef- 
fectually crippling the Virginia Central Rail- 
road. 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 159 

Another Confederate force of two brigades 
(McCausland's and W. L. Jackson's), which 
had been operating against Crook on and near 
the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad, but </ 
under orders to join Breckinridge at Staunton, 
had moved as far as Buffalo Gap, ten miles 
west of Staunton, to interpose between Crook 
and Hunter, to delay if not to prevent their 
columns joining, Crook being then marching 
on Staunton from Lewisburg. As soon as 
Hunter reached Staunton, McCausland moved 
southward toward Lexington and left the way 
clear for Crook's column to move into Staun- 
ton, unopposed, on the 8th of June, with his 
troops in fine condition. On his way eastward 
Crook had destroyed all the railroad bridges, 
depots, etc., from the western terminus at Cov- 
ington onward. 

The operations of Crook's Kanawha column, 
before its junction with Hunter, had been 
fraught with great results, but on account of 
exceptional difficulties had not accomplishel all 
that had been laid out for it. It had found 
Saltville too strongly held by the Confederates 
to justify an attack on the saltworks, after a 
most difficult march through a sparsely settled 
mountain region and with the most refuse 
transportation the West Virginia Quartermas- 
ter's Department could contrive to furnish. 

Crook left Charleston by the Lewisburg road 
on the 2d of May, detaching at Camp Piatt a 
picked mounted column of 2,500 men under 



l6o THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

Averell to proceed to Saltville via Logan and 
Wyoming Court-Honses, Abb's Valley and 
Jeffersonville, then to move eastward along the 
Virginia and Tennessee River to rejoin Crook. 
This latter, with the main body of his troops, 
numbering 6,155 infantry, moved parallel with 
Averell on a road farther east, to the south- 
ward through Fayette Court-House and over 
Flat Top Mountain to Princeton, rinding on 
his arrival there a small party of Confederate 
cavalry which was readily dispersed in the di- 
rection of Rocky Mount. McCausland's Con- 
federate Infantry Brigade had left Princeton 
the day before Crook's arrival, leaving their 
camps standing, apparently not expecting any 
enemy to come upon Princeton, and had march- 
ed toward Dublin to take cars for Lynchburg 
and Staunton to reinforce Breckinridge against 
Sigel in the Shenandoah. McCausland reach- 
ed Dublin on the 7th of May, where he was 
held by Gen. A. G. Jenkins, commanding that 
region in the absence of General Breckinridge, 
and marched back five miles on the 8th to 
Cloyd's Farm, to meet Crook, who was ap- 
proaching from Princeton. Here Jenkins took 
up a strong position with McCausland's Bri- 
gade and gave battle to Crook on the 9th on 
Walker's Mountain, which resulted in a disas- 
trous defeat to the Confederates and their pre- 
cipitate retreat to and through Dublin to Sa- 
lem. General Jenkins was among the wounded 
and the command then devolved upon McCaus- 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS l6l 

land, who was reinforced at Dublin by 500 men 
from John H. Morgan's command from Salt- 
ville. At Cloyd's the Confederate losses were 
several hundred killed and wounded and 230 
prisoners, while Crook's was 2.7 killed, 117 
wounded, and 25 missing. It may be here 
noted that during the last two years of the 
Civil War the Confederate reports never show- 
ed either the strength of their troops in action 
or their casualties. 

Crook captured and destroyed many valu- 
able public stores and then moved out to New 
River Railroad Bridge on the 10th of May, J 
where he found McCausland's troops drawn 
up on the east side. These he dispersed with 
his artillery and then destroyed the important 
railroad bridge which had been the unattain- 
able object of several Federal expeditions dur- 
ing the preceding three years. 

Crook says that at Dublin he found dispatch- 
es from Richmond stating that General Grant 
had been defeated, which determined him to 
move to Lewisburg as soon as possible. On 
the 10th of May Grant was attacking Lee at 
Spottsylvania, and these dispatches may have 
been concocted to encourage those Confeder- 
ates away from Richmond who had commenced 
to despair of success. It is certain that Lee 
could not detach any part of his troops in the 
Wilderness, at Spottsylvania or Cold Harbor, 
and until after Grant had crossed to the south 
side of James River, to go to the assistance of 

11 



162 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

his sorely-pressed troops in the Shenandoah 
Valley or in Western Virginia. His losses had 
been enormous (John Tyler said 18,000), but 
not so great as Grant's, who, between May 4 
and June 15, had lost in killed, wounded and 
missing 52,789 officers and men; but these 
could be replaced by fresh levies at the North, 
whereas Lee's losses in men could not be re- 
stored, for the Confederacy had then exhaust- 
ed its available fighting strength. 

From New River, Crook commenced to put 
into execution his determination to return to 
Lewisburg, so he crossed New River below or 
north of the destroyed railroad bridge, at Pep- 
per's Ferry, and marched to Blacksburg, thence 
to Union and, via Alderson's Ferry of the 
Greenbrier, to Meadow Bluff. He was joined 
at Union by Averell on the 15th of May. 

Averell, after an exceedingly difficult march 
through the mountains, had come out at Jef- 
fersonville on his way to Saltville, when he 
learned that place was held in strength by W. 
E. Jones's (who was shortly afterward killed 
near Staunton) and John H. Morgan's com- 
mands, so Averell turned toward Wytheville, 
where the lead works are located. On the 10th 
of May he engaged the enemy there, finding 
him to consist of part of the Saltville garrison, 
which had been hurriedly sent to its defense, 
and was also under orders to join Breckinridge 
at Staunton by way of Lynchburg. This was 
occurring while Crook, on a road farther east, 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 163 

was pursuing the remnants of McCausland's 
and A. G. Jenkins's Brigades through Dublin 
and at New River Railroad Bridge. 

At Wytheville the enemy gave Averell con- 
siderable resistance and caused him a loss of 
114 officers and men killed and wounded, be- 
sides Averell did not succeed in destroying the 
lead works. The Confederates retired from 
Wytheville during the night of the 10th and 
Averell moved to Dublin on the nth, crossed 
New River on the 12th, followed by Morgan 
and Jones as far as the river, which they could 
not cross. Averell then moved to Christians- 
burg, and thence followed Crook's route over 
the mountains to Union, where he overtook 
Crook on the 15th. 

While the foregoing operations up the Shen- 
andoah and from the Kanawha were progress- 
ing, General Grant, with the Army of the Po- 
tomac, had crossed the Rapidan at Germanna 
and Ely's Fords, on the 4th of May, and was 
attacking Lee's army at the Wilderness, Spott- 
sylvania Court-House and Cold Harbor. 
Grant's largely superior strength prevented Lee 
from detaching any of his troops to the assist- 
ance of his depleted West Virginia and Shen- 
andoah forces, as he was fully occupied in 
holding his own against Grant's murderous as- 
saults or his dangerous flanking movements. 

With the accession of Crook's forces at 
Staunton, Hunter had a command of over 
15,000 men, with thirty guns, but both he and 



164 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

Crook were a long distance from any base 
either on the Potomac or on the Kanawha, be- 
ing entirely dependent upon their wagon trains 
for supplies, and especially for ammunition. 
Crook, however, had established a secondary 
base at Meadow Bluff, which, in turn, was de- 
pendent on Charleston, W. Va. 

Behind both columns, particularly through 
the Shenandoah Valley back to the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, the inhabitants were thor- 
oughly hostile and the country swarming with 
guerillas, partisans and home-guards, through 
which supply trains could not penetrate with- 
out a small army to guard them. Mosby was 
especially active in the region about Strasburg, 
along Hunter's line of communication back to 
Harper's Ferry, his true base, so, after passing 
Harrisonburg, Hunter abandoned that route 
altogether for replenishing his stores. 

At Staunton, Hunter disembarrassed himself 
of his empty and surplus wagons and the pris- 
oners taken at Piedmont, by sending them to 
Beverly, by way of Buffalo Gap and west of the 
Alleghenies, under escort of Colonel Moor and 
800 men, whose terms of enlistment had ex- 
pired. This he could do with comparative 
safety, as the country west and northwest of 
Staunton had been cleared temporarily of any 
large force of Confederates. 

On the 10th of June, with his own column 
and Crook's, Hunter resumed his movement on 
Lexington and Lynchburg, opposed at first 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 165 

only by a small force of Confederate cavalry — 
2,000 men and a battery — under McCausland, 
which was easily driven into and through Lex- 
ington on the nth, although the remnants of 
Vaughn's command, 2,500 strong, still remain- 
ed on Hunter's left and rear at Waynesborough 
and Rockflsh Gap, but too much disorganized 
since the Battle of Piedmont to be seriously 
considered. 

The character of the country south of Staun- 
ton and beyond Lexington to the East Tennes- •/ 
see and Virginia Railroad is a continuation of 
the beautiful Valley of Virginia, bounded on 
the east by the softly-lined Blue Ridge and on 
the west by the outer ridges of the Alleghenies. 

In the reorganization of his army at Staun- 
ton, Hunter gave the command of the Cavalry 
Division, which had accompanied his column 
from Cedar Creek, to Duffie, relieving Stahel, 
who had been wounded and sent back with the 
train to Beverly. Part of Stahel's mission was 
to get a re-supply of ammunition for Hunter's 
column, which, however, it was found imprac- 
ticable to forward to him. 

Early on the 10th of June, Duffies cavalry 
was sent out on the Waynesborough turnpike 
to make a demonstration on Vaughn's com- 
mand, then to turn south to Tye River Gap. 
Imboden's and W. L. Jackson's Confederate 
Cavalry Brigades moved north and east 
of Duffle's column. Near the Gap, Duffie de- 
stroyed Mount Torry Furnace, where Confed- 



1 66 THE DUBLIN DEPOT,, NEW MARKET 

erate pig-iron was being made; the Gap was 
passed by an almost impassable mountain road 
to the head of Tye River on the nth, and 
thence Duffie marched on Amherst, near which 
place a courier from Hunter overtook him on 
the 1 2th with orders to rejoin Hunter at Lex- 
ington. Imboden, by passing through How- 
ardsville Gap and east of the Southwest Moun- 
tains, succeeded in reaching Lynchburg on the 
14th, which, up to that time, had barely 1,200 
men under General Nicholls to defend it. So, 
had Duffie not been recalled, he might easily 
have entered Lynchburg two days before Im- 
boden got there. Instead, Duffie rejoined Hun- 
ter at Lexington by way of White's Gap on 
the 13th. 

On the second day out from Staunton, June 
nth, Duffiie had come up with, in Tye River 
Valley, and destroyed for the most part, a valu- 
able wagon train of Confederate stores, specie, 
bonds, records and money, capturing with it 
about 40 prisoners, 7 of whom were officers. 
This train had been hurriedly sent away from 
Staunton toward Lynchburg on Hunter's ap- 
proach to the former place after the Battle of 
Piedmont. That same afternoon Duffie sent a 
small party to the Virginia and Tennessee Rail- 
road at Arrington Depot, where they burned 
the depot and several small bridges, and tore 
up the track, besides destroying a large quan- 
tity of boots, shoes and other Confederate 
quartermaster stores. 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 167 

On the 1 2th, when near White's Gap, a small 
refugee wagon train loaded with provisions and 
forage was captured, and on the morning of 
the 13th, not far from Lexington, Duffie de- 
stroyed about 2,000 cords of wood, which had 
been cut to manufacture into charcoal. An- 
other furnace for making pig-iron was also 
burned. 

Hunter was in Lexington from the nth to 
the 14th of June. While there he destroyed a 
great quantity of Confederate and State prop- 
erty, including the Virginia Military Institute 
and the residence of Governor John Letcher. 
He also captured a few prisoners and eleven 
pieces of artillery ; the latter were destroyed. 

On the 13th Hunter sent Averell's Cavalry 
Division forward to Buchanan, on the James 
River, and on the 14th followed with his entire 
command. Before leaving Lexington, Hunter 
learned of the large force under Early that 
General Lee had detached to the succor of 
Lynchburg, but as that place was still feebly 
held, Hunter pushed on. At Buchanan he 
found that Averell had driven McCausland 
across the James, but not before McCausland 
had destroyed the bridge; a practicable ford 
was, however, found nearby. At Buchanan a 
number of barges in the James River Canal, 
loaded with stores, fell into Hunter's hands, 
and such as were not needed by his command 
were destroyed. 

On the 15th Hunter moved by the Peaks of 
Otter road to Liberty, on the Virginia and 



l68 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

* Tennessee Railroad, twenty-four miles from 
Lynchburg. At Liberty a picked party of 
200 cavalrymen, which Averell had sent 
out from Lexington to ride around Lynch- 
burg, reported. They had crossed the Blue 

v Ridge and struck the Charlottesville Railroad 
near Amherst, tearing up considerable track. 
Thence they had moved southeastward and 
crossed the James eight miles below Lynch- 

7 burg, destroying two railroad trains and the 
depot on the South Side Railroad at Concor- 
dia; thence, passing through Campbell Court- 
House, they moved south of Lynchburg to Lib- 
erty. They met with trifling loss. 

On the 1 6th the movement on Lynchburg 
was resumed from Liberty. Duffle's cavalry 
was sent to the left on the Forestville road, 
sending out a strong reconnaissance toward 
Balcony Falls. Crook's Infantry Division fol- 
lowed the railroad, destroying it as they ad- 
vanced. Averell's cavalry and Sullivan's Divi- 
sion of Infantry, with the reserve artillery and 
the train, moved on the Bedford turnpike. 
Averell crowded back McCausland, but in the 
afternoon found that he had been reinforced 
and was becoming stubborn. That night (the 
1 6th) Hunter encamped seven miles east of 
Liberty, with his cavalry thrown out to the 
Great Otter River. Here General Hunter di- 
vested himself of an empty supply train of 
200 wagons and sent it, under guard of a 100- 

v day Ohio regiment, by way of New Castle, 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 169 

Sweet Springs and Lewisburg to Charleston, 
W. Va. 

Late in the afternoon of the nth the enemy 
was found strongly posted at Diamond Hill, on 
the Bedford road, five miles from Lynchburg, 
from which point he was driven into the town 
by Crook's infantry, killing and wounding a 
number of Confederates and capturing 70 pris- 
oners and one gun. It was then unmistakably 
ascertained that Breckinridge had reached 
Lynchburg from Waynesborough with all his 
troops, but it being too late in the day for fur- 
ther operations, Hunter camped for the night on 
the battlefield. He was still ignorant of the 
near approach of Early's Corps (late Ewell's), 
which commenced to arrive via Charlottesville 
from Richmond the afternoon of the 17th, but 
that also was developed early on the morning 
of the 1 8th of June, when Hunter pushed for- 
ward his skirmishers to the toll-gate, two miles 
from the town, and a brisk fire was opened 
from the Confederate works, which was kept 
up throughout the forenoon. In this position 
Hunter was finally assaulted by the Confeder- 
ates, who were repulsed and driven back into 
their main redoubts with considerable loss. 

Hunter says : "It had now become suffi- 
ciently evident that the enemy had concentrated 
a force of at least double the numerical strength 
of mine, and what added to the gravity of the 
situation was the fact that my troops had 
scarcely enough of ammunition left to sustain 



170 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

another well-contested battle. I immediately 
ordered all the baggage and supply trains to 
retire by the Bedford turnpike and made prep- 
arations to withdraw the army as soon as it be- 
came sufficiently dark to conceal the movement 
from the enemy." 

It being impossible for Hunter to return to 
the Shenandoah by way of Lexington and 
Staunton, he retired westward through Liberty 
and Buford's Gap during the 19th, 20th, and 
2 1 st, to Salem, "destroying all the bridges, 
depot buildings and contents on the railroad," 
being unmolested except by an occasional rear- 
guard action between his own and the Confed- 
erate cavalry. The most serious of these af- 
fairs occurred near Salem early on the 21st, 
when he suffered the loss of two batteries mov- 
ing on the New Castle road, which, being in- 
sufficiently guarded, were disabled and spiked 
by the Confederate cavalry and the horses car- 
ried off. The guns, however, were recovered 
by Hunter's cavalry, and the Confederates in 
turn driven away with loss, but eight of the 
pieces had to be abandoned finally, after de- 
stroying all their carriages, for the lack of 
horses to haul them. After passing Catawba 
Valley, on the New Castle road, the pursuit 
ended, and Hunter moved on leisurely to Mea- 
dow Bluff, where he arrived on the 25th, and 
found ample supplies. 

Hunter's losses in this campaign foot up 103 
killed, 564 wounded and 271 missing, from 



AND LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS 171 

June 10 to 23. He was so far beyond possible 
support, or even communication by courier, 
that dispatches could not reach him after he 
had passed south of Staunton. General Grant 
endeavored to send two divisions of Sheridan's 
cavalry to Hunter's assistance by way of Char- 
lottesville, expecting Hunter to be in that vicin- 
ity, but Sheridan was attacked by Wade Hamp- 
ton's and FitzHugh Lee's cavalry at Trevilian 
Station of the Virginia Central Railroad on / 
the nth of June, and compelled to withdraw 
to the White House, on the Pamunkey, over 
the circuitous route north of the North Anna 
by which he had come. Although Sheridan had 
started from Grant's army on the 7th of June, 
Breckinridge's two brigades succeeded in pass- 
ing from Lee's army over the railroad to Char- ^ 
lottesville and Waynesborough, before Sheridan 
could intercept them at Trevilian. Wade Hamp- 
ton also had got into position so as to cover 
Gordonsville before Sheridan appeared at Tre- 
vilian and Fitzhugh Lee's Division had reached 
Louisa Court-House, only six miles from Tre- 
vilian. 

While General Grant remained confronting 
General Lee at Cold Harbor it had been unsafe 
for the latter to detach more than Breckin- 
ridge's two small brigades to go to the relief of 
either Waynesborough or Lynchburg, but as 
soon as General Lee discovered, on the 12th, 
that General Grant had withdrawn from his 
front to cross to the south side of the James 



172 THE DUBLIN DEPOT, NEW MARKET 

to join Butler, he, on the 13th, detached Early's 
entire Army Corps (formerly Ewell's) in hot 
haste to the relief of Lynchburg, which Early, 
with part of his troops, reached on the 17th, 
just in time to save the city from Hunter. 



CHAPTER X 

THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON AND THE 
RETURN TO THE VALLEY 

When Hunter placed his army south of 
Lynchburg and then withdrew to the Kanawha, 
he left the Valley and Washington uncovered 
except by the Federal troops on the line of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cumber- / 
land to the Monocacy, commanded by Sigel. 

Early telegraphed General Lee from near 
Salem, on the 226. of June, that Hunter had 
made good his retreat into the West Virginia 
Mountains and that he (Early) would proceed 
the next day to carry out General Lee's original 
instructions. These were to move down into 
the Shenandoah Valley and into Maryland if 
practicable. In a letter to President Davis, 
June 29th, relating to Early's movements, Gen- 
eral Lee says : "I still think it is our policy to 
draw the attention of the enemy to his own 
territory. It may force Grant to attack me, or 
weaken his forces. It will also, I think, oblige 
Hunter to cross the Potomac or expose him- 
self to attack. From either of these events I 
anticipate good results. * * * There will be 
time to shape Early's course, or terminate it, 



174 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

when he reaches the Potomac, as circumstances 
require. He could not be withdrawn from the 
Valley without inviting a return of Hunter's 
expedition. To retain him there inactive would 
not be disadvantageous. As before stated, my 
greatest present anxiety is to secure regular 
and constant supplies. * * * " 

Part of General Lee's plans for Early con- 
templated the release of the Confederate pris- 
oners at Point Lookout, Md. 

It seems pertinent here to mention the great 
difficulty to obtain, and the high prices paid 
for, supplies at this period by the Confederate 
authorities. Besides the tithe required from 
all producers, there was an impressment law 
passed by the Confederate Congress, March 
26, 1863, and subsequently amended, which 
was regulated by a tariff of prices to be paid 
for supplies taken, which tariff was established 
every two months by a Board of Appraisers in 
each State of the Confederacy, one member be- 
ing appointed by the President and the other 
by the Governor of the State. For instance, 
the tariff for stores impressed in Virginia dur- 
ing October and November, 1864, gave the 
prices for wheat at $7.50 per bushel, flour from 
$33 to $42 per barrel, corn $5 per bushel, bacon 
$2.75 per pound, butter $5 per pound, horses 
and mules $800 per head, wood $8 per cord, 
potatoes $4 per bushel, onions $8 per bushel, 
New Orleans molasses $25 per gallon, Rio cof- 
fee $3 per pound, beef cattle $30 per 100 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 75 

pounds, sheep $35 per head, pig-iron $278 to 
$350 per ton, cotton sheetings $1.75 per yard, 
army shoes $15 per pair, men's socks $2 per 
pair, apple and peach brandy $10 per gallon. 
All these prices were largely increased as the 
Confederate currency became further depre- 
ciated, so that in March, 1865, the last schedule 
furnished by the Virginia appraisers before 
they adjourned to May 2, 1865, showed the 
market price of wheat to be $25 per bushel, 
flour $126 per barrel, potatoes $20 per bushel, 
beef cattle $50 per hundred pounds, sheep $70 
per head, army shoes $25 per pair, labor $8 
per day. These were the prevailing market 
rates. 

The suffering of the people and the diffi- 
culties of the Confederate Government became 
so great that in March, 1865, just before the 
close of the horrible drama, the Confederate 
Congress passed "An Act to raise coin for the 
purpose of furnishing necessary supplies for 
the Army," by which the Secretary of the 
Treasury was authorized to pledge cotton and 
tobacco for coin, not to exceed three millions 
of dollars, as a loan payable two years after 
ratification of a treaty of peace. The cotton 
and tobacco belonging to the Confederacy so 
pledged, was to be given safe conduct beyond 
the limits of the Confederacy "free from any 
molestation" to the exporter, or the payment 
of any duty. The attention of the officers of 
the army was called to the clause allowing the 



I7 6 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

free exportation of the above-mentioned sta- 
ples, and they were cautioned not to resist its 
operations. Cotton at Liverpool was then sell- 
ing at $250 per bale of 400 pounds. Up to the 
passage of this Act no cotton was allowed to 
pass the Confederate lines into those of the 
United States. 

Officers of the Confederate supply depart- 
ments were calling upon Richmond for coin to 
enable them to obtain supplies even by impress- 
ment, as the holders of grain or provisions, es- 
pecially in counties bordering upon the Poto- 
mac, refused the depreciated Confederate cur- 
rency and demanded coin or "greenbacks." 

Early had abandoned further pursuit of 
Hunter at Salem and turned his army north- 
ward through Buchanan and Fincastle in two 
columns, which passed through Lexington and 
Jackson's River Depot, converging at Staun- 
ton, and arriving there between the 25th and 
27th of June. General Lee expected Hunter 
to refit and reorganize at Lewisburg and then 
return to the Valley, for, in a letter dated June 
26 to President Davis, he says of Early : " * * * 
I think it better that he should move down the 
Valley, if he can obtain provisions, which', 
would draw Hunter after him. * * * If cir- 
cumstances favor, I should also recommend his 
crossing the Potomac. I think I can maintain 
our lines here against General Grant. He does 
not seem disposed to attack and has thrown 
himself strictly on the defensive. I am less 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 77 

uneasy about holding our position than about 
our ability to procure supplies for the army. 
I fear the latter difficulty will oblige me to at- 
tack General Grant in his intrenchments, which 
I should not hesitate to do but for the loss it 
will inevitably entail. * * * " 

At Staunton, Early rearranged his command, 
so that General Ransom, commanding all the 
cavalry in the Valley District, was relieved 
from duty with General Breckinridge and took 
his orders thereafter from Early direct. This 
cavalry command consisted of Col. Bradley T. 
Johnson's Brigade (formerly W. E. Jones's), 
to which Bradley Johnson's Mounted Mary- 
land Battalion was added; Imboden's and W. 
L. Jackson's Brigades ( formerly partisans, but 
now incorporated in the regular cavalry), and 
McCausland's Brigade (formerly A. G. Jen- 
kins's). 

Breckinridge's infantry was reorganized into 
two divisions, commanded respectively by him- 
self and Maj.-Gen. J. B. Gordon. 

The transportation for baggage was mate- 
rially reduced. 

On the 30th of June Early passed beyond 
New Market northward, finding ample supplies 
of wheat and grass along his route. He de- 
tached Imboden to proceed down the South 
Branch Valley to the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road. Early camped near Winchester on the 
2d of July, and, dividing his force, sent one 
column under Breckinridge to Martinsburg on 

12 



178 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

the 3d, and with his own corps occupied Har- 
per's Ferry on the 4th, the weak force of Fed- 
erals retiring before both columns; those at 
Martinsburg, where Sigel had his headquar- 
ters, falling back to Shepherdstown, and the 
Harper's Ferry garrison to Maryland Heights. 
McCausland's Cavalry Brigade moved on the 
left of Breckinridge from Winchester via 
White Hall and down Back Creek, while the 
main cavalry under Ransom preceded Early's 
column of infantry on the 3d to Kearneysville 
via Brucetown and Leetown, having quite a 
lively engagement with the Federal cavalry at 
Kearneysville. 

Early on the 4th, after McCausland's Mount- 
ed Brigade had captured the blockhouse at 
North Mountain Depot (Hedgesville), and de- 
stroyed the railroad, it swung around to 
Hainesville. Breckinridge's two divisions also 
broke the railroad east and west from Martins- 
burg, while the men of Early's Corps were 
similarly engaged from Harper's Ferry west- 
ward. 

In the presence of such a very large body of 
Confederates (four divisions of infantry and 
one of cavalry) it was remarkable that Sigel 
should have been able to retire the small garri- 
sons of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry to 
the north side of the Potomac in safety and 
with so little loss of stores, but on the morning 
of the 5th of July he was able to report from 
Maryland Heights, where he had gone via 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 79 

Shepherdstown, that his own and Weber's 
commands were there and had provisions for 
twenty days, besides a liberal supply of ammu- 
nition. Weber partially destroped the railroad 1/ 
bridge at Harper's Ferry after crossing, and 
took up the pontoons. Sigel intimated that he 
had no intention of abandoning the position, 
although he soon learned that Breckinridge had 
crossed that day to Sharpsburg and was forag- 
ing as far east as Boonsborough. Sigel re- 
ported his own force on Maryland Heights to 
be 6 regiments of infantry, 2,500 dismounted 
cavalry, 2 battalions of heavy artillery and 26 
field guns. Nearby, in Pleasant Valley, there 
were about 1,000 mounted cavalry, 2 compa- 
nies of artillery acting as infantry, and one 4- 
gun battery. 

General Sigel was relieved by Gen. A. P. 
Howe on the 8th of July, the day the enemy 
disappeared from Harper's Ferry, after having 
sent Breckinridge's two infantry divisions the 
day before to feel the Federal position on 
Maryland Heights from the direction of 
Sharpsburg, but who found it too strong to 
assault. 

Early then moved his entire force to the 
north side of the Potomac west of Harper's 
Ferry, and sending his cavalry, part to Freder- 
ick and part to Hagerstown, where it met some 
parties of Federal cavalry on observation, he 
moved his infantry column through Rohrers- 
ville, Boonsborough and Middletown to Fred- 



180 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

erick and Jefferson, Md., and thence, on the 
9th, to the Monocacy River, where they met 
resistance which lasted throughout the day of 
the 9th, from troops hastily gathered at Balti- 
more by Gen. Lew Wallace and marched out 
to the Monocacy, to reinforce a small party 
under General Tyler already there. The ob- 
ject was to delay Early's progress toward Bal- 
, timore or Washington, at the iron railroad 
bridge and where the turnpikes to both Balti- 
more and Washington converge within a dis- 
tance of two miles. 

Wallace had thus succeeded in collecting a 
rather incongruous party of 2,500 men of all 
arms on the 6th of July, the Confederate cav- 
alry being then only at Middletown. At this 
juncture Ricketts's Division of the Sixth Army 
Corps, which had been started from City Point 
by General Grant on the 7th of July on trans- 
ports, commenced to arrive, and by daylight 
of the 9th two brigades (Truex's and McClen- 
nan's) 3,350 strong, were in position near Mo- 
nocacy Bridge, thus increasing Wallace's com- 
mand to nearly 6,000 men, but still a very weak 
force to oppose Early's vastly superior num- 
bers. Wallace had but one field battery of six 
guns and one 24-pounder, as against at least 16 
of Early's. Yet from 9 a. m. until 4 p. m. Wal- 
lace held his position, repulsing two infantry 
attacks, when, being heavily outflanked on his 
left, he threw all his force over to the other 
flank at the stone bridge on the Baltimore turn- 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY l8l 

pike to cover the retreat to Baltimore. The 
bridge was held by General Tyler with his 
handful of men until after all the other troops 
had passed to his rear and he was virtually sur- 
rounded by Rodes's Division, when he cut his 
way through with the larger part of his troops. 
Wallace's losses were 1,294 killed, wounded 
and missing, mostly in Ricketts's Division; that 
of the Confederates is given by Early as 600 or 
700, yet he left 435 of his wounded at Freder- 
ick, who could not bear transportation. 

The great importance of the Battle of the 
Monocacy lay in the delay it caused Early in 
his march on Washington, thereby enabling the 
remainder of the Sixth Corps to reach the 
Capital from Grant's army, as well as the Nine- 
teenth Army Corps from New Orleans, before 
Early could reach there, which he would have 
accomplished had he not been forced to march 
around Harper's Ferry and then been checked 
by Wallace at the Monocacy. These most im- 
portant events saved the Capital from capture, 
and General Grant so accords it in both his of- 
ficial report and in his "Memoirs," notwith- 
standing which Sigel was relieved by Howe on 
the 8th of July and Wallace was superseded 
by Ord on the nth, after he had marched his 
command safely back to Baltimore. 

Sigel and Wallace between them had delay- 
ed Early's progress at least three days. The 
inscription Wallace proposed to place on the 
monument over his dead at the Monocacy — 



1 82 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

"These Men Died to Save the National Capi- 
tal" — would not be amiss. 

Making no pursuit of Wallace toward Balti- 
more, Early, on the day after the Battle of the 
Monocacy, resumed his march on Washington, 
through Rockville, where he turned to the left 
so as to get upon the Seventh street road. He 
appeared before Fort Stevens (now Bright- 
wood) during the afternoon of the nth of 
July and pushed his skirmishers up to within 
40 rods of the defenses, driving in the small 
force of Veteran Reserves, convalescents from 
the hospitals, quartermasters' employees, and 
civilian volunteers gathered there to dispute his 
advance; but he made no general assault, giv- 
ing as a reason that he found the works too 
strong and his men too much worn by the heat 
and the forced marching of the past two days. 
Then came the dramatic arrival of the two Di- 
visions of Wright's Sixth Army Corps from 
City Point by water and the head of the Nine- 
teenth Army Corps from New Orleans by 
ocean steamers, with Mr. Lincoln meeting them 
at the wharf and then going out to Fort Stev- 
ens to see in person what was being accomplish- 
ed. It is said that as the President stood by the 
side of General Wright on the parapet of Fort 
Stevens, watching the movements of the skir- 
mishing then in progress between Wheaton's 
Division of the Sixth Corps and the Confeder- 
ates, as Wheaton was recovering the ground 
lost before his troops arrived on the line, an of- 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 83 

ficer standing near the President was struck, 
and it was only this that induced the President 
to yield to the entreaties of those about him to 
no longer expose himself. 

Early remained in close proximity to Fort 
Stevens throughout the 12th until night, skir- 
mishing continually. His headquarters were 
at Silver Spring, about two miles north of 
Washington, at the house of Montgomery 
Blair, then Postmaster-General of the United 
States, which was destroyed when his army re- 
treated, although Breckinridge pleaded with 
Early to save it. In passing through Hagers- 
town, Early had levied a contribution of $220,- 
000 on the inhabitants and another of $200,000 
at Frederick. 

While Early was feeling the lines at Fort 
Stevens on the Seventh Street road, his cav- 
alry, under McCausland, was demonstrating 
on the Georgetown road at Tenallytown and 
in front of Fort Reno. Mosby's Battalion of 
partisans was threatening to cross the Potomac 
at the Chain Bridge and move toward George- 
town by the River road. Both these points, 
however, were well protected. 

When Early retired from in front of Wash- 
ington during the night of the 12th, he moved 
through Rockville and thence crossed the Po- 
tomac to Leesburg, by way of Darnestown, 
Poolesville and White's Ford. He remained 
near Leesburg during the 14th and 15th. 



I84 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

At Frederick, on the 8th of July, Early had 
detached Bradley Johnson's cavalry to make a 
raid on the Northern Central and the Phila- 
delphia and Baltimore railroads, which resulted 
in their being closed to traffic by the destruction 
of several bridges. The most notable was the 
burning of the bridge two miles long over Gun- 
powder Creek, 15 miles northeast of Baltimore, 
and the capture there of two passenger trains 
by Major Harry Gilmor, commanding a 
Mounted Maryland Battalion, which Gen. 
Bradley Johnson detached for that purpose. 
Part of the latter's mission was to endeavor to 
surprise the small garrison at Point Lookout, 
Md., where the Potomac enters Chesapeake 
Bay, and release the Confederate prisoners 
confined there ; but from this he was recalled at 
Bladensburg by Early, when the latter had de- 
cided to withdraw south of the Potomac from 
in front of Washington. 

While Early was ravaging Maryland and 
threatening the seat of the Federal Govern- 
ment, Hunter, with all the troops he had car- 
ried to the Kanawha from Lynchburg, was re- 
turning to the Valley as rapidly as he could, by 
boat up the Ohio to Parkersburg and thence 
eastward by rail. His advance left Charleston, 
on the Kanawha, on the 3d of July (the day 
Breckinridge occupied Martinsburg and Early 
reached the vicinity of Harper's Ferry) and 
his head of column reached Cumberland on the 
9th (the day of the Battle of the Monocacy). 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 185 

Martinsburg was reoccupied by Hunter's cav- 
alry on the 10th, followed soon after by Sulli- 
van's Division, the first infantry to arrive from 
the West. (Early was then — July 14th — at 
Leesburg, and who, in a letter to General Lee, 
announced his intention to "start for the Val- 
ley in the morning. * * * I will retreat in forced 
marches by land toward Richmond. * * * 

Later events changed Early's intentions after 
he reached the Valley and had placed the Blue 
Ridge between his army and the pursuing 
column under Wright with the Sixth and part 
of the Nineteenth Army Corps. Wright was 
given command, by order of the President, July 
13, 4.35 p. m., "of all the forces moving from 
Washington or elsewhere against the enemy," 
including any that might join him from the 
commands of Hunter, Ord, "or elsewhere." 

For a while some difficulty was found in lo- 
cating Hunter, owing to the breaks caused by 
the Confederates in both the railroad and the 
telegraph lines, although it was known that he 
had passed eastward through Cumberland to- 
ward Harper's Ferry. Finally he was reached 
at the latter place on the 15th by a special mes- 
senger, bearing instructions from General 
Grant, for Hunter to move with all his forces 
that had arrived from the west, and with 
Howe's troops at Maryland Heights, 
and then to form a junction with Wright's col- 
umn to attack Early. Sullivan's Division and 
some detachments of Hunter's command, 8,000 



1 86 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

strong, which had only then reached Harper's 
Ferry, immediately pushed out toward 
Hillsborough and Purcellville east of the 
Blue Ridge, preceded by Duffle's cavalry, 
who struck into the rear of Early's col- 
umn near Purcellville, and captured from it 
about 80 wagons and 50 prisoners, the main 
force of Confederates having passed about two 
hours before, headed for Snicker's Gap, in 
which direction Duffle, supported by Crook's 
troops, followed on the 17th, passing through 
the Gap and into the Valley, where the enemy 
was found drawn up in strength at the west side 
of the crossing of the Shenandoah River on the 
Berry ville road. During the 18th Early remain- 
ed in this position and resisted Crook's efforts 
to force a crossing, those troops which had suc- 
ceeded in getting across farther down stream 
being forced to retire again to the east bank, 
with considerable loss. Ricketts's Division of 
the Sixth Corps, which had rejoined Wright 
from Baltimore, came up in time to cover 
Crook's retirement. The Confederate losses 
are not stated, but were also considerable. 

Wright, with the Sixth Corps and two Divi- 
sions of the Nineteenth, as soon as Hunter's 
column under Crook had been located at Hills- 
boro, feeling uneasy about Crook's proximity 
to so largely a superior force of the enemy un- 
supported, crossed the Potomac at White's 
Ford, and followed the track of Early's army 
through Leesburg out on the Snicker's Gap 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 87 

road until he was joined by the head of Crook's 
column at Purcellville, when he sent him in ad- 
vance to pursue Early into Snicker's Gap. 

Another attempt was made to cross the Shen- 
andoah early on the 20th, when it was found 
Early had retreated the night before, and had 
gone with his main army toward Front Royal 
and Strasburg, covering his trains. Early had 
thus succeeded in getting away with all his 
Maryland plunder, including several thousand 
head of horses, mules and cattle. 

'Wright then deemed the time had come to 
obey Grant's orders, communicated through 
Halleck, to return to Washington with the 
Sixth and Nineteenth Army Corps, preparatory 
to rejoining Grant at City Point, as Grant said, 
"before the enemy can get Early back * * * ;" 
for Grant then believed Early to be in full re- 
treat on Richmond by way of the Valley. His 
dispatch of July 16th, 4.40 p. m., to Halleck, 
indicates that he expected Hunter's troops to be 
able, without any assistance from Wright, to 
pursue Early to Gordonsville and Charlottes- 
ville, break up the railroad there, etc. Grant 
adds : "I do not think there is now any fur- 
ther danger of an attempt to invade Maryland. 
The position of the enemy in the West and 
here (meaning Richmond) is such as to de- 
mand all the force they can get together to save 
vital points to them. * * * As soon as the rebel 
army is known to have passed Hunter's forces, 
recall Wright and send him back here with all 



1 88 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

dispatch, and also send the Nineteenth Corps. 
If the enemy have any notion of returning, the 
fact will be developed before Wright can start 
back. * * * " 

When Wright started to march back to Lees- 
burg and Washington, Crook set out for Win- 
chester by way of Berryville. He reached Win- 
chester on the 22d, finding Averell and his Cav- 
alry Division, with some infantry as supports, 
already there since the 21st, when he had enter- 
ed Winchester unopposed, after quite a spirited 
affair on the afternoon of the 20th at Stephen- 
son's Depot, north of Winchester, with Imbo- 
den's and Jackson's cavalry, supported by 
Ramseur's Division of Early's infantry, where 
Averell captured 4 guns, 17 officers and 250 
men, killed 73 and wounded 130 of the enemy; 
his own loss being 53 killed, 155 wounded and 
6 missing. Averell's Division was the last of 
Hunter's command to return from the Kana- 
wha, so that on the 22d virtually all of that 
force was again reunited at Winchester, and 
was about 1 1 ,000 strong. Early's strength was 
estimated at 25,000. 

The departure of Wright's two Army Corps 
for Washington was known in Richmond and 
by Early almost as soon as they started. Early's 
intention to "retreat in forced inarches by land 
on Richmond" underwent a sudden change at 
Strasburg, for he turned back toward Win- 
chester on the 22d and badly defeated Crook's 
command at Kernstown on the 23d, driving it 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 1 89 

through Winchester on the 24th and into Mar- 
tinsburg on the 25th, where a stand was made 
during the day, and a retreat on Williamsport 
across the Potomac during the night was unop- 
posed by Early, who followed only with his 
cavalry to the river. Crook then marched his 
infantry north of the river to Harper's Ferry, 
leaving his cavalry along the Potomac from 
Hancock to Harper's Ferry to guard the cross- 
ings. As Hunter had remained at Harper's 
Ferry while Crook commanded in the field, 
Hunter now resumed charge of all the troops 
within his Department. Crook's losses at 
Kernstown and during the retreat were 100 
killed, 606 wounded and 579 missing. Early's 
losses were also severe. 

Early then occupied Martinsburg, Smith- 
field and Bunker Hill with his infantry, his 
cavalry being thrown forward to the Potomac ; 
his own headquarters were at Bunker Hill. The 
Valley was again in entire possession of the 
Confederates, and the Baltimore and Ohio. 
Railroad, which had been placed in complete 
running order throughout its entire length on 
the 2 1 st of July, was again interrupted as a 
means of Federal communication with the 
West. 

As soon as Early had retired to the Valley 
from his raid on Washington, General Lee 
sent Fitzhugh Lee's Division of cavalry to Cul- 
peper Court-House, to be used as a means of 
communication with Early and to gather fresh 



I90 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

horses, its absentees, etc. These troops were 
found in position on the Rapidan on the 25th 
by a scouting party sent out from Washington. 
The trains on the Virginia Central Railroad 
were then running and bringing supplies 
from Richmond to Culpeper, which were there 
transhipped by wagon trains to Early's com- 
mand, via Front Royal. Eventually these 
troops, strengthened by Kershaw's Division of 
infantry under Gen. R. H. Anderson, joined 
Early in the Valley. 

On the 2 1st of July, on representations made 
from Washington by Halleck, General Grant 
modified his orders about sending the Sixth 
Corps, and that part of the Nineteenth with 
Wright, to City Point. Grant's new instruc- 
tions to Halleck read: "You may retain 
Wright's command until the departure of Early 
is assured, or other forces are collected to make 
its presence no longer necessary. * * * I am 
now sending back all veterans whose terms of 
service expire previous to the 25th of Au- 
gust. * * * " 

Wright's command all reached Washington 
by nightfall of the 23d (Early had then turned 
on Crook, and drove him through Winchester 
the next day). Grant at that time telegraphed 
Halleck as follows : "City Point, Va., July 23, 
1864, 6 p. m. — If Wright has returned to 
Washington, send him immediately back here, 
retaining, however, the portion of the Nine- 
teenth Corps now in Washington for further 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 191 

orders. Early is undoubtedly returning here 
to enable the enemy to detach troops to go to 
Georgia. * * * " That same morning Mr. Lin- 
coln had telegraphed to General Hunter at 
Harper's Ferry : "Are you able to take care of 
the enemy when he turns back upon you, as he 
probably will do on finding out that Wright 
has left?" To which Hunter had immediately 
replied : "My force is not strong enough to 
hold the enemy should he return upon me with 
his whole force." And Early was then return- 
ing in full strength. At noon of the 24th Gen- 
eral Grant telegraphed Halleck : " * * * You 
can retain General Wright until I learn posi- 
tively what has become of Early. * * * " 

On the morning of the 26th of July Wright's 
column, about 19,000 strong, was again set in 
motion from Washington via Rockville for the 
Monocacy, to form a junction with Hunter's 
forces at such point as the latter might select. 
As already mentioned, Hunter's entire com- 
mand, about 1 1,000 strong, was then at or near 
Harper's Ferry, with his cavalry (two Divi- 
sions) guarding the crossings of the Potomac 
on the north bank as far up as Hancock. In 
addition to authorizing the retention of 
Wright, General Grant dispatched from City 
Point all that portion of the Nineteenth Corps, 
which had been sent to the Army of the Poto- 
mac, when he learned that Baltimore and Wash- 
ington were no longer seriously threatened. He 
also sent six more regiments of his cavalry. Of 



192 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

course, all these troops went by water. On the 
30th General Grant sent Torbert's Division of 
Cavalry from the Army of the Potomac to 
Washington, followed on the 2d of August by 
General Sheridan in person, Grant's intention 
being then to give Sheridan command of all of 
Hunter's troops in the field ; but, finding oppo- 
sition existing to this arrangement at Washing- 
ton, Grant deferred action until he could first 
confer with Hunter in person, which he soon 
after did. 

Meanwhile, Wright's column had joined 
Hunter's at Harper's Ferry on the 29th of July, 
both commands, except Crook's cavalry, being 
assembled at Halltown, three miles south, on 
the Charlestown road. The next day the en- 
tire force was marched back toward Freder- 
ick to more effectually cover Baltimore and 
Washington. Kelley, at Cumberland, was 
strengthened by troops from Kentucky by way 
of Parkersburg. 

Up to the 29th of July, besides an occasional 
demonstration by Confederate cavalry at the 
upper crossings of the Potomac, Early's troops 
were busily engaged foraging in the lower Val- 
ley and gathering the ripening crops; but on 
that date Early sent two of his mounted bri- 
gades, under McCausland and Bradley John- 
son, to cross the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry 
and raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. This 
force numbered about 2,600 men, commanded by 
McCausland, and moved via Clear Spring, Md., 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 193 

and Mercer sburg to Chambersburg, Pa., where 
it appeared early on the 30th of July, brushing 
away to the eastward, all along the route, the 
feeble parties of Averell's Federal cavalry 
watching its progress from the direction of Ha- 
gerstown, where Averell had his headquarters. 
As soon as the enemy's strength and purpose 
had been developed, Averell gathered a consid- 
erable force of his cavalry and set out for 
Chambersburg via Greencastle, in pursuit, but 
did not reach there until some hours after Mc- 
Causland had burned the town and fallen back 
toward McConnellsburg, westward. 

McCausland on entering Chambersburg de- 
manded a ransom of $100,000 in coin or $500,- 
000 in United States currency, to be paid in 
three hours' time, failing which the town was 
fired in many places simultaneously, after a 
scene of most revolting villainies perpetrated 
by the Confederates. There exists no report 
from McCausland of events at Chambersburg, 
but Bradley Johnson recounts them in consid- 
erable detail. 

McCausland, who had intended proceeding 
west from McConnellsburg toward Bedford, 
was so closely followed by Averell that he was 
forced to turn southward to Hancock. There, 
on the 31st, a ransom of $30,000 and 5,000 
cooked rations were demanded under threat of 
destroying the town; but before they could be 
collected, McCausland was attacked by Averell, 
and hastily moved off with his command to- 
la 



194 THE EARLY RAID TO WASHINGTON 

ward Cumberland, in front of which he appear- 
ed and engaged Kelley's troops late in the after- 
noon of August ist. Finding Kelley too well 
prepared, McCausland drew off eastward after 
nightfall, abandoning his dead and wounded, 
and at Oldtown forced a crossing of the Poto- 
mac at daylight of the 2d of August, capturing 
or dispersing a regiment of new troops from 
Ohio that Kelley had placed there to defend 
the crossing. The Confederates then moved 
south into the Valley of the South Branch of 
the Potomac, via Springfield and Romney. 

From Romney, on the 4th of August, Mc- 
Causland moved on New Creek (Keyser), and 
was repulsed in his attack on that fortified 
place, leaving 25 of his dead on the field when 
he moved off again that same day toward 
Moorefield, where he was surprised in camp by 
Averell on the morning of the 7th of August 
and routed, with a loss of 27 officers and 393 
men prisoners, 4 guns and caissons complete, 
several hundred horses, equipments and small 
arms. The greater part of McCausland's 
forces were dispersed and retreated into the 
Shenandoah Valley through the mountain 
passes in small squads, which finally were as- 
sembled at Mount Jackson. 

The movement later of Hunter's and 
Wright's combined commands from Harper's 
Ferry again to Frederick, except the strong 
force left behind under Howe to hold Mary- 
land Heights, was the result of the commotion 



AND THE RETURN TO THE VALLEY 195 

at the North and in Washington caused by the 
Chambersburg raid, together with hostile dem- 
onstrations along the line of the Potomac from 
Williamsport down to Leesburg. As soon as 
it was definitely ascertained that none of 
Early's infantry had, crossed to the north side 
of the river, Hunter's infantry was marched to 
a line east of and along the Monocacy, to ob- 
serve Early's movements in the lower Valley 
and be available to protect the Capital from any 
coup de main. It was in this position that Hun- 
ter was visited by General Grant on the 5th of 
August, which resulted in Hunter's asking to 
be relieved from command of the Department 
of West Virginia, and Sheridan, who had al- 
ready reached Washington from City Point, 
being sent for to meet Grant at the Monocacy, 
when he was placed temporarily in command of 
the newly-formed Middle Military Division, 
comprised of the States of Maryland, Pennsyl- 
vania, West Virginia, the District of Colum- 
bia, and as much of Northern Virginia as was 
then occupied by the Federal army. 

Grant had already ordered the troops assem- 
bled at the Monocacy to move back to Harper's 
Ferry and Halltown before Sheridan's arrival. 
The written instructions prepared for Hunter 
were given to Sheridan instead, and Grant re- 
turned to City Point. 



• 



CHAPTER XI 

sheridan's campaigns — battles of the 

opequon, fisher's hill and 

tom's brook 

The written instructions addressed to Hun- 
ter, which Sheridan received, were as follows : 

"Monocacy Bridge, Md., 
"August 5, 1864, 8 p. m. 
Maj.-Gen. D. Hunter: 

"General — Concentrate all your available 
force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's 
Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and 
garrisons for public property as may be neces- 
sary. Use, in this concentration, the railroad, 
if by so doing time can be saved. From Har- 
per's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has 
moved north of the Potomac in large force, 
push north, following him and attacking him 
wherever found; follow him if driven south 
of the Potomac as long as it is safe to do 

There are now on the way to join you three 
other brigades of the best of cavalry, number- 
ing at least 5,000 men and horses. These will 



SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS 197 

be instructed, in the absence of further orders, 
to join you by the south side of the Potomac. 
* * * In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, 
where it is expected you will have to go first or 
last, it is desirable that nothing should be left 
to invite the enemy to return. Take all pro- 
visions, forage and stock wanted for the use 
of your command ; such as cannot be consumed, 
destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings 
be destroyed; they should rather be protected, 
but the people should be informed that so long 
as an army can subsist among them recurrences 
of these raids must be expected, and we are de- 
termined to stop them at all hazards. Bear 
in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, 
and to do this you want to always keep him in 
sight. Be guided in your course by the course 
he takes. * * * 

(Signed) U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General." 

Sheridan found Early's army concentrated 
west of the Opequon River, covering Winches- 
ter and Bunker Hill. He moved his own army 
from Halltown to a line running from Clifton 
to Berryville, sending part of his cavalry to 
White Post on the Front Royal road and post- 
ing the remainder under Lowell at Summit 
Point, on the Harper's Ferry and Winchester 
Railroad, to guard his right flank. From these 
positions a general advance was made west- 
ward to the Opequon, when it was ascertained 



igtt Sheridan's campaigns 

by the cavalry on the White Post and Winches- 
ter road that Early was retreating toward 
Strasburg, where the Valley is narrowest and 
most favorable for defense. This was on the 
nth of August, 1864. Sheridan followed to 
Cedar Creek and, through very brisk recon- 
noitering, developed Early's main line on Fish- 
er's Hill, immediately south of Strasburg, 
strongly entrenched. 

While in these relative positions on the 12th, 
Sheridan learned of a large force of Confeder- 
ates approaching Front Royal from Culpeper 
by way of Chester Gap, in the Blue Ridge, 
almost directly opposite his left flank and only 
fifteen miles from it. Sheridan's information 
about the approach of these Confederates was 
confirmed on the morning of the 14th, when a 
special messenger from Washington, who came 
by way of Snicker's Gap, brought the follow- 
ing dispatch from General Grant : 

"City Point, August 12, 1864, 9 a. m. 
Major-General Halleck : 

Inform General Sheridan it is now certain 
two (2) divisions of infantry have gone to 
Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) 
pieces of artillery. This movement commenced 
last Saturday night. He must be cautious and 
act on the defensive until movements here force 
them to detach to send this way. Early's force, 
with this increase, cannot exceed forty thou- 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 199 

sand men, but this is too much for General 
Sheridan to attack. * * * 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General." 

To fully verify this information, Sheridan, 
on the 14th and 15th, sent Merritt's Division 
of cavalry to Front Royal and withdrew all his 
infantry to the north side of Cedar Creek, prior 
to withdrawing entirely to what Sheridan con- 
sidered the best defensive position in the lower 
Valley — at Halltown and Harper's Ferry. By 
this movement he would also be marching to- 
ward reinforcements then coming to him from 
Washington by way of Snicker's Gap, of the 
Blue Ridge, and consisting of Grover's Divi- 
sion of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson's Di- 
vision of cavalry. 

On the nights of the 15th and 16th he with- 
drew his entire infantry force to Winchester, 
leaving his cavalry out as a screen, but with 
instructions, as it retired, to carry out that part 
of General Grant's orders to destroy all stores 
and forage south of a line drawn westward 
from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat 
Gap, in North Mountain. Also to seize all 
mules, horses and cattle that might be useful 
to his army. No houses were to be burned and 
the people were to be informed "that the ob- 
ject is to make this valley untenable for the 
raiding parties of the rebel army." The infan- 
try was withdrawn at night, mainly because 



200 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS 

the movement could not be concealed during 
the day from Early's lookouts on Massanutten 
Mountain, overlooking the entire region about 
Strasburg and Cedar Creek. 

This withdrawal was made none too soon, 
for on the afternoon of the 16th, before the 
main infantry had commenced to move back, 
Merritt's cavalry was attacked at the Shenan- 
doah crossing of the Front Royal and Winches- 
ter road by Gen. R. H. Anderson's infantry, 
Kershaw's Division, and Fitzhugh Lee's two 
brigades of cavalry, arriving in the Valley from 
Richmond and Culpeper via Chester Gap. Mer- 
ritt repulsed Anderson's attack, capturing two 
battle flags and three hundred prisoners, and 
then fell back to White Post, while the infan- 
try was getting into position on the 17th at 
Berryville and Clifton, and Wilson's and Low- 
ell's cavalry held Winchester. Averell's Cav- 
alry Division had returned to Hancock from 
Moorefield, where it had attacked and dispersed 
McCausland's Confederate cavalry on the 7th 
of August. 

Early started in pursuit of Sheridan on the 
17th, as soon as he became aware of the lat- 
ter' s retirement, driving the Federal cavalry 
out of Winchester toward Summit Point that 
same evening, Early being joined by Ander- 
son's column near Winchester on the morning 
of the 1 8th. Sheridan then drew Merritt back 
from White Post to Berryville, while the cav- 
alry on his other flank held a line from Sum- 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 201 

mit Point, with pickets out along the Opequon, 
to Smithfield Bridge, the infantry being posted 
near Charlestown, where, on the 21st, Early 
made a reconnaissance in force by way of 
Smithfield Bridge, but quickly withdrew again 
west of the Opequon, and Sheridan then moved 
his entire army to Halltown, posting his cav- 
alry on his right flank toward Shepherdstown. 

This general retrograde movement from 
Strasburg to Halltown by Sheridan's army, 
leaving Maryland and Pennsylvania again 
open to Confederate raiding parties, caused in- 
tense commotion at the North and excitement 
at Washington, although, by keeping close con- 
tact with Early, Sheridan, from his position at 
Halltown or from Berryville, was able to 
closely follow after Early's army should the 
latter attempt to cross north of the Potomac, 
or, if he went east of the Blue Ridge toward 
Washington, Sheridan could readily interpose 
his army to protect the Capital. Still it was a 
retrograde movement, justified by the prudence 
of not risking a battle with a superior force at 
Cedar Creek, so far away from his base at 
Harper's Ferry, and with Anderson's reinforce- 
ments arriving at Front Royal on his left flank 
to threaten his communications to the rear. 

Early felt Sheridan's lines at Halltown on 
the 22d and the following days, until the night 
of the 25th, when he retired west of the Ope- 
quon, concentrating his forces at Bunker Hill 
and Brucetown. Sheridan moved forward to 



2o2 sheridan's campaigns 



Charlestown on the 28th and seized Smith- 
field Bridge with Merritt's Cavalry Division. 
On the 29th a heavy force of Confederate in- 
fantry first drove Merritt back toward Charles- 
town, and then, in turn, were driven out across 
the Opequon, which was thereafter held by 
Sheridan's cavalry. 

Averell, who had been guarding the cross- 
ings of the Potomac from Hancock down the 
north side of the river to Antietam Creek, 
crossed to the south side and advanced to Mar- 
tinsburg on the 29th, driving out the enemy's 
pickets; but Averell in turn was driven back 
to Falling Waters by Rodes's Division of in- 
fantry on the 31st. On the 2d of September 
Averell advanced again through Martinsburg 
to near Bunker Hill, where he attacked and 
routed Early's Cavalry (now commanded by 
Lomax, who had succeeded Ransom), captur- 
ing 2 battle-flags, 55 prisoners, some wagons 
and a herd of cattle, finally driving Lomax 
nearly into Winchester on the 3d. 

On that day Sheridan moved his infantry to 
a line running from Clifton to Berryville, his 
cavalry (except Averell's Division) being 
pushed south to White Post. Averell was 
brought east of the Opequon to Leetown. There 
was virtually no change in these positions until 
the 19th of September. 

Information had been received a fortnight 
before, that Kershaw's Division of infantry had 
been or was to be ordered to return to Rich- 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON., ETC. 203 

mond, where Grant's activity was causing Lee 
great concern. Lee had already recalled Hamp- 
ton's Cavalry Division when it was marching 
to join Anderson at Culpeper on the 14th of 
August. Kershaw's Division of infantry, with 
Gen. R. H. Anderson, finally left Winchester 
on the 14th of September to return to General 
Lee via Front Royal ; by Early's advice he had 
already made an attempt on the 3d to go 
through to Millwood and Ashby's Gap into 
Loudoun County, for the purpose of giving the 
appearance of moving on Washington, but on 
that occasion he had unexpectedly run into 
Crook's Corps near Berryville, and, after a 
sharp engagement, returned to Winchester. 
Everything then being quiet, and at the repeat- 
ed summons from General Lee that at least he 
and his staff should return to Richmond to re- 
sume command of the First Army Corps, An- 
derson started again from Winchester with 
Kershaw's Division, as above seen. 

This was what Sheridan claims to have been 
waiting for to assume the offensive against 
Early; General Grant, having come from City 
Point to Charlestown on the 16th of Septem- 
ber, approved Sheridan's plans of attack and 
then returned to the Army of the Potomac. 

At 3 a. m. of the 19th, Sheridan's army 
moved out from the Clifton-Berryville line to 
the Opequon, Wilson's cavalry first striking 
Ramseur's Confederate Division immediately 
west of the Opequon in the canyon on the 



204 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS 

Berryville- Winchester road, driving it in to- 
ward Winchester. This movement was sup- 
ported by the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, 
who, with Crook's Eighth Corps in reserve, 
then took up the righting, which became desper- 
ate, with varying results throughout the day, 
until Crook's Corps, having been put in on the 
right of the Nineteenth Corps, found the 
enemy's left flank and crushed it. Simulta- 
neously the two Divisions of cavalry (Merritt's 
and Averell's) under Torbert, which had cross- 
ed the Opequon lower down (north) and had 
joined forces at Stephenson's Depot, came 
charging up the Martinsburg road, driving be- 
fore them Lomax's Confederate Cavalry Divi- 
sion in a confused mass through the Confeder- 
ate broken infantry troops. Sheridan then ad- 
vanced his entire infantry line, and assembling 
Torbert's two Cavalry Divisions on the right 
of the infantry, directed them to renew the 
charge, and Early's army was driven through 
Winchester hopelessly routed at dark, in full 
retreat toward Newtown and Fisher's Hill, 
where the valley narrows down to about four 
miles in width and furnishes an almost im- 
pregnable defensive position, which Early had 
also strongly entrenched. 

The losses at the Battle of the Opequon (or 
Winchester) were: Union, killed, 697; wound- 
ed, 3,983; missing, 338 — total, 5,018. Con- 
federates ; Early's official report gives his killed 
at 226, wounded, 1,567; missing, 1,818 — total, 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 205 

3,611, and he also admits losing three guns, 
but makes no report of his cavalry losses, which 
were undoubtedly heavy. Among general offi- 
cers lost were Generals Rodes and Godwin by 
the Confederates; Gen. D. A. Russell by the 
Federals — all killed. 

On the 31st of August Sheridan's returns 
showed a strength present of about 50,000 men, 
of whom 8,000 were cavalry. It is not possible 
to get at Early's strength for the same period, 
on account of the incompleteness of his re- 
turns, and want of mention of either his artil- 
lery or his cavalry, but his army was undoubt- 
edly inferior in all arms to Sheridan's, espe- 
cially in cavalry. 

Sheridan, on the 20th of September, follow- 
ed Early with his infantry and Merritt's cav- 
alry on the Valley turnpike to the Heights of 
Strasburg, sending his cavalry under Averell 
by a parallel road to the westward, known as 
the Back road, and Wilson's cavalry eastward 
toward Front Royal by a road diverging from 
the Valley pike at Newtown. During the 
night of the 21st orders were sent to Crook's 
Corps to repeat his movement of the 19th, by 
getting into position on the Confederate left 
flank and attacking from that direction. To 
do so, Crook was moved from his position in 
reserve on Cedar Creek to a point on North 
Mountain, some distance beyond where Sheri- 
dan had massed the Nineteenth and the Sixth 
Army Corps, then passing through a series of 



206 sheridan's campaigns 

ravines and woods, which concealed his move- 
ments, to a point which brought him in beyond 
the Confederate left. Crook, early on the 22d, 
formed in two parallel columns and proceeded 
in that formation until he had gone almost the 
length of his columns to the rear of the Confed- 
erate entrenchments, when he faced to the left, 
and thus formed a double line of battle, which 
was moved forward with a shout, going over 
very difficult ground and taking the Confeder- 
ate battle-lined entrenchments in reverse, driv- 
ing out its defenders in confusion, who were 
pursued four miles without being permitted to 
reform. A battery near the left of the Con- 
federate line was abandoned by its gunners and 
run over by Crook's men, and small arms in 
great quantities were thrown away. Being then 
joined by Ricketts's Division of the Sixth 
Corps, which, equally with all the remainder of 
the infantry, had passed through the Confed- 
erate lines in their front, Crook continued the 
pursuit until dark. Crook's losses were only 
8 killed, 153 wounded and 1 missing. The en- 
tire losses were but 528. Among those Crook 
thanked in his official report, was Capt. Wil- 
liam McKinley, acting assistant adjutant-gen- 
eral. 

At Fisher's Hill Early reported his losses to 
aggregate 1,235 men an d I2 g" uns > an d many 
small arms thrown away. In taking up that po- 
sition, which had been repaired and strength- 
ened a month before, Early evidently expected 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON., ETC. 207 

to check effectually Sheridan's jubilant army 
from passing farther south up the Valley. To 
secure himself at Fisher's Hill and his commu- 
nications with Harrisonburg and Staunton, 
Early immediately detached Fitzhugh Lee's 
cavalry on the 20th of September to prevent 
any movement of the enemy into the Luray 
Valley by way of Front Royal. There Fitzhugh 
Lee was attacked by Sheridan's cavalry under 
Torbert on the 21st and again at Mil ford 
Creek on the 22d. At the latter place the Shen- 
andoah impinges so closely upon the Blue 
Ridge that the position could not be turned, 
and the banks of Milford Creek so precipitous 
that a direct attack was out of the question ; so, 
on the 23d, Torbert withdrew to Front Royal, 
Cedarville and Buckton. There he learned of 
the victory at Fisher's Hill, and at the same 
time received orders from Sheridan to move up 
the Luray Valley again. Torbert found the 
enemy had gone from Milford Creek, but came 
up with him on the 24th, three miles from Lu- 
ray, driving him through the town and out on 
the New Market road over Massanutten 
Mountain. On the 25th Torbert rejoined the 
main army at New Market, Early having re- 
treated through that place the day before, and 
gone through Harrisonburg to Port Republic, 
in which direction he was followed by Tor- 
bert's cavalry, who also sent a part of his force 
around through Staunton to Waynesborough. 
Here Torbert met resistance from Early's main 



208 Sheridan's campaigns 

army and fell back toward Staunton on the 
night of the 28th, to Spring Hill, on Middle 
River, and went to Bridgewater, on North 
River, on the 29th. The other part of Tor- 
bert's cavalry was at Cross Keys operating in 
the vicinity of Brown's Gap and Piedmont. 
Early, meanwhile, had been reinforced by Ker- 
shaw's Division of infantry, which had been 
diverted by General Lee at Orange Court- 
House, while it was marching to rejoin him at 
Richmond pursuant to previous orders already 
mentioned. Kershaw joined Early at Port Re- 
public. Rosser, with his brigade of cavalry, 
was also sent to Early via Burksville. 

Sheridan moved his infantry to Harrison- 
burg on the 25th and to Mount Crawford on 
the 29th, while Torbert's cavalry were carrying 
out General Grant's instructions to destroy all 
mills, grain, forage, etc., that they could not 
use themselves, in the vicinity of Staunton, 
Waynesboro, Piedmont and Port Republic. 
Grant's latest orders to Sheridan of September 
26 read : "If the war is to last another year, 
we want the Shenandoah Valley w remain a 
barren waste." 

It was while at Harrisonburg on the 1st 
of October that Sheridan received a dispatch 
from General Grant, dated September 28, and 
sent through General Halleck at Washington, 
that it was expected of him to reach Charlottes- 
ville. Sheridan, in reply, said : "It is no easy 
matter to pass these mountain gaps [meaning 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 209 

the Blue Ridge] and attack Charlottesville, 
hauling supplies through difficult passes, 14 
miles in length, and with a line of communica- 
tion from 135 to 145 miles long, without the or- 
ganization of supply trains, ordnance trains, 
and all the appointments of an army making a 
permanent advance. * * * I am ready and 
willing to cross the Blue Ridge, but know from 
present indications that the enemy will strongly 
fortify at Charlottesville and Gordonsville, and 
that these places cannot be taken without the 
expenditure of a largely superior force to keep 
open the line of communication. With my 
present means I cannot accumulate supplies 
enough to carry me through to the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad." 

In a dispatch to Halleck of the same date as 
the one to Grant (October 1, 1864,) Sheridan 
says : " * * * I strongly advise General Grant 
to terminate this campaign by the destruction 
of the crops in the Valley and the means of 
planting, and the transfer of the Sixth and 
Nineteenth Corps to his army at Richmond. 
This is my best judgment. With Crook's force 
the Valley can be held. * * * There is no ob- 
jective point except Lynchburg, and it cannot 
be invested on the line of this Valley and the in- 
vesting army supplied. What we have destroy- 
ed and can destroy in this Valley is worth mil- 
lions of dollars to the rebel Government." 

On the 3d of October General Grant tele- 
graphed Secretary Stanton: "I will follow 

14 



■w 



2IO 



Sheridan's suggestion of bringing the Sixth 
and Nineteenth Corps here and yours as to 
bringing them by rail from Front Royal." 

So General Grant relinquished for the time 
his pet idea of getting possession of Charlottes- 
ville and breaking up the Virginia Central Rail- 
road at that point. He had urged that move- 
ment on Hunter when that officer was on his 
expedition up the Valley towards Lynchburg 
in June, and had sent Sheridan with two divi- 
sions of cavalry from City Point to meet Hun- 
ter in that vicinity when Sheridan was inter- 
cepted by Wade Hampton at Trevilians's. 
Grant repeated the project to Hunter and to 
Wright after Early had retreated from in front 
of Washington, and we have just seen how he 
recurred to the same plan when Sheridan reach- 
ed Harrisonburg and Staunton. 

On the 3d of October Grant directed Sheri- 
dan : "Take up such position in the Valley as 
you think can and ought to be held, and send 
all the force not required for this immediately 
here. Leave nothing for the subsistence of an 
army on any ground you abandon to the enemy. 
* I will direct the railroad to be pushed toward 
Front Royal, so that you may send your troops 
back that way. * * *" As the Manassas Gap 
Railroad from Strasburg and Front Royal 
would carry the troops to Alexandria, water 
transportation from that place to City Point 
was arranged for. 

With this authority Sheridan commenced 
withdrawing from the upper Valley on the 6th 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 211 

of October, his cavalry moving in rear of his 
infantry and stretched "across the Valley from 
the Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alle- 
ghenies, with directions to burn all forage and 
drive off all stock, etc., as they moved to the 
rear, fully coinciding with the views of the 
Lieutenant-General, that the Valley should be 
made a barren w r aste. The most positive orders 
were given, however, not to burn private dwell- 
ings. In this movement the enemy's cavalry 
followed at a respectful distance until in the vi- 
cinity of Woodstock, when they attacked Cus- 
ter's Division, and harassed it as far as Tom's 
Brook, a short distance south of Fisher's Hill." 

There, on the 8th of October, Sheridan halt- 
ed his infantry and instructed Torbert to en- 
gage the Confederate cavalry and to defeat it. 
With Custer's Division on the Back road and 
Merritt's on the Valley pike, the heads of the 
opposing columns came in contact at Tom's 
Brook on the 9th and deployed. "After a short 
but decisive engagement the enemy was defeat- 
ed, with the loss of all his artillery, excepting 
one piece, and everything else that was carried 
on wheels. The rout was complete and was 
followed up to Mount Jackson, a distance of 
some twenty-six miles. 

"On October 10th the army crossed to the 
north side of Cedar Creek, the Sixth Corps 
continuing its march to Front Royal. * * * " 
From this the Sixth Corps was recalled, how- 
ever, when it was learned that Early's army 



212 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS 

had returned to his entrenched lines on Fisher's 
Hill on the 13th. 

While Sheridan was at Harrisonburg and 
above, it was found to be exceedingly difficult 
to get the necessary supply trains through to 
^ him from Martinsburg or Harper's Ferry, un- 
less heavily escorted. It was simply a repeti- 
tion of the experience of Banks and Fremont 
in 1862 and of Hunter in June, 1864, while op- 
erating in that same region, among a thorough- 
ly hostile population, with Mosby's and White's 
men swarming through the passes of the Blue 
Ridge from Loudoun County to fall upon any 
unprotected convoy that could not be fought 
through. With Sheridan the case was made 
more difficult still, by the addition of hundreds 
of armed stragglers from Early's army who 
had been dispersed at the battles of Winchester 
and Fisher's Hill, and who, under the leader- 
ship of their officers, likewise stragglers, had 
been gathered from the mountains in squads, 
after Sheridan's army had passed on, and form- 
ed in the aggregate quite a formidable force in 
his rear. 

While on his return march, Sheridan reported 
to Grant from Woodstock on the 7th of Octo- 
ber the results of his operations as follows : "In 
moving back to this point the whole country 
from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountains 
has been made untenable for a rebel army. I 
have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with 
wheat, hay and farming implements; over 70 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 213 

mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven 
in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, 
and have killed and issued to the troops not less 
than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces 
the Luray Valley and Little Fort Valley, as 
well as the main Valley. A large number of 
horses has been obtained, a proper estimate of 
which I cannot now make. * * * Since I came 
into the Valley from Harper's Ferry up to 
Harrisonburg, every train, every small party 
and every straggler has been bushwhacked by 
people, many of whom have protection papers 
from commanders who have been hitherto in 
this Valley. 

From the vicinity of Harrisonburg over 400 
wagon loads of refugees have been sent back 
to Martinsburg; most of these people were 
Dunkers and had been conscripted. * * * 

To-morrow I will continue the destruction 
of wheat, forage, etc., down to Fisher's Hill. 
When this is completed, the Valley from Win- 
chester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will 
have but little in it for man or beast. * * * " 

These Dunkers are a religious sect which 
came to America from Switzerland and Ger- 
many between 17 19 and 1729; they settled first 
in Pennsylvania, from where they spread out 
into Ohio, Maryland and Virginia. Their be- 
lief was akin both to that of the Baptists and 
the Friends, particularly that tenet of the latter 
sect which forbids the shedding of human 
blood in battle. 



214 SHERIDAN S CAMPAIGNS 

Being essentially an agricultural people, the 
fertile valley of the Shenandoah was not long 
in inviting them to settle there the overflow 
from their increasing numbers in Pennsylvania, 
especially from the Cumberland Valley, by way 
of its physical extension southward across the 
Potomac through Winchester, up to the broad 
expanse of the Valley at Harrisonburg and vi- 
cinity. 

It was the descendants of these Dunker pio- 
neers that Sheridan found means to provide for, 
when he loaded them into his empty wagons at 
Harrisonburg and brought them North with 
him. His orders had required him to destroy 
their means of subsistence and leave them des- 
titute, so that Confederate troops could no lon- 
ger forage there. 

The relations of the Dunkers to the Confed- 
eracy were passive rather than disloyal. They 
meekly accepted the situation and the usual 
conditions of war, except to volunteer to bear 
arms and go into battle. This their religious 
faith forbade. , 

They submitted to all the penalties of the 
Conscription Acts, but still refused to shed 
blood, — until modified relief came to them 
through an Act of the Confederate Congress, 
dated October n, 1862, by which provision 
was made to exempt them as follows : " * * * 
and all persons who have been or who are now 
members of the Society of Friends and the As- 
sociation of Dunkards, Nazarenes, and Men- 



BATTLES OF THE OPEQUON, ETC. 215 

nonites, in regular membership in their respec- 
tive denominations, provided, * * * [they] shall 
furnish substitutes or pay a tax of five hundred 
dollars each into the public Treasury/' 

A more liberal Act of the Legislature of Vir- 
ginia had already been passed March 29th, 
1862, by which there was a proviso that, where 
unable to pay the tax of five hundred dollars, a 
Dunkard might "be employed as a teamster or 
in some character which will not require the 
actual bearing of arms," etc. 

To the westward of the Valley, about Ward- 
ensville and Moorefield, there were two bodies 
of partisans, under the leadership of Harness 
and McNeill, who were very enterprising, and 
constantly making forays through that moun- 
tainous section toward the Baltimore and Ohio S 
Railroad near Cumberland or New Creek 
(Keyser), or up the South Branch Valley. 

But the most formidable of all the independ- 
ent parties of Confederate regulars or irregu- 
lars sent out that season, was one organized 
under Lieut.-Col. Vincent A. Witcher, of the 
Thirty-fourth Battalion Virginia Cavalry, 
which, starting from Jeffersonville, in South- 
western Virginia, passed down the Valley of 
New River to Lewisburg, where Witcher pick- 
ed up several small guerilla bands commanded 
by the Thurmond brothers and others, making 
an aggregate force of 523. 

Leaving Lewisburg on the 22d of September, 
Witcher marched northward over the Cold 



2l6 SHERIDAN^S CAMPAIGNS 



Knob trail to Bulltown, thence to Weston and 
Buckhannon. The only resistance Witcher 
mentioned having was from some home-guards 
at each of the above-mentioned places, who 
were easily dispersed. He claims to have cap- 
tured and paroled 300 prisoners, taken 1,000 
small arms, 400 horses and 300 beef cattle, and 
destroyed large quantities of commissary, quar- 
termaster and medical stores. General Lee had 
authorized the expedition and commended the 
results, but it had no military value beyond 
causing a commotion to the weak guards of 
/ the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad within Gen- 
eral Kelley's jurisdiction, west of Cumberland, 
although none of Witcher's men reached the 
railroad itself. The movement was intended 
by General Lee as a diversion in favor of Early, 
but Witcher found the railroad too well guard- 
ed to be attacked, so he withdrew to the Green- 
brier country. The excesses committed by 
Witcher's men were so discreditable that the 
Confederate War Department was forced to 
take notice of them. 



CHAPTER XII 
Sheridan's Campaigns (Continued) 

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK AND SUBSEQUENT 
CAVALRY MOVEMENTS 

That the project of a movement on Gordons- 
ville still existed in General Grant's mind was 
made manifest by a dispatch from Halleck to 
Sheridan, dated Washington, October 12, noon, 
reading: "General Grant wishes a position 
taken far enough south to serve as a base for 
future operations upon Gordonsville and Char- 
lottesville. It must be strongly fortified and 
provisioned. Some point in the vicinity of 
Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all 
purposes. * * * " It is to be recalled that a 
large force of men and a railroad construction 
corps were at work restoring the Manassas Gap 
Railroad from Alexandria (or Manassas June- 1/ 
tion) through to Front Royal, although con- 
tinually harassed by Mosby's and White's guer- 
rilla bands. The expectation was to transfer 
Sheridan's base of supplies from Harper's 
Ferry to Alexandria as soon as the Manassas 
Gap Railroad could be made use of. 



218 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

This revived Gordonsville project Sheridan 
disapproved of, and after considerable commu- 
nication backward and forward between him 
and Washington, and Washington with City 
Point, he was called to Washington by Mr. 
Stanton on the 13th of October, who said : "If 
you can come here a consultation on several 
points is extremely desirable. I propose to 
visit General Grant and would like to see you 
first." 

Early, who had been reinforced by Ker- 
shaw's Infantry Division at Port Republic, 
September 26th and by Rosser's Cavalry Divi- 
sion on the 2d of October at Mount Crawford, 
followed Sheridan's forces as the latter retired 
down the valley, Early halting his infantry for 
a few days at New Market, and then moving 
down to his old line at Fisher's Hill on the 
13th of October, as already stated, closely ob- 
servant of Sheridan' j- further movements. 

In his general report of the Valley cam- 
paigns, which he wrote at New Orleans Feb- 
ruary 3, 1866, Sheridan says: "On the even- 
ing of the 15th I determined to go [meaning to 
Washington], believing that the enemy at Fish- 
er's Hill could not accomplish much, and as I 
had concluded not to attack him at present, I 
ordered the whole of the cavalry force under 
General Torbert to accompany me to Front 
Royal, from where I intended to push it 
through Chester Gap to the Virginia Central 
v Railroad at Charlottesville, while I passed 



Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 219 

through Manassas Gap to Piedmont, thence by- 
rail to Washington. Upon my arrival with 
the cavalry at Front Royal on the night of the 
1 6th, I received a dispatch from General 
Wright, who was left at Cedar Creek in com- 
mand of the army, to the effect that a message 
taken off the Confederate signal flag on Three 
Top Mountain, overlooking Fisher's Hill, indi- 
cated that Longstreet was moving to Early's 
support, and when the two forces joined they 
would crush Sheridan. Moreover, Wright ex- 
pressed great uneasiness that the enemy might 
attack his right flank from the direction of 
North Mountain." 

Sheridan then says concerning the Confeder- 
ate signal message : "My first thought was 
that it was a ruse, but, on reflection, deemed it 
best to abandon the cavalry raid and give to 
Wright the entire strength of the army. I 
therefore ordered the cavalry to return and 
report to him." 

Sheridan then rode on to Piedmont, where 
he found transportation to Washington by rail, 
reaching that city on the morning of the 17th; 
had his interview with Mr. Stanton and re- 
turned to Winchester by a special train over the 
Baltimore and Ohio as far as Martinsburg, so 
that he reached Winchester on the night of the 
1 8th of October and slept there. 

Torbert's two divisions of cavalry, mean- 
while, had rejoined Wright from Front Royal 
on the 17th, one division (Powell's) being 



220 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

placed along the line of the Shenandoah from 
the left of the army toward Front Royal, while 
Merritt's division returned to its former posi- 
tion on the right of the infantry, where Cus- 
ter's Division had remained to cover that flank, 
during the absence of the other two divisions, 
when Sheridan organized the projected raid 
I on Charlottesville via Front Royal and Chester 
Gap, which he subsequently abandoned. 

So that, on the night of the 18th, the line of 
the Union Army was along Cedar Creek, the 
Eighth Corps (Crook's) on the left, with 
Powell's Cavalry Division to his left, but about 
eight miles away at the crossing of the Shenan- 
doah on the Front Royal and Winchester turn- 
pike. To the right of Crook came the Nine- 
teenth Army Corps, then commanded by Em- 
ory, and still farther to the right was the Sixth 
Corps (Wright's). Merritt's and Custer's 
Cavalry Divisions were placed beyond the right 
of the Sixth Corps, and west of Middletown. 
The general direction of the entire line was 
originally S. E. to N. W., north of Cedar 
Creek. 

Early, in his report of October 21 to General 
Lee from New Market, says : 

"After ascertaining the location of the en- 
emy's camps by observation from the signal 
station on Massanutten Mountain, I determined 
to move around the left flank of the enemy. 
* * * To get around the enemy's left was a 
very difficult undertaking, however, as the river 



sheridan's campaigns (continued) 221 

had to be crossed twice, and between the moun- 
tain and river, where the troops had to pass to 
the lower ford, there was only a rugged path- 
way. I thought, however, the chances of suc- 
cess would be greater from the fact that the 
enemy would not expect a move in that direc- 
tion, on account of the difficulties attending it 
and the great strength of their position on that 
flank. The movement was accordingly begun 
on the night of the 18th just after dark, Gor- 
don's, Ramseur's and Pegram's Divisions be- 
ing sent across the river and around the foot of 
the mountain, all under command of General 
Gordon; and late at night I moved with Ker- 
shaw's Division through Strasburg toward a 
ford on Cedar Creek just above its mouth, and 
Wharton was moved on the pike toward the 
enemy's front, in which road the artillery was 
also moved. The arrangement was for Gordon 
to come around in the rear, for Kershaw to at- 
tack the left flank, and for Wharton to advance 
in front, supporting the artillery, which was to 
open on the enemy when he should turn on 
Gordon or Kershaw, and the attack was to be- 
gin at 5 a. m. 

Rosser was sent to the left to occupy the 
enemy's cavalry, and Lomax, who had been 
sent down the Luray Valley, was ordered to 
pass Front Royal, cross the river and move 
across to the Valley pike. 

Punctually at 5 a. m. Kershaw reached the 
enemy's left work and attacked and carried it 



222 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

without the least difficulty, and very shortly 
afterwards Gordon attacked in the rear, and 
they swept everything before them, routing the 
Eighth and Nineteenth Corps completely, get- 
ting possession of their camp and capturing 18 
pieces of artillery and about 1,300 prisoners. 
They moved across the pike toward the camp 
of the Sixth Corps, and Wharton was crossed 
over, the artillery following him ; but the Sixth 
Corps, which was on the enemy's extreme right 
of his infantry, was not surprised in camp, be- 
cause Rosser had commenced the attack on that 
flank about the same time as the attack on the 
other, and the firing on the left gave that corps 
sufficient time to form and move out of camp, 
and it was found posted on a ridge on the west 
of the pike and parallel to it, and this corps of- 
fered considerable resistance. The artillery 
was brought up and opened on it, when it fell 
back to the north of Middletown and made a 
stand on a commanding ridge running across 
the pike. 

In the meantime the enemy's cavalry was 
threatening our right flank and rear, and the 
country being perfectly open, and having on 
that flank only Lomax's old brigade, number- 
ing about 300 men, it became necessary to make 
dispositions to prevent a cavalry charge and a 
portion of the troops were moved to the right 
for that purpose, and word was sent to Gordon, 
who had got on the left with his division, and 
Kershaw, who was there also, to swing round 



sheridan's campaigns (continued) 223 

and advance with their divisions; but they 
stated in reply that a heavy force of cavalry 
had got in their front, and that their ranks were 
so depleted by the number of men who had 
stopped in the camps to plunder, that they could 
not advance them. 

Rosser also sent word that when he attack- 
ed the cavalry he found a part of the Sixth 
Corps supporting it ; that a very heavy force of 
cavalry had massed in his front and that it was 
too strong for him and that he would have to 
fall back. I sent word to him to get some po- 
sition that he could hold, and the cavalry in 
front of Kershaw and Gordon having moved 
toward Rosser, they were moved forward and a 
line was formed north of Middletown and fac- 
ing the enemy. The cavalry on the right made 
several efforts to charge that flank but was 
driven back. 

So many of our men had stopped in the 
camp to plunder (in which I am sorry to say 
that officers participated), the country was so 
open and the enemy's cavalry was so strong, 
that I did not deem it prudent to press further, 
especially as Lomax had not come up. I deter- 
mined, therefore, to content myself with trying 
to hold the advantages I had gained until all 
my troops had come up and the captured prop- 
erty was secured. If I had had but one division 
of fresh troops I could have made the victory 
complete and beyond all danger of a reverse. 
We continued to hold our position until late in 



224 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

the afternoon when the enemy commenced ad- 
vancing." 

In the Union army the first blow had fallen 
upon the left flank and rear of Crook's Eighth 
Army Corps (the Army of West Virginia), 
then numbering about 4,000 men present, and 
constituting the left of the Federal infantry 
forces. This corps was soon crushed back upon 
the Nineteenth Corps, which, in turn, was 
fiercely attacked by the Confederates from the 
rear and on both flanks, and after some resist- 
ance forced from its position, and both corps 
being overpowered, were seized with panic and 
dispersed toward Middletown, north of which 
place a rally was finally made upon the un- 
broken Sixth Corps (Wright's) about 1 p. m., 
and further attacks by the enemy successfully 
resisted. It was at this stage that General 
Sheridan reached the field from Winchester, 
ten miles away, and resumed command of the 
disordered army, General Wright, on whom the 
command had devolved during Sheridan's ab- 
sence, returning to his own, the Sixth Corps. 

Sheridan in his report of the battle says : "At 
about 7 o'clock on the morning of the 19th of 
October an officer on picket at Winchester re- 
ported artillery firing, but, supposing it resulted 
from a reconnaissance which had been ordered 
for this morning, I paid no attention to it and 
was unconscious of the true condition of affairs 
until about 9 o'clock, when, having ridden 
through the town of Winchester, the sound of 



Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 225 

artillery made a battle unmistakable, and, on 
reaching Mill Creek, half a mile south of Win- 
chester, the head of the fugitives appeared in 
sight, trains and men coming to the rear with 
appalling rapidity. I immediately gave direc- 
tions to halt and park the trains at Mill Creek, 
and ordered the brigade at Winchester to 
stretch across the country and stop all strag- 
glers. Taking twenty men from my escort I 
pushed on to the front. * * * I am happy to say 
that hundreds of the men, when on reflection 
found they had not done themselves justice, 
came back with cheers. 

On arriving at the front I found Merritt's 
and Custer's Divisions of Cavalry, under Tor- 
bert, and General Getty's Division of the Sixth 
Corps, opposing the enemy. I suggested to 
General Wright that we would fight on Getty's 
line, and to transfer Custer to the right at once, 
as he (Custer) and Merritt, from being on the 
right in the morning, had been transferred to 
the left ; that the remaining two divisions of the 
Sixth Corps, which were to the right and rear 
of Getty about two miles, should be ordered up, 
and also that the Nineteenth Corps, which was 
on the right and rear of these two divisions, 
should be hastened up before the enemy attack- 
ed Getty. I then started out all my staff offi- 
cers to bring up these troops, and was so con- 
vinced that we would soon be attacked that I 
went back myself to urge them on. Imme- 
diately after I returned and assumed command, 

15 



226 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

General Wright returning to his corps, Getty 
to his division, the line of battle was formed on 
the prolongation of Getty's line, and a tempo- 
rary breastwork of rails, logs, etc., thrown up 
hastily. * * * At 4 p. m. I ordered the advance. 
* * * It was at this stage of the battle that Cus- 
ter was ordered to charge with his entire divi- 
sion, but, although the order was promptly 
obeyed, it was not in time to capture the whole 
of the force thus cut off, and many escaped 
across Cedar Creek. Simultaneous with this 
charge a combined movement of the whole line 
drove the enemy in confusion to the creek, 
where, owing to the difficulties of crossing, his 
army became routed. Custer, finding a ford 
on Cedar Creek west of the pike, and Devin, of 
Merritt's Division, one to the east of it, they 
each made a crossing just after dark and pur- 
sued the routed mass of the enemy to Fisher's 
Hill, where his strong position gave him some 
protection against our cavalry ; but most of his 
transportation had been captured, the road 
from Cedar Creek to Fisher's Hill, a distance 
of over three miles, being literally blockaded 
by wagons, ambulances, artillery, caissons, 
etc." 

For the harrowing particulars of that rout, 
the loss of artillery and transportation, etc., 
Early gives in his report to General Lee a most 
graphic and pathetic account of the crumbling 
away of his infantry under Sheridan's attack, 
commencing on the left of his line in Gordon's 



sheridan's campaigns (continued) 227 

Division, followed by Kershaw's and Ram- 
seur's; "when they found Gordon's giving 
away, not because there was any pressure on 
them, but because of an insane idea of being- 
flanked. Some of them, however, were rallied, 
and with the help of the artillery the army 
[enemy] was checked for some time; but a 
great number of the men could not be stopped, 
but continued to go to the rear. * * * The left 
again gave way, and then the whole command 
falling back in such a panic that I had to order 
Pegram's and Wharton's commands, which 
were very small and on the right, to fall back, 
and most of them took the panic also. I found 
it impossible to rally the troops. They would 
not listen to entreaties, threats, or appeals of 
any kind. A terror of the enemy's cavalry 
had seized them and there was no holding them. 
They left the field in the greatest confusion. 
All the captured artillery had been carried 
across Cedar Creek and a large number of cap- 
tured wagons and ambulances, and we succeed- 
ed in crossing our own artillery over. * * * A 
small body of the enemy's cavalry dashed 
across Cedar Creek above the bridge and got 
into the train and artillery running back on the 
pike, and passed through our men to this side of 
Strasburg, tore up a bridge, and thus succeeded 
in capturing the greater part of the artillery 
and a number of ordnance and medical wagons 
and ambulances. The men scattered on the 
sides and the rout was as thorough and dis- 
graceful as ever happened to our army." 



228 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

Early claims to have captured 18 guns and 
1,300 prisoners in the early part of the day; he 
secured his prisoners before the panic struck 
his troops, but his "net" loss in artillery on the 
19th was 23 pieces. He does not give his own 
losses in prisoners, killed or wounded. As 
none of his division commanders made any re- 
ports that are now available, those losses will 
probably never be ascertained. 

Sheridan gives his losses for the battles of 
the Opequon, September 19th, Fisher's Hill, 
September 22d, and Cedar Creek, October 
19th, 1864, besides reconnaissances and minor 
engagements, as follows: Killed, 1,938; 
wounded, 11,893; missing, 3,121 — an aggre- 
gate of 16,952. 

His field return for September 10, 1864, 
showed a strength of 40,672. 

There is no record of Early's strength nor 
of his losses during the 1864 campaign in the 
Valley. 

It was several days before Sheridan could 
give many particulars of his victory at Cedar 
Creek, but on the 25th of October he tele- 
graphed to General Grant as follows : 

"The battle of the 19th still increases in re- 
sults. We captured 48 pieces of artillery, cais- 
sons, horses and all the appointments; 24 of 
the above number were captured from us in the 
morning; these I returned, and in addition al- 
lowed the batteries to refit and exchange, and 
have left 24 pieces of rebel artillery, with cais- 



sheridan's campaigns (continued) 229 

sons complete, which I will send to Washing- 
ton to-morrow. All the ambulances of the 
Nineteenth Corps captured by the enemy were 
retaken, with 56 rebel ambulances in good con- 
dition, and as many more were destroyed. A 
number of wagons and ambulances were burn- 
ed unnecessarily by the cavalry in the excite- 
ment. Not less than 300 wagons and ambu- 
lances were captured or burned. The road be- 
tween Cedar Creek and Fisher's Hill for three 
miles was blocked by captured artillery and 
wagons. * * * We captured 14 battle-flags. 
* * * We are now reduced to an effective force 
of not over 22,000 infantry. From the ac- 
counts of officers, Early's infantry when he at- 
tacked me was 25,000; the number of cavalry 
not yet known." 

This peculiar battle of Cedar Creek, or Belle 
Grove as the Confederates called it, probably 
has never had its exact counterpart. Early 
gives his reason for attacking an intrenched 
enemy, who was probably his superior in 
strength, that owing to the lack of forage for 
his animals and the great difficulty of otherwise 
supplying his troops, so far from his base, the 
intermediate country having been laid waste, 
he would be forced soon to withdraw his army 
altogether unless he could accomplish by sur- 
prise what he dared not attempt otherwise. 
He selected also the stronger flank of his enemy 
for the execution of his well-conceived plan, 
with success almost within his grasp, when, by 



230 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

superhuman efforts on the part of his enemy, 
together with the disintegration of his own 
troops, while plundering the captured Federal 
camps, the tide was turned against him. An hour 
more of daylight would have destroyed entirely 
his panic-stricken army. He found he could 
not rally his forces in his old entrenchments at 
Fisher's Hill, they having lost all organization, 
so under cover of the night he retreated to New 
Market, fortunately for him unpursued, while 
Sheridan's army simply returned for the night 
to the camps they had lost in the morning. 

All reports show that no Confederate attack 
was expected, for even General Sheridan be- 
lieved he could safely leave his army to obey 
Mr. Stanton's call to Washington, although the 
false Confederate signal message from Long- 
street caused him great uneasiness. 

Wright, whom he left in command, says that 
the reconnaissance by a brigade sent out from 
Crook's command returned on the 18th and 
reported "that nothing was to be found in his 
old camp (the enemy's), and that he had doubt- 
less retreated up the valley." That reconnais- 
sance could not have proceeded very far, for 
Crook's line, as shown by both Confederate and 
Union maps, was less than five miles from 
Early's. Not being satisfied with the result of 
this reconnaissance of the 18th, Wright pre- 
pared two others — one brigade from the Nine- 
teenth Corps and another from the cavalry — to 
start at early dawn of the 19th of October, up 



sheridan's campaigns (continued) 231 

the Valley turnpike and the Back road respect- 
ively, to ascertain the enemy's whereabouts. 
Both these columns were in the act of starting 
when the attack opened on both flanks of the 
army. 

Wright expected an attack on his right flank 
instead of the left flank, if the enemy attacked 
him at all, for he said in his despatch of the 
1 6th to Sheridan, then at Front Royal, trans- 
mitting the bogus signal message : "If the 
enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry, 
he might, by turning our right, give us a great 
deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the 
enemy's movements are developed, and shall 
only fear an attack on my right, which I shall 
make every effort for guarding against and 
resisting." 

After the battle of Cedar Creek and until the 
10th of November, Early remained with his 
shattered army in the vicinity of New Market 
and Harrisonburg, reorganizing and recruiting 
his forces. He received during this period 
some accessions by conscripts, detailed men, 
and men of the second class (farmers) — 
reserves probably. 

At sunrise of the 10th of November Early 
marched his army from New Market down the 
Valley again, through Woodstock, and the next 
day to Middletown, where Sheridan's cavalry 
pickets were first encountered, the latter's main 
army being entrenched north of Newtown, at 
Kernstown, etc., where Sheridan had with- 



23^ SHERIDAN^ CAMPAIGNS (CONTINUED) 

drawn shortly after the battle of Cedar Creek, 
to shorten his line of supplies from his depots 
at Winchester. Early lay in line of battle near 
Newtown on the 12th, but made no attack; his 
cavalry on both flanks were driven back, Rosser 
by Custer on the Back road as far as Cedar 
Creek and McCausland on the Front Royal 
road by Powell as far as Milford. Sheridan 
says of this movement : "In consequence of 
contradictory information received from scouts 
and captured cavalry prisoners, I was uncon- 
vinced of any rebel infantry being in my vicin- 
ity until it was too late to overtake it in its 
galloping retreat, a retreat which was con- 
tinued until in the vicinity of Lacey's Spring, 
near Harrisonburg." 

This affair was reported by Early to General 
Lee on the 13th from New Market, where he 
returned with his entire army, which he had 
taken with him to Newtown to ascertain Sheri- 
dan's location; he remained in the vicinity of 
New Market until December 16, meanwhile 
detaching Rosser's Cavalry Division on the 
26th of November for a raid on Moorefield and 
New Creek. Kershaw's division of infantry 
had already been detached on the 15th of No- 
vember and sent to Richmond by way of 
Staunton. On the 16th of December Early 
also sent to Richmond, Gordon's and Pegram's 
Divisions of infantry by way of Staunton and 
Waynesboro. 

Early then had left with him but two divi- 
sions of infantry (Wharton's and Rodes's, or 



Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 233 

Grimes's) and Rosser's and Lomax's Divisions 
of cavalry, which were then retired up the val- 
ley from New Market on the 16th of Decem- 
ber, Wharton and Grimes going to Fishersville, 
while Lomax went to Swift Run Gap and Ros- 
ser to Swoope's, five miles west of Staunton. 

Rosser's raid on Moorefield, New Creek and 
Piedmont, from which he had only recently 
returned, yielded great and unexpected results, 
for he had captured and destroyed vast quanti- 
ties of army and railway material at both New ^ 
Creek (Keyser) and Piedmont, besides 8 pieces 
of artillery, part of which he brought off. Also 
about 350 prisoners, and all with very small 
loss to his own troops. The capture of the 
forts at New Creek on the 28th of November, 
being a complete surprise in broad daylight, 
was a disgrace to the garrison. At Piedmont, 
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, five miles 
west of New Creek, a detachment, under Major 
McDonald, endeavored to destroy the railway 
material and shops, but succeeded only partially 
in so doing, being prevented by the small gar- 
rison of Federal troops, thirty-five men in all, 
under Captain Fisher of the Sixth West Vir- 
ginia Infantry. 

Rosser then hurriedly withdrew his division 
to New Market by the route he had come, via 
Greenland Gap, Petersburg and Brock's Gap, 
rejoining Early in the upper valley. 

For permitting his garrison at New Creek to 
be surprised, and the consequent humiliating 



•y 



234 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

losses of prisoners and public stores, Colonel 
Latham, Fifth West Virginia Cavalry, the 
commander, was sentenced by court-martial to 
be dismissed from the service, but this sentence 
was subsequently revoked by a War Depart- 
ment order and Colonel Latham was "honor- 
ably mustered out of the service at his own 
request March 9, 1865." 

On the 28th of November, 1864, after Early 
had withdrawn to the region of Staunton in the 
upper valley, General Sheridan, from his in- 
trenched camp at Kernstown, sent out Merritt's 
Division of cavalry to clear the country of 
guerrillas east of the Blue Ridge and in Lou- 
doun county. This was the main field of oper- 
ations of the Confederate partisan Colonel 
Mosby, who had shown much enterprise in cap- 
turing small bodies of Federal troops passing 
through the country, both east and west of the 
Blue Ridge, attacking parties repairing rail- 
/ roads, or insufficiently guarded wagon-trains, 
and for which he had received the warmest 
approval of General Lee. 

Sheridan, in his report of the Valley cam- 
paign, mentions the annoyance these guerrillas 
or partisan bands had caused him, but had con- 
stantly refused to operate against them, "be- 
lieving them to be, substantially, a benefit to 
me, as they prevented straggling and kept my 
trains well closed up, and discharged such other 
duties as would have required a provost-guard 
of at least two regiments of cavalry." In re- 



Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 235 

taliation for the assistance and sympathy given 
them, however, by the inhabitants of Loudoun 
valley, Sheridan sent out Merritt, with instruc- 
tions to operate in the region east of the Blue 
Ridge "bounded on the south by the Manassas 
Gap Railroad as far east as White Plains, on 
the east by the Bull Run Range, on the west by 
the Shenandoah River, and on the north by the 
Potomac." 

Merritt was further instructed to "consume 
and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all 
barns and mills and their contents, and drive 
off all stock in the region. * * * This 
order must be literally executed, bearing in 
mind, however, that no dwellings are to be 
burned, and that no personal violence be offered 
the citizens. The ultimate results of the guer- 
rilla system of warfare is the destruction of all 
private rights in the country occupied by such 
parties. This destruction may as well com- 
mence at once, and the responsibility of it must 
rest upon the authorities at Richmond, who 
have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerrilla 
bands. * * * " 

Merritt, in his report of December 6, 1864, 
says these orders "were most fully carried out," 
but although the entire Loudoun Region was 
gone over, few guerrillas were found. 

Shortly after Merritt' s return from Loudoun 
valley, Sheridan sent Custer's Cavalry Division 
up the Shenandoah to locate the whereabouts 
of Early's army. Custer left the vicinity of 



• 



23 6 Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

Kernstown at an early hour on the 19th of 
December, by way of the Valley Turnpike. At 
Woodstock, on the 20th, Custer first learned of 
the presence of the Confederate cavalry ad- 
vanced scouts, who were picketing the three 
roads leading down the Valley — the turnpike, 
the Middle and the Back roads — extending 
from Edenburg westward to Little North 
Mountain. Custer took with him but three 
days' rations and one day's forage, expecting to 
find the enemy's cavalry no farther south than 
New Market ; but finding no serious opposition 
even at Woodstock, and learning of no large 
force of the enemy being nearer than Staunton, 
Custer continued his march into the region that 
had been devastated by General Grant's orders 
in the early autumn, camping at Lacey's 
Springs, 9 miles north of Harrisonburg, dur- 
ing the night of December 20. Strong pickets 
were thrown out toward Harrisonburg in front, 
Keezletown on the left, Timberville on the 
right, and a large force was left on the pike 
well to the rear. 

In this position Custer was attacked about 6 
A. M. of the 2 1 st by Payne's Brigade of Ros- 
ser's Cavalry Division from the direction of 
Timberville, to Custer's right and rear, toward 
which point they had marched from their camp 
near Staunton the day before, reaching Custer's 
vicinity during the night of December 20. 
Rosser's other two brigades attacked from the 
Back road. 



Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 237 

These were all readily repulsed before day- 
light, after which there was no further demon- 
stration, but as two of his three day's rations 
and all of his forage had been consumed, with 
no expectation of replenishing either for at 
least two days should he continue his advance 
to Staunton through a devastated country, 
Custer decided to retire, especially as the 
weather was exceedingly inclement and he had 
quite a number of wounded, mainly from sabre 
cuts, to care for. He took 32 prisoners, but 
does not state how many he lost in killed or 
captured, although Early claims Rosser took 
forty. 

As Rosser attacked with sabres a force he 
expected to surprise in camp, but which he 
found on the alert, and who resisted with car- 
bines at very short range, the probabilities are 
Rosser's losses in killed and wounded were 
larger than he cared to report. 

Simultaneously with Custer's reconnaissance 
up the Valley to locate Early's army, General 
Sheridan sent another expedition of two divi- 
sions of cavalry under Torbert, to proceed 
from Winchester across the Blue Ridge by way 
of Front Royal and Chester Gap, thence south, 
to carry out, if practicable, General Grant's 
favorite hobby of seizing Gordonsville and 
Charlottesville, with a view to destroying the 
Virginia Central Railroad at those points. v^ 

Torbert' s column moved out the same day as 
Custer's (December 19), both columns suffer- 



238 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

ing intensely from the severe winter weather. 
By the morning of the 20th Early had already 
received information of the movements of both 
commands, and prepared to meet them from 
both sides of the Blue Ridge with his greatly 
depleted and much scattered forces, together 
with such reinforcements as could be sent him 
J from Richmond by rail. 

At that time Early had already sent off to 
Lee three of his divisions of infantry and, with 
his one remaining infantry division (Whar- 
ton's), had established his winter quarters at 
/ Fishersville, on the Central Railroad, a few 
miles west of Waynesboro. He had placed one 
of his cavalry divisions (Rosser's) at Swoope's, 
five miles west of Staunton, while Lomax's 
Cavalry Division was posted east of the Blue 
Ridge, between Gordonsville and Liberty Mills. 
All these points were easily reached by rail and 
were outside the zone of Sheridan's destructive 
autumn operations. 

When Sheridan had learned earlier in the 
month that Early had sent away Kershaw's, 
Gordon's and Pegram's Divisions, he, too, de- 
tached all of the Sixth Corps (Wright's) and 
sent it to Grant at Petersburg, by way of Har- 
per's Ferry, Washington, Chesapeake bay and 
City Point. In addition he sent Grant one di- 
vision of Crook's Eighth Army Corps, with- 
drawing the remainder of that corps to Cum- 
berland, where it went into winter quarters. 

This left to Sheridan for immediate service 
in the Valley, the two divisions of the Nine- 



Sheridan's campaigns (continued) 239 

teenth Corps (Emory's) arid Torbert's three 
divisions of cavalry, and he had placed the 
railroad from Harper's Ferry in running order 
almost to his camps around Winchester. 

The two divisions of the Nineteenth Army 
Corps were also subsequently withdrawn and 
sent to Grant. 

Torbert approached Gordonsville by way of 
Madison Court-House, driving in Jackson's 
Brigade of Lomax's cavalry, which rallied at 
Liberty Mills, and, together with McCaus- 
land's Brigade, succeeded in delaying Torbert 
there by destroying the bridge over the Rapi- 
dan and forcing Torbert to use the fords both 
above and below, when Lomax's troopers hasti- 
ly fell back to a line of defenses immediately 
north of Gordonsville, which Torbert assaulted 
but could not carry, early on the morning of 
the 23rd. He had succeeded the night before, 
however, in capturing two field pieces and some 
thirty prisoners, with small losses. 

Having failed to dislodge Lomax, Torbert 
endeavored to flank him out by sending a 
strong column to turn the left of the position. 
While that movement was proceeding, the cars 
came in from Richmond loaded with infantry, 
which soon after were seen to file into the 
works. Torbert then became convinced it was 
useless further to attempt to break the Virginia 
Central Railroad at that point, and withdrew >/ 
via Madison Court-House, with a loss of "six 
or eight men killed and about forty wounded, 



240 sheridan's campaigns (continued) 

more than I could transport, and the worst 
cases were left behind. * * * About thirty 
prisoners were taken, but having no provisions, 
and it being very difficult, if not impossible for 
them to keep up, I paroled them. The guns, 
two three-inch rifles, were brought to 
camp." * * * 

The infantry which Torbert saw file into the 
entrenchments in South West Mountain, north 
of Gordonsville, was Bratton's Brigade of 
Field's Division, which had been taken out of 
the lines in front of Petersburg and hurriedly 

Vsent by rail to Gordonsville at Early's call for 
assistance; Hunton's Brigade was following 
Bratton's, but did not reach Gordonsville when 

t Torbert withdrew. The alarm being over, 
Hunton and Bratton were as rapidly taken back 
as they had been taken away from the lines of 
Lee's army. 

With the return of Torbert's expedition to 
Sheridan's army at Winchester, operations in 
the Valley or in the adjacent region were 
suspended. 



EPILOGUE 

Sheridan devoted the months of January and 
February, 1865, to the refitting of his cavalry 
and light artillery in the vicinity of Winches- 
ter, preparing for a renewal of his campaign 
against Early. 

On the 31st day of December, 1864, Early's 
strength in the region of Fishersville and Staun- 
ton, as shown by his inspection reports, aggre- 
gated 3,611 men present and absent, with 28 
guns. This strength was greatly diminished 
when the campaign against him opened two 
months later. 1 

Both armies sent out small expeditions dur- 
ing January and February, noticeably one from 
Early's army, consisting of Rosser's cavalry, 
which went in January from their winter can- 
tonment at Swoope's, a few miles west of 
Staunton, over the main Allegheny and Cheat 
River Mountains into Tygart's River Valley, 
and surprised Beverly. In going, Rosser fol- 
lowed the old Parkersburg turnpike, one of the 
few good roads leading west and northwest out 
of the Valley, and had always been in coaching 
days, before the era of railroads, a favorite 
route to the Ohio river from Southern Vir- 



242 EPILOGUE 

ginia. It is in excellent order today and was 
driven over by the writer in August, 1902, 
Some of the old taverns of the days of i860 
still exist. Rosser, after capturing Beverly on 
the nth of January, returned to Swoope's by 
way of Huntersville and Warm Springs. 

The results of this raid were the capture of 
572 officers and men belonging to the Eighth 
Ohio Cavalry and Thirty-fourth Ohio Infan- 
try, about 100 horses, a small amount of quar- 
termaster's stores and 10,000 rations, besides 
over 600 arms and equipments. The surprise 
was complete, as no attack was expected in the 
dead of winter, when the snows and inclement 
weather, as well as the isolation of the position 
among the mountains of West Virginia, gave 
a temporary fancied security to the garrison. 
The commanding officers of the Eighth Ohio 
Cavalry and Thirty-fourth Ohio Infantry were 
recommended for dismissal by General Crook, 
the Department Commander, "for disgraceful 
neglect." 

As at the surprise and capture of New Creek 
November 28, 1864, three months before, Ros- 
ser's men wore Federal clothing, enabling them 
to effect a close approach before their identity 
could be discovered. Rosser claimed to have 
had only 300 men with him. If so, his divi- 
sion had dwindled away to the size of a dimin- 
utive regiment. 

During January and February several cav- 
alry expeditions were sent out from Sheridan's 



EPILOGUE 243 

position at Winchester, mainly to operate 
against Mosby and White, east of the Blue 
Ridge, and against Harry Gilmor or the Mc- 
Neills in the vicinity of Moorefield, to the west- 
ward in the South Branch of the Potomac 
Valley. 

In one of these latter Harry Gilmor was sur- 
prised in bed at Randolph's, three miles out 
from Moorefield, at an early hour of the 5th of 
February. Gilmor, who appeared to be a free- 
lance partisan from Maryland, had been sent 
by Early to take charge of the McNeill and 
Harness bands, operating near Moorefield, who 
resisted all control by anybody (especially by 
Gilmor). 

Sheridan in his "Memoirs" says of Gilmor's 
capture: "Thus the last link between Mary- 
land and the Confederacy was carried a pris- 
oner to Winchester, whence he was sent to Fort 
Warren." The capture was effected by Colonel 
Young and twenty men of Sheridan's scouts, 
dressed in Confederate uniforms, supported by 
a mixed cavalry detachment of 300 men under 
Lieut.-Col. E. W. Whitaker, First Connecticut 
Cavalry. As an offset to this capture of Gil- 
mor, a party of 50 of his men, led by young 
Jesse McNeill and dressed in Federal uniforms, 
entered the City of Cumberland during the 
night of the 21st of February, proceeded direct 
to the hotel which was the headquarters of both 
Generals Kelley and Crook, surprising them in 
bed. Not a shot was fired and so little dis- 



244 EPILOGUE 

turbance created, that staff officers living in 
rooms adjoining those of Generals Crook and 
Kelley, were not awakened. 

The raiders remained only ten minutes in the 
town, and then hastily withdrew on the Spring- 
field and Romney road with their prisoners, 
reaching Staunton in the upper Shenandoah on 
the 24th — all efforts to intercept the party hav- 
ing failed. 

These captures were even more daringly 
made than was that of Harry Gilmor, about a 
fortnight earlier in the month, by Colonel 
Young. 

On the 27th of February, 1865, Sheridan 
started from Winchester with two divisions of 
cavalry (Custer's and Devin's) and three sec- 
tions of artillery, the whole commanded by 
Major-General Wesley Merritt. The strength 
of the force was 9,987 officers and men. 

The men carried five days' rations in haver- 
sacks, with fifteen days' additional rations of 
coffee, sugar and salt in wagons, thirty pounds 
of forage for "each horse, one wagon for each 
division headquarters, eight ambulances and an 
ammunition train. No other wagons were 
allowed except a pontoon train of eight boats. 

According to the instructions of General 
Grant, Sheridan was to destroy the Virginia 
Central Railroad, the James River canal, cap- 
ture Lynchburg, if practicable, and then join 
General Sherman wherever he might be found 
in North Carolina, or return to Winchester. 



EPILOGUE 245 

Sheridan's troops were in fine condition for 
the movement, notwithstanding the bad con- 
dition of the roads and the continued inclem- 
ency of the weather, Early's depleted command 
near Staunton promising little opposition. 

Staunton was reached in four marches and 
found abandoned by the enemy, who had with- 
drawn eastward to Waynesboro. He was 
closely followed and assaulted in position by 
Custer's Division, March 2d, who charged 
around and over the breastworks of Early's 
two brigades of infantry, dispersing them as 
well as a small body of cavalry under Rosser. 
The pursuit of the fugitives was continued as 
far as the South Fork of the Shenandoah river, 
where 1 1 pieces of artillery, with horses and 
caissons complete, 200 loaded wagons, 17 battle 
flags and 1,400 officers and men were captured. 
Generals Early, Long, Wharton, Lilley and 
Rosser, with a few men, escaped. 

From Waynesboro the prisoners and cap- 
tured artillery were sent back to Winchester 
under escort of 1,600 men, who safely reached 
their destination, although constantly harassed 
by a considerable force which Rosser had suc- 
ceeded in gathering. 

Meanwhile Custer pushed on to Charlottes- 
ville, destroying much government property on 
the way, besides the railroad and its bridges. S 
At 4 p. m. of the 3d of March he was met by 
the mayor and prominent citizens of Charlottes- 
ville, that town so long coveted by General 
Grant, who surrendered the place peaceably. 



246 EPILOGUE 

Wharton, who had gathered a few of his 
infantry at Charlottesville the day before Cus- 
ter's arrival, endeavored to find Early, but the 
latter with a small party had fled eastward 
toward Richmond. 

With this dispersal of Early's army at 
Waynesboro, campaigns in the Shenandoah 
were ended. 

Some minor scouting expeditions against 
Mosby's partisans were made from the region 
of Winchester, where Sheridan had left behind 
two or three thousand men to protect the lower 
valley. The line of the Baltimore and Ohio 
J Railroad and of the Potomac River, from Har- 
per's Ferry westward, were strongly held 
against possible raiding parties coming either 
from the direction of the country where Mosby 
continued to operate, or from the region of 
Moorefield, where Jesse McNeill still had a 
small following. 

When Sheridan moved south from Winches- 
ter, President Lincoln showed some concern 
that Washington might be uncovered from that 
direction, but he was reassured by General 
Grant, who sent Hancock to command, during 
Sheridan's absence, all the territory comprised 
within the Middle Military Division, from 
Washington west to the Ohio River. Han- 
cock's headquarters were fixed at Cumberland. 

From Charlottesville Sheridan subsequently 
moved to the White House on the Pamunkey, 
and thence to the south side of the James, 



EPILOGUE 247 

where he joined Grant and was placed by him 
on the extreme left of his army. That part of 
his instructions to capture Lynchburg and then 
strike out to join Sherman's army coming 
north through North Carolina, Sheridan found 
to be impracticable, on account of the very high 
stage of water in the James from Lynchburg 
down, all bridges having been destroyed and 
his eight pontoons being insufficient to effect a 
crossing. 



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